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Decentralisation in South African Local Government: A Critical 
Evaluation 
 
The South African local government model is considered to be decentralised in character, 
incorporating various constitutional, policy and statutory instruments to enable local 
government to achieve its constitutionally mandated developmental objectives. Yet local 
government is widely viewed as being in a state of crisis. Many municipalities are seen as 
dysfunctional and incapable of performing their duties. 
 
The hypothesis underlying this study is that the effective application of the principles of 
decentralisation, to the extent that they have been incorporated in the constitutional, 
policy and regulatory framework of local government in South Africa, is endangered by a 
lack of commitment to the concept of decentralisation by central government and by the 
failure by municipalities to implement at local level those rules, systems, mechanisms, 
powers and functions which are intended to reflect the principles of decentralisation; and 
that the achievement  of the constitutional objectives of local  government is thereby in 
turn endangered. 
 
The thesis seeks to ascertain the extent to which the principles of decentralisation are 
incorporated in the regulatory framework of local government in South Africa, and to 
which the principles of decentralisation are applied in practice. 
Accordingly, various “dimensions of decentralisation” are examined within the context of 
the local government framework, the objective being to determine the extent to which 
that framework incorporates these dimensions. In addition, the actual practice among 
municipalities regarding certain of these dimensions is examined. For the latter purpose, 
information was obtained from a sample of 37 municipalities across the country, by 
means of interviews and discussions with officials, the examination of documents, and 
















The study finds that the dimensions referred to above are reflected in the local 
government framework. It also finds that central government has shown tendencies to 
encroach, by statutory and regulatory means, on the autonomy of local government and 
thereby compromise the decentralised character of the local government framework. It 
also finds that there is a widespread failure on the part of local government to give effect 
to the critical dimensions of decentralisation by failing to observe specific requirements 
contained in the applicable framework.  
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1.1 Preliminary Remarks 
 
This study arose from the author’s involvement, which extended over a period of several 
years and covered some 50 municipalities throughout the country, in the South African 
local government environment. It became apparent at an early stage of this involvement 
that many of the municipalities with which the author had dealings had failed to 
implement significant aspects of the framework which had been established for the new 
local government dispensation. The new constitution and a battery of statutes had been 
adopted with a view to providing democratic, participative, responsive, efficient and 
effective government at local level, in accordance with a clearly decentralised model. Yet 
it was striking that there was widespread lassitude, inertia or simple indifference 
regarding the implementation of aspects of this new framework, as a result of which, it 
seemed,  the supposed benefits of a decentralised system must inevitably be limited. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which the precepts of 
decentralisation have been incorporated in South Africa’s local government framework 
and the extent to which they are applied in practice within that framework. The ultimate 
object is to enhance a  understanding of the malaise, which is more fully described later 
in this chapter, which afflicts South African local government 
 
1.2 Local Government as a Subject for this Study 
 
A study of local government may at first glance appear to be a none-too-complex task. As 
a sphere of government, it is often viewed – incorrectly, it is submitted – as a miniature 
version of national government, the main differences being that it is confined to a small 















however, local government has peculiarities that influence the way in which its processes 
are carried out, and its participants act.  
 
In the first place, local government deals with issues which are close to home. It follows 
that it is at this level that most citizens come into contact with and experience government 
and administration in any shape or form. In a geographic sense, the acts of local 
government may have limited consequences, but those consequences are often 
immediate, and touch directly the lives of citizens.
1
 It may be said, therefore, that the 
relationships established between local government and citizens are the least abstract and, 
in a sense, most intimate, of relationships between citizens and any level of government. 
 
In the second place, the tasks which local government are expected to perform are 
complex. A functional local authority performs – or should perform – a wide range of 
functions, usually greater in scope than that which a regional or national government 
department is expected to perform, and often with relatively limited resources. In this 
sense local government should be intrinsically multi-sectoral, being the only sphere of 
government that has the mandate to bring together a variety of sectoral issues within one 
development policy, programme or project (Atkinson 2002). Expectations of the ability 
of local government to meet these multi-sectoral demands are often high, and, as we shall 
see in the course of this study, sometimes unrealistic. 
 
Third, local governments tend to have complex relationships with other levels of 
government. Even in notionally decentralised systems, they are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, subject to control from, and are dependent upon, higher levels of government. On 
the other hand, local government is simultaneously answerable to its own electorate. The 
result is that this level of government is subject to multiple pressures. 
 
                                                 
1
 John Stuart Mill noted that “It is obvious, to begin with, that all business purely local – all which concerns 
only a single locality–should devolve upon the local authorities. The paving, lighting, and cleansing of the 
streets of a town, and, in ordinary circumstances, the draining of its houses, are of little consequence to any 















Local government has fulfilled an important role in society over the ages. For example, 
the ancient Greek city- state, or “polis,” provided a model of public participation to which 
modern concepts of democracy can trace their ancestry. Ancient Rome, a large city even 
by modern standards, paid great attention to the administration of local government, and 
performed a range of functions for its citizens which in many respects mirror those 
performed by modern local authorities in many countries.
2
 Today, despite obvious 
historical and current differences between systems around the globe, local government 
worldwide is said to be at the forefront of service delivery; and generally there appears to 
be a corresponding level of trust in local authorities. For example, a poll conducted in the 
United States of America in 2008 indicated that 72% of US citizens claimed to have a 
great deal or fair amount of trust in their local government, while a mere 42% said the 
same of the executive branch of the Federal Government.
3
 In a study conducted of 33 
European countries in 1999, it was found that in 14 of those countries, a clear majority of 
respondents thought it a “good thing” to give more powers to local government; in 15 
cases more respondents thought it a good thing rather than a bad thing (the balance 
indicating that they “did not mind”); whilst in only 4 cases did a clear majority think it a 
“bad thing” (van der Walle et al 2006). Van Assche and Dierickx (2007), referring to a 
number of studies, conclude that in almost all countries, trust in local government is 
stronger than trust in central government. 
 
It is therefore fair to say that the general view of local government, from a global 
perspective, is a favourable one. This study, however, is about local government in South 
Africa, which has its own peculiar challenges and issues, and which has come to be 
viewed in a less favourable light than is suggested above. 
 
                                                 
2
 Throughout much of Rome’s history, including the periods of the Republic, the Principate and the 
Empire, it was clear that the Romans were familiar with the concept of the planned city. In addition, they 
had laws, systems, functionaries and other resources for regulating and providing building controls, 
demolition, streets, cleansing, traffic, open spaces, drains, sewers, flood protection, water reticulation, fire 
control, public health, burials, markets and a host of other functions (Robinson 1991).  
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1.3 South African Local Government in Context 
 
Once regarded as the “stepchild” level of government, local government in South Africa 
moved to centre stage in recent years. Local Government in South Africa as it existed 
prior to 1994 has been described as “racist, subservient, exploitative and illegitimate in 
nature,” and “inherently subservient to the racist policies of the central state” (de Visser 
2005:58/60). The political system in which local government then operated 
“fundamentally damaged the spatial, social and economic environments in which people 
live, work, raise families and seek to fulfill their aspirations” (Ministry for Provincial 
Affairs and Constitutional Development 1998:ix). A consequence was that by the time of 
the 1994 democratic elections, South African cities were “characterised by dire housing 
and service backlogs, inequalities in municipal expenditure, the spatial anomalies 
associated with the ‘apartheid city’, profound struggles against apartheid local 
government structures, high unemployment and many poverty-stricken households” 
(Pillay et al  2006:2). 
 
With the advent of the new political dispensation in South Africa, Local Government was 
given a critical role to play in rebuilding local communities and environments, as the 
basis for a democratic, integrated, prosperous and non-racial society. There was to be a 
new developmental local government system, “committed to working with citizens, 
groups and communities to create sustainable human settlements which provide a decent 
quality of life and meet the social, economic and material needs of communities in a 
holistic way” (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 1998:ix). 
Previously, municipalities focused primarily on the regular maintenance of infrastructural 
services and social facilities. They maintained streets, water pipes, storm water drainage, 
electricity networks, parks and cemeteries. But the focus of municipalities had changed. 
They were now required to serve as the foremost development agencies within 
government as a whole (Atkinson 2002).
4
 
                                                 
4
 One of the most striking features of the role of the new model of Local government that it was to take on a 
developmental character: “Developmental local government is local government committed to working 
with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and 
















The objects of local government are stated in Section 152 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, namely: 
 
 to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
 to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
 to promote social and economic development; 
 to promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
 to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local government. 
 
Given the importance of these objects, it is hardly surprising that “the historical burden 
on the shoulders of local government is colossal and mounting” (Pieterse 2002:1). 
 
Yet, despite this burden, there was great optimism about the potential role of local 
government in addressing the many problems faced by South Africa. In his foreword to 
the White Paper on Local Government, the then Minister for Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development declared that: 
 
“South Africa has been given a rare and historic opportunity to transform 
local government and to meet the challenges of the next century…Local 
government stands at the threshold of an exciting and creative era in which it 
can and will make a powerful impact on reconstruction and development in 
our new democracy” (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 
Development 1998:v). 
 
The Constitution and the White Paper gave rise to a profusion of legislation aimed at 
promoting the constitutionally mandated objects of Local Government referred to above. 
In order to achieve these objects, the Constitution endowed local government with a 
range of powers and functions, ranging from air pollution to local tourism, to electricity 

















reticulation, to storm water management, to licensing and control of undertakings that sell 
liquor to the public, to traffic and parking. These powers and functions, according the 
White Paper, “should be exercised in a way that has a maximum impact on the social 
development of communities – in particular meeting the basic needs of the poor – and on 
the growth of the local economy” (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 
Development 1998:18). 
 
The transformation of local government in South Africa has been described as being 
nothing short of remarkable, as evidenced by the fact that it has been de-racialised, 
municipal jurisdictions have been consolidated, the notion of developmental local 
government has been introduced, and the intergovernmental fiscal system has been 
overhauled to make greater financial resources available at local municipal level 
(Atkinson 2007). It is certainly true that the scope of the proposed transformation was 
enormous. It is difficult to imagine, more than a decade after work of restructuring the 
system of local government began in earnest, quite how much planning, energy, time, 
debate and resources were required in order to attain the stated objectives.  Nonetheless, 
local government under the new dispensation was immediately faced with an astonishing 
range of challenges, some of them long-standing, some of them new, including: 
 
 the creation of larger areas of jurisdiction through the demarcation of new 
municipal boundaries;  
  an increase in service backlogs which municipalities  were tasked with 
eliminating; 
 a complete re-definition of local government roles as set out in the Constitution; 
 the devolution of several new powers and functions to local government, without 
a sufficient corresponding increase in its fiscal base; 
 new and often fraught relationships between councillors and officials;  
 new concepts of service delivery; 
 lack of capacity;  
 other institutional weaknesses, such as corrupt and nepotistic practices;  















 unrealistic expectations from other levels of government and the citizenry. 
 
One is therefore left asking the question: just how successful has the process been? 
 
1.4 A Sphere of Government in Crisis 
 
It has been said that “through the leadership of municipalities, basic service delivery has 
been extended to the marginalized to a degree that is unprecedented in South Africa’s 
history” (de Visser 2009:4). It may well be that there has been an unprecedented 
extension of basic service delivery; but if so, is this due to “the leadership of 
municipalities,” or despite it? Twelve years after the release of the White Paper, and 
remarkable though the transformation might have been, there are obvious signs that the 
optimism which was felt at the time was to a large d gree misplaced. Whilst local 
government was given the massively important task of leading the developmental crusade, 
it seems that in many cases, local government as a sphere of government cannot perform 
even the basic functions which previously constituted its reason for existence, let alone 
come to grips with its new developmental role, and has lost credibility. For example: 
 
 21% of South Africans trust their elected local governments “not at all”, whilst 
28% trust them “just a little”; 29% trust them “somewhat”; just 13% trust them “a 
lot”; and 10% “don’t know” or “haven’t heard enough”;  (Afrobarometer  
Website, Round 4 Survey Findings); 
 IDASA’s Local Governance Barometer Survey found that Civil Society 
organisations rated governance in local government at 40 out of 100 (officials and 
councillors, not surprisingly, rated it higher) (Memela et al 2008); 
 The 2007 Community Survey conducted by Stats SA found that, notwithstanding 
the fact that sanitation is a function that is clearly assigned to  local government 
by the constitution: 
o In 5 Provinces, less than 50% of households own flush toilets; 















o In the Eastern Cape, 25,2% of households had no toilet at all (Stats SA 
website); 
 For the 2007/2008 financial year, only 4 municipalities achieved unqualified5 
audit opinions from the Auditor-General; 19% of municipalities could not be 
audited because they did not submit reports (Auditor-General 2009); the number 
of unqualified reports remains at four for the 2008/2009 financial year (Auditor-
General 2010); 
 “Recent evidence shows that there is a growing perception that local government 
is unable to manage its own affairs as well as perform its powers and 
functions”(SA Local Government Briefing, May 2009: 29); 
 According to the National Taxpayers’ Union, residents and ratepayers 
associations had declared disputes with 40 municipalities over poor service 
delivery (SA Local Government Briefing, March 2009:27); 
 Rates were being withheld in protest in more than 20 of those municipalities (SA 
Local Government Briefing, March 2009:27); 
 There are repeated instances of corruption and maladministration in 
municipalities, and perceptions of corruption are overwhelming – the 
Afrobarometer survey indicated that 72% of respondents believed that, some, 
most or all of local government councillors are involved in corruption;  
 Municipalities across the country owe various water boards more than R 1,5 
billion in arrears for bulk water supplies (Cape Times, 16 September 2010); 
 According to the National Treasury, municipalities countrywide underspent their 
budgets by 9.1% in the 2008/9 financial year (Cape Times, 1 September 2010); 
 Community protests against poor service delivery have become a constant feature 
of South African life, starting in 2004
6
 and continuing up to the time of writing. 
 
                                                 
5
 “Unqualified” in the sense that there were no “other matters.” See Chapter 12 for a discussion on audit 
opinions of the Auditor-General 
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The litany of local government failures seems endless,
7
 and it was perhaps inevitable that 
the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, within whose brief local 
government falls, was moved finally  to acknowledge in a speech delivered to the South 
African Local Government Association conference on 10 June 2009 that many of the 
country’s 283 municipalities were in a “state of paralysis and dysfunction”; and that  
local government “is a sector that is perceived to be incompetent, disorganised and 




What went wrong?Authors and researchers have suggested a number of possible causes, 
including the lack of funding, lack of social capital,
9
 and poor institutional design and 
lack of capacity.
10
 All of these (and other) explanations are no doubt valid to a greater or 
                                                 
7
 Tapscott sums up the position by noting that there is a “lack of trust... a general unwillingness to pay taxes 
or tariffs into municipal coffers or to participate in the process of local governance. As a consequence of 
this state of affairs local councils lack popular support and legitimacy. At the same time, they are also able 
to operate with limited public accountability. In this context, corruption has become endemic, public funds 
are frequently misappropriated, and service delivery is generally poor or non-existent. This cycle leads to 




 Reported in the SA Local Government Briefing, June 2009:15. Strangely enough, the same minister told 
Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs some sixteen months 
later  that “Saying municipalities is dysfunctional is incorrect…Municipalities do have problems, but they 
are functional.” (Reported in the Cape Argus, 20 October 2010). It is difficult to imagine what occurred in 
the local government sphere in those intervening sixteen months to cause the minister to change his opinion 
so drastically.  
 
9
 Social capital is the set of “informal rules, norms, and long-term relationships that facilitate coordinated 
action and enable people to undertake cooperative ventures for mutual advantage.” (World Bank 
1997:114).  “The complex ways in which these sectors of civil society [including business and industry, 
voluntary and community groups, and non-governmental from environmental, social and economic arenas] 
build and maintain capacity (economic, social and mutual support) for action to promote the needs of 
different groups is encompassed in the concept of social capital…the concept can be broadly defined as : 
‘those networks and assets that facilitate the education, coordination and cooperation of citizens for mutual 
benefit’”(Evans 2005:14). The idea of social capital has become broadly used, having emerged during the 
1980’s and having been famously popularised by Putnam (1993) in the following decade.  
 
10
 “It has become clear that many local authorities lack the capacity to initiate or implement developmental 
programmes. This lack of capacity has surfaced most visibly in the inability of many local authorities to 
survive financially… Deeper analysis, however, suggests that the weaknesses of local authorities are deeper 
than financial management. Many councillors are totally inexperienced in local government, party-political 
conflict is much more pronounced in local government, many councils have not established co-operative 
relationships with their officials, other municipalities have become administratively bloated, or key 
administrative staff have vacated their posts. At the same time, local authorities have to address a much 
greater range of issues than municipalities did in the past.”(Atkinson 2001:534). It is worth noting that 
















lesser extent. The present study will not attempt to disprove one in favour of another, it 
being accepted that each of these plays some role, however great or small, in explaining 
the phenomenon described above.  
 
The last of these explanations, namely, that relating to institutional design and lack of 
capacity is, however, of particular interest for present purposes. Some authors who favour 
this view suggest that institutional mechanisms in the new constitution and the resulting 
structure of governance constitute serious impediments to addressing the issues of 
economic development and service delivery. Others suggest that the problem lies in the 
varying degrees of managerial competence or incompetence and a general lack of skills 
throughout the public service sector (Koelble & LiPuma 2008). One such author 
(Atkinson 2007) places much of the blame for the failure of municipal government to 
supply services on the failure by national government to put in place mechanisms for 
both oversight and assistance by national to local level government, and the 
organisational incompetence of municipal government. 
 
Olowu and Wunsch (2004) describe and contrast the idealised process by which local 
governance emerges from decentralisation reforms, on the one hand, and the frequently 
encountered actual experience of decentralisation reforms, on the other: 
 
 In the idealised process, we find (i) the political elite choosing to embark on the 
decentralisation process, (ii) followed by the necessary reforms being defined and 
promulgated, (iii) which leads to a redistribution of authority, resources and 
accountability; (iv)  from this emerge decision-making institutions, broadened 
public participation, and greater accountability. As a result, we see a (v) 
reinforcement of local support for the improved system, and it can fairly be said 
that at that point, (vii) local governance is a “going concern.” 
 In the frequent actual experience, on the other hand, (i) the elite announce 
decentralisation reforms; (ii) some reforms are then defined and promulgated; (iii) 
redistribution of authority, resources and accountability to localities is announced; 















effective control; resources are retained or captured by central actors; resources 
are consumed paying for salaries; local councils are ineffective because of low 
levels of education, poor organisation, infrequent meetings, internal division and 
executive dominance; local institutions are designed to maintain central control; 
and /or local elites dominate local governance from behind the scenes; (v) this 
results in poor performance and non-accountability, which discourages local 
support; (vi) local governance remains weak in consequence; and (vii) 
recentralisation occurs. 
 
The South African experience does not fit precisely either of the above two scenarios 
described by Olowu and Wunsch. Certainly, as has been shown time and again, South 
African local government is marked by poor performance and lack of accountability, of 
the kind described in the “actual experience” above. At the same time, however, South 
Africa has adopted a framework which goes far beyond the mere definition and 
promulgation of some reforms and the announcement of redistribution of authority, 
resources and accountability. It is a framework which enjoys constitutional authority and 
which is supported by a comprehensive range of legislative measures, most of which by 
now have been in force for a considerable time. Yet in addition to the patterns which 
emerge as described in the “actual experience” described above, South Africa’s attempt 
to achieve good local governance has, despite its having an impressive framework, been 
bedevilled by a weak commitment to the precepts of decentralisation both at central and 
local government level. 
 
1.5 Hypothesis, Research Objectives and Research Questions 
 
Having regard to the discussion contained in the previous section, the hypothesis 
underlying this study is therefore that the effective application of the principles of 
decentralisation, to the extent that they have been incorporated in the constitutional, 
policy and regulatory framework of local government in South Africa, is endangered by a 
lack of commitment to the concept of decentralisation by central government and by the 















powers and functions which are intended to reflect those principles of decentralisation; 
and that the achievement of the constitutional objectives of local government is thereby in 
turn endangered. 
 
The objective of the proposed research is twofold, namely: 
 
 To examine and determine the extent to which the principles of decentralisation 
have been incorporated and supported in the constitutional, policy and regulatory 
framework of  South African Local Government; and 
 To examine and determine the extent to which the principles of decentralisation 
are applied by local government in practice within this framework. 
It follows that two corresponding research questions stand to be answered, namely: 
 
 To what extent are the principles of decentralisation incorporated and supported in 
the regulatory framework of Local Government in South Africa? and 
 To what extent are the principles of decentralisation applied in practice within this 
framework? 
 
The point of departure of this study is that the proper application of institutional and 
operational rules provided by the decentralised model of local governance which has 
been adopted in South Africa is essential in order to avoid the failure of policy and the 
weakening of local governance.
11
 The focus is on the extent to which the principles of 
decentralisation are incorporated in the South African local government framework and 
the manner in and extent to which they are applied in practice. As Olowu and Wunsch 
(2004) point out, legal acts providing for decentralisation are among the prerequisites to 
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 A long-standing school of thought emphasises institutional design as a basis for explaining institutional 
performance. This tradition assumed that viable government depended largely on the arrangement of its 
formal parts. The experience of several democratic experiments during the inter-war years, however, 
showed that “painstaking design did not ensure good performance” (Putnam 2003:10). This is undoubtedly 
correct; it is, however, submitted that whilst the existence of the rules comprising such design does not 
guarantee success, without them, and without their being properly implemented, there is no prospect of 
















local governance, but do not in themselves achieve it. But, it is submitted, if those acts 
are improperly applied or ignored, then the process will have failed even before it has 
scarcely begun, resulting in the doubtless unanticipated consequences of the kind 
described above. 
 
This study examines the constitutional, policy, statutory and procedural reforms which 
are intended to give effect to the notions of decentralisation in local government in South 
Africa. The framework which is thereby created consists of a multitude of systems, 
platforms and institutions which are intended to enable a municipal administration to 
function.  The existence of those reforms and the resultant framework do not 
automatically result in effective local governance. There are other key intervening factors 
which are necessary to translate those reforms into effective local governance – such as 
effective local autonomy and authority, adequacy of resources, effective local institutions 
and accountable political processes (Olowu & Wunsch 2004). Nonetheless the adoption 
and implementation of those reforms at local government level is a critical element in 
achieving the objective of effective local governance within a decentralised model. This 
study aims to describe the manner and extent to which those reforms have been adopted 
in the South African local government framework, and to describe the extent to which 
they have been applied in practice in the local government environment. 
 
1.6 Justification for this Research 
 
As was indicated above, a massively important responsibility has been placed on South 
African local government, but there are undeniable indications that it is failing in its duty 
of fulfilling this responsibility.  
 
The consequences of failure are profound, and serious efforts to understand the causes of 
such failure should be encouraged. This research is timely in that local government in 
South Africa is at a crossroads. 2009 and 2010 were particularly trying years for South 
African local government in general, with, as we have seen, a litany of failures coming to 















in the local government sphere. In response to these problems, the Cabinet approved a 
turnaround strategy for local government in December 2009.  Crucial issues are whether 
government’s analysis of the challenges facing local government is accurate, and whether 
its response to those challenges is appropriate. 
 
It is important, therefore, to undertake a close examination of the framework which 
guides local government, and how that framework is applied in practice, in order to better 
understand the nature of the difficulties this level of government faces in order to be able 
to propose workable solutions. It is intended that the present research should promote an 
understanding of the difficulties facing local government and facilitate the development 
of solutions. It is also intended that in the process, the research should contribute towards 
the fields of governance, public administration, general management and policy 
development. For this purpose, 37 municipalities across the country were examined in the 




1.7 Organisation of Study 
 
This study is divided into the following chapters: 
 
 Chapter 1: Introduction: The present chapter introduces the subject, places the 
issues in context, sets out the justification for the research, and defines the 
research objectives and the scope of the study. 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review:  Decentralisation- The Concept and its Emergence: 
The literature concerning decentralisation as a global phenomenon is reviewed in 
this chapter. It examines the concept of decentralisation, its origins and its rise, as 
well as the types and levels of decentralisation.  
 Chapter 3: Literature Review: Decentralisation - Objectives and Obstacles:  This 
chapter provides a review of the literature on decentralisation insofar as it relates 
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to the objectives which a decentralised system is intended to achieve, and the 
obstacles which confront the achievement of those objectives. 
 Chapter 4: The South African Local Government Framework: The recent history 
of local government in South Africa is traced in this chapter, as are the 
constitutional, policy and statutory elements which make up the current local 
government framework in South Africa.  
 Chapter 5: Methodology and Related Matters: The methodology employed in this 
research is discussed in this chapter. 
 Chapter 6: Dimensions of Decentralisation: A Basis for Evaluation: The aim of 
this chapter is to extract the essential dimensions of decentralisation in order to 
provide a basis for evaluating the extent to which decentralisation is incorporated 
in the South African local government framework. 
 Chapter 7: Evaluation: Constitutional Security, Size, Democratic Process and 
Intergovernmental Relations: This chapter presents an evaluation of the  
following dimensions of decentralisation as contained the South African Local 
government framework, namely, constitutional security, size, democratic process 
and intergovernmental relations. 
 Chapter 8: Evaluation: Executive Structure and Administrative Authority: An 
evaluation of the local government framework in the context of dimensions of 
executive structure and administrative authority is provided in this chapter. It also 
examines the extent to which systems aimed at enhancing executive authority are 
applied in practice in municipalities. 
 Chapter 9: Evaluation: Institutional Capacity:  This chapter evaluates the 
incorporation and application of the dimension of institutional capacity in the 
South African local government framework, and examines the extent to which 
relevant systems provided for by statute are applied in practice at local 
government level. 
 Chapter 10: Evaluation: Public Participation:  This chapter evaluates the 
incorporation and application of the dimension of public participation in the South 
African local government framework, and examines the extent to which relevant 















 Chapter 11: Evaluation: Jurisdictional Scope and Legislative Authority: This 
chapter evaluates the incorporation of the dimensions of jurisdictional scope - that 
is, the scope of the power and functions exercised by a municipality - and 
legislative authority. It also examines the extent to which municipalities exercise 
their jurisdictional scope and legislative authority in practice. 
 Chapter 12: Evaluation: Fiscal Dimensions:  The incorporation and application 
of fiscal dimensions of decentralisation in the South African local government 
framework, namely, revenue raising authority and revenue sharing, are examined 
in this chapter. Also examined are the extent to which municipalities apply 
statutory systems for enforcing their revenue raising authority, and the extent to 
which they are reliant on revenue sharing with national government. Finally, it 
examines the manner in financial resources are managed in local government. 
 Chapter 13: Government’s Response to the Crisis in Local Government: This 
chapter examines the response of the national government to the crisis in South 
African Local Government, and considers the prospects of success of that 
response. 
 Chapter 14: Conclusion: This chapter considers the principal conclusions to be 





















2.1.1 The State of the Literature 
 
There exists a vast body of literature on the subject of decentralisation, yet it has been 
described as being “far from exhilarating” (Manor 2006:283). Schneider (2006), on the 
other hand, states that although the literature on decentralisation is rich and varied it is, at 
the same time, confused, and provides a home to contradictory hypotheses; as a result, we 
know very little definitively. In addition, as Manor (1999) points out, much of the 
literature on decentralisation is the work of economists and specialists in public 
administration, and there is a tendency on their part to underemphasise and misperceive 
the motivations and actions of politicians, and the political (rather than the administrative 




Literature on the subject until ecently also tended to be - but was not exclusively so - 
rather unquestioning as to the merits of decentralisation. Saito (2008) suggests that 
excessive expectations and uncritical approval of decentralisation have made critical 
scrutiny of decentralisation very difficult; and it is only more recently that more realistic 
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 See also Heller (2001) who identifies two “diametrically opposed transformative visions” in the 
decentralisation debate, namely, that of the technocrats whose view is “formed by an unbounded faith in the 
ability of experts to apprehend and transform the world” and that of the “anarchocommunitarians” who 
argue that “the advent of liberal democracy does little to change the overly centralized and elite-controlled 
character of post-colonial states” (135). 
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2.1.2 Objective and Scope of this Chapter 
 
For the sake of convenience, the literature review on decentralisation is divided into two 
chapters. The present chapter has the  principal objectives of presenting a review of the 
literature so as to provide a broad understanding of the concept of decentralisation, with 
particular reference to the definition of decentralisation, and the types and levels of 
decentralisation, as well as the motives behind decentralisation. The next chapter will deal 
with the objects of decentralisation and the obstacles its implementation faces. 
 
2.2 What is Decentralisation? 
 
2.2.1 A General Definition 
 
Treisman (2007) writes that people define centralisation and decentralisation in many 
different ways, with the result that any two scholars or policy makers who debate the 
subject will usually have different things in mind. Perhaps this is something of an 
exaggeration, but it is certainly true that there are many concepts of what constitutes 
decentralisation. It would be tempting to list them, but a better purpose would be served 
by seeking a practical, workmanlike definition of the concept. The United Nations 
proposes the following definition: 
 
“Decentralization is commonly regarded as a process through which powers, 
functions, responsibilities and resources are transferred from central to local 
government and/or other decentralized entities. In practical terms, 
decentralisation is a process of striking a balance between the claims of the 
periphery and the demands of the centre. Decentralization, when 
appropriately structured, provides an arrangement through which critical 
issues (such as those of national unity and indivisibility, how to safeguard 




















This definition is useful because, amongst other reasons, it recognises the importance of 
the transfer of powers, functions and resources from one level of government to another. 
At the very heart of the debate about decentralisation, after all, is the relationship between 
the various levels of government (Devas and Delay 2006),
16
 and the balance of power 
between those levels.
17  
The definition also recognises common basic objectives of 
decentralisation, and importantly, it recognises that it is a process of reforms and not 
merely a description of the political or fiscal systems in place in a given state at any one 
time. 
 
Whilst this definition is useful enough, a difficulty arises in that writers generally 
distinguish between three types of decentralisation – administrative decentralisation, 
fiscal decentralisation and political decentralisation – and here, unfortunately, the matter 
is not so easily resolved by reference to a convenient universal definition, and a 
comparison of some of the different definitions cannot be avoided. The three types of 
decentralisation are considered in greater detail in subsections 2.2.2 to 2.2.4 below. 
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 This definition is contai ed in the UN’s on-line Glossary on Governance and Public Administration. The 
Glossary was developed following the recommendations made at the Seventh Session of the United Nations 
Committee of Experts in Public Administration . See Bibliography for website details. 
 
16
  See also Saito: “...decentralization is a process to redefine the roles and responsibilities of the central and 
local governments... (it is) essentially a political process.” (2008:284); and  Schneider: “By redrawing the 
political–administrative division of the state, decentralisation changes the geographical boundaries of 
political contestation, alters the relative power of different actors, and changes the location of government 
interaction with society. The result is a change in the issues that are likely to appear on the agenda and the 
interests that are likely to prevail in political competition” (2006:344-345). 
 
17
 A useful definition of the intergovernmental balance of power is provided by Falleti, who refers to it as 
“the relative power or degree of autonomy of subnational officials with regard to national officials. 
Intergovernmental power is dependent on (1) economic resources, which enhance the capacity of political 
actors to pursue their desired courses of action; (2) legal authority, which sets the institutional limit that 
economic resources can reach; and (3) organizational capacities, which facilitate coordination at each level 















2.2.2 Administrative Decentralisation 
 
Falleti (2005) defines administrative decentralisation as the set of policies that transfer the 
administration and delivery of social services such as education, health, social welfare, or 
housing to sub-national governments. It may entail the devolution of decision-making 
authority over these policies, but this is not a necessary condition.
18
 
By contrast, O’Dwyer and Ziblatt (2006) define it in terms of the degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by sub-national levels of government, and more specifically, in terms of the 
“control exercised over local revenue.” The higher the percentage of local revenues that 
comes from locally-raised taxes, the higher the level of administrative decentralisation 
since, of all forms of revenue, taxes offer sub-national governments the greatest 
autonomy in policy making. Grants and loans offer less autonomy, and discretionary 




 Administrative decentralisation is in turn defined by Schneider (2006) as the process of 
granting local jurisdictions autonomy from central control. This autonomy includes 
general policy-making authority and personnel control, as well as control over what is 
done with public finances. Treisman (2007), on the other hand, maintains that 
administrative decentralisation exists when at least one policy is implemented not by the 
central government but by locally based agents appointed by and subordinate to the 
central government. 
 
Manor (1999) equates administrative decentralisation with deconcentration, which refers 
to the dispersal of agents of higher levels government into lower level arenas.
20
 The terms 
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 See Falleti 2005:329. 
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 See O’Dwyer and Ziblatt 2006:341. 
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 Manor emphasises that when deconcentration occurs in isolation, or when it occurs together with fiscal 
decentralisation but without democratisation, it enables central authority to penetrate more effectively into 
those arenas without giving up any authority. “In such circumstances, it tends in practice to constitute 





















2.2.3 Fiscal Decentralisation 
 
Various definitions have been proposed for fiscal decentralisation.  Falleti (2005) defines 
it as the set of policies designed to increase the revenues or fiscal autonomy of sub-
national governments. Fiscal decentralisation policies can assume different institutional 
forms such as an increase of transfers from the central government, the creation of new 
sub-national taxes, or the delegation of tax authority that was previously national. 
 
Taking a somewhat different approach, O’Dwyer and Ziblatt (2006) define fiscal 
decentralisation in terms of sub-national government expenditures as a percentage of total 
government expenditures. Expenditures are all cash outlays made by a given level of 
government, and revenues include all cash inflows to sub-national governments, 
including taxes, loans and grants. The larger the percentage of revenues and expenditures 
passing through sub-national governments, the greater the level of fiscal decentralisation. 
 
According to Schneider (2006), fiscal decentralisation concerns the proportion of fiscal 
impact at levels other than the central government. This impact can be measured in 
several ways, often in terms of stabilisation, allocation and distribution. Stabilisation 
policy involves governments injecting money into the economy (or withdrawing it) to 
influence the overall level of economic activity. Allocation policy directs resources 
towards one activity or another. Distribution policy governs the channelling of wealth to a 
particular group, region or set of individuals. Fiscal decentralisation refers to the role of 
sub-national units in these activities.  
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 See Manor 1999:5. Deconcentration is, however, often treated by other authors as a different issue to 
administrative decentralisation, and is viewed as a level of decentralisation rather than a type of 
















Manor (1999) views fiscal decentralisation as referring to downward fiscal transfers, by 
which higher levels in a system cede influence over budgets and financial decisions at 
lower levels. This authority may pass to deconcentrated bureaucrats who are accountable 
only to superiors at higher levels, or to unelected appointees selected from higher up. 
 
According to Treisman (2007), fiscal decentralisation requires the existence of 
“decisionmaking decentralisation” on tax or expenditure issues and sub-national 
governments being accountable for a large share of total government revenues or 
spending. 
 
2.2.4 Political Decentralisation 
 
As is the case with administrative and fiscal decentralisation, numerous definitions of 
political decentralisation have been suggested by various writers. Falletti (2005) defines 
political decentralisation as the set of constitutional amendments and electoral reforms 
designed to provide for the representation of sub-national polities. In this view, political 
decentralisation policies are designed to devolve political authority or electoral capacities 
to sub-national actors.  
 
According to the definition provided by O’Dwyer and Ziblatt (2006), political 
decentralisation measures the importance of municipal and provincial elections.
 
Schneider 
(2006) states somewhat more comprehensively that political decentralisation focuses on 
conducting political activities such as participation, organisation, elections and 
representation at the local level as opposed to the national level. According to Schneider, 
decentralised political systems are those in which political actors and issues are 
significant at the local level and at least partially independent from those at the national 
level. Under politically decentralised systems, citizens define interests and form identities 
on the basis of local concerns, and organisations such as parties and social movements 
















Treisman (2007) divides political decentralisation into three sub-types. What he calls 
“decisionmaking” decentralisation” implies that at least one sub-national tier of 
government has exclusive authority to make decisions on at least one policy issue. 
“Appointment decentralisation” implies that government officials at one or more sub-
national tiers are selected by local residents, independent of higher levels of government. 
“Constitutional decentralisation” occurs when sub-national governments or their 
representatives have a formal right to participate (in some non-trivial way) in central 
policymaking. 
 
Finally, Kauzya (2007) states that political decentralisation to refers to either or both of 
the following: (i) Transferring the power of selecting political leadership and 
representatives from central governments to local governments, and (ii) transferring the 
power and authority for making socio-politico-economic decisions from central 
governments to local governments and communities. 
 
2.2.5 Proposed Definitions of the Types of Decentralisation 
 
As was seen  above, whilst defining decentralisation in general terms is in itself easy 
enough, the difficulty lies with understanding what is meant by the various types, or sub-
categories,  of decentralisation, for which several (sometimes confusing) definitions have 
been provided. The following are therefore offered as workable definitions to be used for 
purposes of this study: 
 
 Administrative decentralisation is the process whereby the authority to administer and 
execute powers and functions (and by implication, the responsibility to deliver 
services) is transferred from national to sub-national government, thereby  resulting in 
deconcentration of powers; 
 Fiscal decentralisation is the process whereby revenues of the central government, and 
















 Political decentralisation is the process whereby sub-national governments, elected by 
local participants, are established within a constitutional framework and granted 
political power and authority to govern over particular geographical areas. In short, it 
is the transfer (whether whole or partial) of political power and authority from central 
to sub-national governments, and therefore involves the balancing of the exercise of 
power between various levels of government. 
 
2.3 Levels of Decentralisation  
 
2.3.1 Three Broad Levels  
 
 In Section 2.2, we examined the various types of decentralisation. The purpose of this 
section is to consider briefly the various levels of decentralisation. 
 
According to Oxhorn (2009), decentralisation consists fundamentally of the transfer of 
power by the central state to sub-national levels of government. It is closely linked to the 
concept of subsidiarity, according to which functions are devolved to the lowest level of 
social order that is capable of completing them (Work 2002).  It is essentially a process of 
vertical transfer that can be understood in terms of three broad levels: deconcentration, 
delegation and devolution. All three of them reflect varying levels of power transferred 
from the centre to sub-national authorities as a result of reforms in the central state 
apparatus. Deconcentration involves the least amount of autonomy, delegation slightly 
more, and devolution the most. The distinction between the three levels of 
decentralisation can perhaps conveniently be summed up as follows: deconcentration 
involves a bureaucratic, hierarchical relationship; delegation involves a contractual 
relationship; and devolution involves an arm’s length relationship (Schneider 2006).
22
 The 
three levels are discussed in subsections 2.3.2 to 2.3.4 below. 
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 Schneider (2006) suggests that these levels should be viewed as “break-points along a continuum of 




















The first level, deconcentration, occurs when a central government disperses 
responsibility for a policy to its local offices. This changes the spatial and geographical 
distribution of authority, but does not significantly change the autonomy of the entity to 
which the authority is given. Under such arrangements, the central government retains 
authority over the local office and exercises that authority through the hierarchical 
channels of the central bureaucracy (Schneider 2006). The central government designs a 
structure that enables its agents to work close to the local people in field units or agencies 
of central government (Kauzya 2007). Deconcentration may be said to reflect the 
decentralisation of policy administration or implementation, while policy continues to be 
made at central level (Oxhorn 2009).  Deconcentration has been described as the first step 




At the second level, delegation, policy responsibility is transferred to local governments 
or semi-autonomous organisation  which are not controlled by the central government but 
remain accountable to it (Schneider 2006; Kauzya 2007). The central state in effect 
reserves control over key aspects of policy (Oxhorn: 2009).  The distinguishing feature is 
that in delegation, the central government must exercise its control through the 




The third level, devolution, is the process of transferring decision-making and 
implementation power functions, responsibilities and resources to legally constituted local 


















 It has also been described as the arrangement whereby the 
central government allows quasi-autonomous local units of government to exercise power 
and control over the policy responsibility being transferred (Schneider 2006).
24
 “The local 
unit is only accountable to the central government in so far as the central government can 
impose its will by threatening to withhold resources or responsibility that the local unit 
needs”(Schneider 2006:349). Oxhorn (2009) states that devolution necessarily implies 
that a significant measure of financial autonomy will accompany the process. 
 
2.4  The Decentralisation Phenomenon 
 
2.4.1 An Article of Faith, a Fashion of Our Times 
 
 Decentralisation has become one of the most predominant themes in the field of 
governance in recent years. There has been an overwhelming move towards the 
decentralisation of government by the granting of new powers, functions and resources to 
local and regional governments, something which has brought sub-national government 
to the forefront of politics (Faletti 2005). It has become a cornerstone of a wide range of 
policies promoting state reform, more effective service delivery and greater levels of 
democratisation through increased opportunities for citizen participation (Oxhorn 2009).  
Depending on one’s viewpoint, decentralisation might be seen as “an article of faith” 
(Heller 2001:132) or “one of the fashions of our times” (Manor 2006: 284) or “a new 
mantra for policymakers and academics alike that seems to transcend ideology and 
academic discipline” (Oxhorn 2009:2). 
Manor, writing in 1999, noted that  
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 Kauzya (2007) adds a fourth level, namely, delocalization, which is the special distribution of central 




 “The devolution category … is often defined as decentralisation to democratically elected local bodies. 
Such a definition includes patterns of representation in the administrative dimension. This shifts focus, 
however, and introduces aspects not associated with administrative autonomy. Representation deserves 
attention in its own right, and belongs appropriately to the… dimension (of) political decentralisation” 
















“(Decentralization) is being considered or attempted in an astonishing 
diversity of developing and transitional countries – by solvent and insolvent 
regimes, by democracies (both mature and emergent) and autocracies, by 
regimes making the transition to democracy and by others seeking to avoid 
that transition, by regimes with various colonial inheritances and by those 
with none. It is being attempted where civil society is strong, and where it is 
weak. It appeals to people of the left, the center and the right, and to groups 
which disagree with each other on a number of other issues” (Manor 1999:1). 
 
2.4.2 Earlier Views on Centralisation and Decentralisation 
 
Multi-tier states have been common since ancient times, although the manner in which 
powers and functions were divided between the tiers does not seem then to have been a 
subject of much interest. Real interest in the functions of government, and how they were 
exercised, appears to have arisen during the Enlightenment, to which many of today’s 
arguments in favour of or against decentralisation may be traced (Treisman 2007).  
Decentralisation has not always been in vogue, even in circles where one might have 
thought that it would naturally enjoy favour. For example, some of the key figures who 
played a role in the founding of the United States of America were clearly of libertarian 
persuasion but were opposed to the notion of decentralisation.
25
 In continental Europe, 
during the 19
th
 century, the highly-centralised French model was considered to be the 
“latest word in administrative science” (Putnam 2003:18).
26
Of course, proponents of 
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 Included in this number were John Knox, (1750-1806) Revolutionary War General and later US 
Secretary of War; Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804), a Revolutionary War figure and first Secretary of the 
US Treasury; James Madison (1757-1836), fourth President of the United States of America and principal 
drafter of the US Constitution; and John Jay (1745-1829), a Revolutionary War figure and first Chief 
Justice of the United States. Hamilton, aided by Madison and Jay, had as his brainchild the Federalist, 
which consisted of a series of 85 papers published in the New York Independent Journal in 1787 and 1788.  
It was intended to persuade the voters of New York State to ratify the new constitution of the United States, 
which had been drafted that same year, and was strongly biased towards the centralised state. The views 
expressed in the Federalist would, by contrast, have been diametrically opposed to those of Madison’s 
frequent correspondent and contemporary, Thomas Jefferson, third President of the United States of 
America and principal author of the US Declaration of Independence, who was a staunch believer in a 
strictly limited federal government. Regarding the Federalist, see Kramnick (1987). 
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 Putnam relates that when the Italian state was proclaimed in 1860, despite a few calls for the 















decentralisation were not silent either, with the likes of John Stuart Mill expressing 




2.4.3 Late- and Post- Colonial Period 
 
Particularly in British colonies, during the late colonial period a system of decentralised 
local government had emerged and in many respects had flourished. It reflected a number 
of key attributes, such as a tradition of elected councils, a well-defined tax system, 
involvement of local government in a range of infrastructural services (supported by grant 
systems from central government), and involvement by local government in capital 
investment and community development activities (Olowu and Wunsch 2004). Post-
independence leaders sought, however, to dismantle this arrangement, and there emerged 
a tendency towards centralisation. This may be attributed to several causes. The success 
achieved by victorious nations in the Second World War by centralising power and 
resources lent attraction to the notion of centralisation. Subsequent reconstruction - 
centrally guided - of states which had fared less well in the war added to the reputation of 
centralised systems being able to get things done (Manor 1999). During the 1950s and 
1960s, economies which were managed along both Keynesian and Leninist lines made 
spectacular advances, and this tended to bolster the belief in the centralised state. The 
result was that for years after the Second World War, centralisation was the guiding 
principle for policy initiatives around the world (Oxhorn 2004). 
                                                                                                                                                 
was the necessary remedy for the weak integration of the state. “The majority of the makers of modern Italy 
(like most of their counterparts in the emerging states of today’s third world) insisted that decentralisation 
was incompatible with prosperity and progress” (2003:18). 
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 Mill declared that “It is but a small portion of the public business of a country which can be well done or 
safely attempted by the central authorities; and even in our own government, the least centralized in Europe, 
the legislative portion at least of the governing body busies itself far too much with local affairs, employing 
the supreme power of the State in cutting small knots which there ought to be other and better means of 
untying. The enormous amount of private business which takes up the time of Parliament and the thoughts 
of its individual members, distracting them from the proper occupations of the great council of the nation, 
















This optimistic view on centralisation was shared in many regimes in Latin America, 
Africa and Asia, where the idea enjoyed great popularity. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, the 
Statist model was adopted or aimed for by virtually all developing countries (Batley 
2006). In Africa and Asia, in particular, welfare infrastructures burgeoned, the economic 
boom of the 1950’s produced enormous revenues, and there was a widespread increase in 
state expenditures. Most of the new ruling parties “had just succeeded in what were 
usually highly centralized campaigns for self-rule...and these triumphs naturally inclined 
the new leaders to the view that further great accomplishments were likely, if they could 
sustain unified efforts by centralized, homogenising means” (Manor 1999:18). 
Decentralised local governments were seen as irritants or even obstacles to the building of 
powerful states (Olowu and Wunsch  2004). A role was also played by donor agencies 
which were eager to deal with centralised regimes, because they “could get things done 
quickly” (Manor 1999:21). In addition, aid programmes and academic advisers promoted 
the idea of the state bureaucracy as the lead agent for the transition to “modernisation,” 
and aid agencies and multilateral institutions favoured large scale industrial and 
agricultural development projects which required government involvement (Batley 2006).  
The result was that centralised governance was generally viewed in a favourable light; 
something which no doubt was welcomed by politicians who “everywhere strive to 
enhance their power, and those who stand at the apex of any political system therefore 
tend toward centralization.”  (Manor 1999:13).  
But a series of problems eventually overtook centralised regimes. First, the demand for 
benefits from governments outstripped their capacity to respond. Second, slow (or no) 
economic growth took a heavy toll on that capacity. Third, within some of those systems, 
middle-level political activists began pocketing huge proportions of the resources passed 
to them. Fourth, senior leaders in many nations went to excess in centralising power in 
ways that eroded the institutional strength and autonomy of many of these systems. 
















Whilst it took time for the limits of centralised governance or commandism to be 
recognised in less developed countries, by the 1970s, they became quite apparent. 
Autocratic regimes were particularly dependent on economic performance to sustain their 
legitimacy and faced particularly severe difficulties such as inflation, debt burdens, and 
little or no economic growth. There developed “the widespread but rather vague sense in 
many nations that centralized structures had fallen well short of adequacy” (Manor 
1999:24). 
The stage was set for the wave of decentralisation which occurred in the 1980’s. The next 
sub-section discusses the motives which impelled this wave.  
 
2.4.4 The Rise of Decentralisation: A Variety of Causes 
 
Manor (1999) argues that the vague but widespread notion that centralised governance 
had failed allowed the idea of decentralisation to appeal to a diversity of regimes facing a 
variety of problems, and made decentralisation attractive to politicians with differing 
motives. But leaders were offered few clear and specific guides to help them choose 
particular forms of decentralisation. As a result, the processes which then developed in 
various countries varied considerably. Furthermore, would-be decentralisers had little or 
no empirical evidence to guide them as to what decentralisation was and was not capable 
of achieving, or what results might flow from the application of specific types of 
decentralisation. As a result, they were free to act on a variety of motives, and it seems 
that most decentralisers have operated with mixed motives and objectives, having “often 
proceeded on the basis both of statesmanlike considerations, seeking the genuine 
empowerment of groups at lower levels, and of hard-nosed calculations of self-interest” 
(Manor 1999:36-37).  
A factor which had a marked effect on the promotion of decentralisation is the great 
advance in communications which occurred in the 1980’s and 1990’s, and which led to 















that it entailed. Once a few leaders began experimenting with decentralisation, these 
advances promoted the spread of the concept and prompted others to learn about and seek 
to replicate their efforts. These changes were, however, disseminated around the world so 
rapidly that decentralisation became popular before the emergence of any evidence to 
support the existence of its supposed benefits. “In other words, decisions to decentralize 
were made not because its utility had been proven, but because it appeared possible that it 
could help them to cope with the loss of popular confidence in the centralized state” 
(Manor 1999:33).  To some extent, also, the simple fact that the concept was fashionable 
may have contributed to its spread, enthusiastically abetted by consultants and advisors 
who had vested interests in ensuring that this occurred.
28
  
It seems clear, in any event, that no single cause triggered decisions (which were 
ultimately of a political nature)
29
 to decentralise. As was noted earlier, decentralisation 
has been attempted by a great diversity of regimes, which also suggests that a diversity of 
influences has been at work, and that decentralisation has been undertaken for a variety of 
motives and with a variety of goals in mind (Manor 1999). 
Several writers have added their views as to what drives decentralisation. Included 
amongst them are Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006), Hiskey and Seligson (2003), Nickson, 
(2006), Alam (2006), Devas and Delay (2006), Saito (2008), and Shah and Thompson 
(2004). They mostly agree that these motives are many and varied, although there is some 
debate as to the actual role played by some of these purported motives. 
 It would be futile to list all of the motives which each of them suggests; the following, 
however, appear to be amongst the most commonly cited or significant amongst them: 
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 A characteristic sequence attending a fad or fashion is an initial enthusiasm, eagerly promoted by gurus, 
followed by a relatively brief period of prominence and acceptability, which in turn is followed by a 
growing realisation that the promise is unlikely to be fulfilled, and then its eventual consignment to 
obscurity, leaving behind perhaps a few traces to mark its passing (Briggs and Fisher 2006). Whether this 
ephemeral existence is the fate of decentralisation remains to be seen. 
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 “Here...we need to focus mainly on how politicians think and react to the trends and problems which 
confront them. They are usually assisted by technocrats with expertise in the social sciences, but it is 
political leaders who nearly always make the key decisions about decentralization. Since politicians tend to 
be short of time and tranquillity in which to weigh policy decisions, and preoccupied with short-term trends 
and current problems, the impact of deeper causes is usually filtered through the distorting lens of these 
















 Political crises or pressures, due to ethnic or regional conflicts or other causes, 
which may prompt leaders to pre-empt future threats or disarm existing threats by 
widening political representation; 
 A response to the growing negative public views of existing political systems; 
 Fiscal crises; 
 “Policy convergence,” in which policy responses of a similar nature were adopted 
to similar problems in countries at a similar stage of economic or political 
development;  
 Unification of the state; 
 Revival of a long-existing spirit of local-self-governance; 
 Strengthening of power bases of established or new regimes; 
 Institutional pressures such as from donor organisations, 30  often following 
external shocks which force drastic changes in policy, which saw good public 
management and administration with an emphasis on accountability as an aspect 
of good governance; 
 Local demands;  
 Genuine desire for political and economic transformation, such as the transition to 
democracy,
 31
 enhancing participation and improving service delivery; 
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 Manor (1999) maintains that actual decisions to decentralise were, however, seldom donor-driven, and 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund tended to lag behind governments in less developed 
countries. Serious reservations existed in both institutions about the dangers posed by decentralisation, 
especially to macroeconomic management. Some bilateral agencies, according to Manor, were drawn to 
decentralisation more quickly, but they tended to support decentralised institutions once they were created.  
Other writers seem, however, to prefer the view that donor agencies played a far more critical role – for 




 Such as occurred following the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the disintegration of the USSR, the 
already largely discredited notion that commandism could be effective and popular was further eroded. The 
demise of the USSR and the democratisation of numerous other formerly autocratic regimes led to greater 
interest in accountability. “Local government, because of its proximity to civil society, was seen as a crucial 
mechanism for...bridging the gap between the state and civil society, and in transforming hitherto 
marginalized groups into full-fledged citizens” (Nickson, R 1995:2). Manor (1999) argues, however, that 
interest in decentralisation had crystallised in many countries well before Communist regimes broke down 
















 Changes of political ideology (either within an already ruling party or as a result 
of a new party coming to power); 
 Other hidden agendas, such as shifting deficits downwards or devolving 
responsibility for spending to local governments. 
Devas and Delay (2006) state that whilst there are no doubt many valid economic and 
administrative arguments in favour of decentralisation, the reality is that in many 
countries, decentralisation has been driven not so much by these arguments or by local 
level democratic demand, as by the interests of local and national political elites, by 
certain political realities at the centre, and by external pressures. Oxhorn (2001) takes a 
view which is not dissimilar and emphasises the political nature of decentralisation. He 
points out that economic efficiency and economic growth have been noticeably absent 
from the debate on the goals being pursued through decentralisation by domestic elites, 
with the interests of particular social and political groups dominating instead. Oxhorn 
suggests elsewhere (2004) that in many cases, decentralisation seems to be promoted as 
much because of policy failures of the central state as for any clear reasons for suggesting 
that decentralised systems are intrinsically better or less likely to fail. “It is as if 
decentralization were the default option when no other viable alternatives were present” 
(2004:13). 
 
2.4.5  Decentralisation, New Public Management and Neo-liberalism 
 
Whether coincidentally or not, decentralistion appears to have emerged as a highly 
topical factor in governance more or less simultaneously with the notion of New Public 
Management (“NPM”). It would be useful to dwell briefly on NPM in the context of 
decentralisation, as there is sometimes a tendency to equate the one with the other, and to 
assume that the forces which drive one are the same that drive the other. Decentralisation 
and NPM represent different concepts; the former is a politico-administrative and 















present purposes, it may conveniently be termed a management doctrine. The existence 
of a decentralised system in a particular country does not presuppose the existence of 
NPM in that same country, or vice versa; indeed, the demands of one may well contradict 
those of the other. Yet, they are phenomena which have occurred virtually across the 
globe; they are often both encountered in the same context; they emerged into the 
spotlight in roughly the same era; and they have been introduced in constitutional and 
administrative systems usually (but, apparently, not always) with a view to achieving 
certain purportedly beneficial outcomes.  
Most writers recognise in NPM the emphasis on management skills; on output; on an 
intendedly more competitive basis for providing public services; on variable rewards; on 
privatisation; disaggregation and unbundling; on contracting-out and the like. NPM 
became a convenient term for a set of broadly similar administrative doctrines or 
management approaches which dominated the public administration reform agenda in 
many countries (especially within the OECD) from the late 1970s (Hood 1991; Larbi 
1999).  NPM supposedly promotes operating principles based on efficiency, quality, 
flexibility, competition and management-by-contract. It promotes new structures 
designed to facilitate client / contractor splits, the decentralisation of provider units, 
“consumer” choice, and feedback, and service monitoring (Lowndes 1997). It also recasts 
political decisions about the distribution of resources as technical management decisions, 
and defines citizens as customers, thereby changing the nature of engagement from state 
provision to user-based market principles (McLennan 2008). 
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that NPM has become associated with neo-liberal 
ideology; and inasmuch as decentralistion is also regarded as a way to achieve 
efficiencies, promote responsiveness, promote innovations in administration and enhance 
local government administrative capability, it is likewise not surprising that there is 
perceived to be a connection between decentralisation and neo-liberalism. Niksic (2004), 
for example, argues that it is quite apparent that administrative and fiscal decentralisation 
have links to neo-liberalism. Many of its principles and guidelines, he argues, are in line 
with neo-liberal prescriptions to make local government more streamlined and flexible, 















an obstacle to the flow of capital at the local level. Niksic acknowledges that this 
approach is correct in emphasising the importance of local governments keeping their 
finances in order, but suggests that it often forgets the plight of the poor masses. The 
costs of services are to be borne by the users and the inability of the poor to pay for basic 
services, according to Niksic, is not treated as a major issue. Furthermore, full-scale 
privatisation is acceptable to many proponents of administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation. It is submitted, however, that these are not necessarily objectives or even 
consequences of decentralisation. As we will see, decentralisation has many objectives, 
but the principal aim of decentralisation is to bring responsive, participative and efficient 
government closer to the people.  Disregard for the poor, widespread privatisation and 
mass contracting out of local government functions to private enterprise are not necessary 
concomitants of decentralisation, and whilst they may in many cases be viewed as 
consequences of NPM, it is submitted that it is inappropriate to suggest that these are part 
and parcel of decentralisation.
32
 
There is a tendency to view NPM and decentralisation as being one and the same thing, 
or at least going hand-in-hand. This tendency in turn perhaps leads, in the views of some 
observers, to decentralisation being inextricably linked to neo-liberalism. This, it is 
submitted, is unfortunate. Whilst decentralisation and NPM often coexist in particular 
systems, and whilst decentralisation and neo-liberalism are not incompatible, they are not 
one and the same thing and care should be taken not to conflate them. 
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 South Africa provides an example of the use of a decentralised model of local governance to promote a 
developmental agenda, which requires that municipalities structure and manage their administration and 
budgeting processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and 
economic development of the community (Section 153 of the Constitution). It is true also that the South 
African policy and statutory framework does contain strong elements of NPM - for example, contracting 
out and public-private partnerships; these were no doubt incorporated with a view to promoting 
efficiencies. But the presence or absence of these NPM elements would not in itself alter the decentralised 
















2.4.6 The Role of International Organisations 
 
Given that the role of certain international organisations – and in particular, those of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – in the decentralisation process has 
been the focus of much ire from certain quarters,
33
 it is appropriate to devote further 
attention to this role. As conservatively inclined governments (which were seen as anti-
public sector and pro-market) came to power in the United Kingdom and the United 
States in the late 1970s, the emphasis within the IMF and the World Bank - 
coincidentally or otherwise - shifted towards one of a less centrist character. The shift 
was to have a profound influence on the reforms that developing countries in crisis were 
to undertake in the 1980s and 1990s under the auspices of these two institutions (Larbi 
1999). 
The IMF and the World Bank imposed stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes, with their accompanying conditionalities, on countries seeking to obtain 
credits and debt rescheduling arrangements as an instrument to encourage states in 





governance came to be seen by most donor and other international organisations as a 
necessary precondition for growth and poverty reduction; and democratic decentralisation 
was seen as one of the key elements of good governance (Olowu and Wunsch 2004). 
Stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes provided the motive for reforms in 
public sector management in most developing countries, in transitional economies in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and, in the newly industrialised countries of 
Asia (Larbi 1999). The perhaps inevitable result was that decentralisation became firmly 
entrenched as a feature of modern governance, and took on a level of respectability that 
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 See, for example, Bond (2000) who writes that “as the Third World debt crisis mounted early in the 
1980’s, the (World) Bank and the IMF stepped in to ‘manage’ the external debts – and government policies 
– of countries in Southern Africa, as they did elsewhere in the world. However, this did not solve – but 
instead deepened – the debt. The Bank and the IMF continued to squeeze whatever they could from our 
countries…Utilizing such indebtedness as a weapon, the IMF, the Bank and other Northern creditors 




 Again, it must be emphasised that whilst pro-market and pro-governance reforms were both on the 















made it attractive to countries seeking a constitutional model, even to those which were 
not subject to pressures from international organisations. 
 
2.5 Decentralisation and Governance 
 
Decentralisation is, we are frequently told by its proponents, largely about governance. 
The term “governance” is an old one (Lee 2003); for a long time, it had a somewhat 
obscure dictionary existence, but, according to Doornbos (2003), it become prominent in 
international aid circles around 1989 or 1990. “All at once, the notion of good 
governance was there, referring to the way in which cities, provinces, or whole countries 
were being governed…Moreover, with the adjective ‘good’ added to it, it became 
unmistakably clear that that the concept of good governance could invite judgment about 
how a particular country, city or agency was being governed” (Doornbos 2003:4). 
 It is perhaps not coincidental that the popularisation of the term occurred around the era 
– the 1980s - in which donor agencies began attaching certain conditions for the granting 
of development aid, which often involved adopting principles of decentralisation. It now 
was apparently considered appropriate and justified to set prescriptions for the manner in 
which client states managed their affairs (Doornbos 2003; Halachmi 2005). Reducing 
many developing countries’ state systems and reducing their political weight became a 
key element in the thinking of global institutions. What was needed, however, was a new 
standard or criterion, and this is where the notion of good governance came in; it was 
broad enough to incorporate notions of public management as well as political 
dimensions, “while at the same time vague enough to allow a fair measure of discretion 
and flexibility in interpretation as to what ‘good’ governance would or would not 
condone” (Doornbos 2003:7).  
The concept of “good governance” is surprisingly difficult to pin down.  A definition of 
“governance”, unqualified by any adjective, which bears the approval of the United 















country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions 
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, 
meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (United Nations Development 
Programme1997). The European Union Governance White Paper (Commission of the 
European Communities 2001:8 footnote 1) defines governance as “rules, processes and 
behaviour that affect the way in which policies are exercised …particularly as regards 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence”. The World Bank 
defines it as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s 
economic and social resources (1992:3).
35
  Each of these definitions seems to be adequate 
and uncontroversial enough.  
 
As Doornbos suggests, it is when the adjective “good” is added to the term that one 
struggles to find consensus as to the core meaning, and less of a common idea as to how 
to apply it concretely. The term “hardly carries a specific meaning. Rather, its intrinsic 
open-ended quality, vagueness, and inherent lack of specificity have tended to generate a 
good deal of searching and debate as to what its proper meaning is or should be, 
prompting multiple efforts to appropriate it and define it in particular ways” (Doornbos 
2003:5). 
It is difficult to establish exactly when “decentralisation” became a commonly used term, 
but its emergence probably preceded the flourishing of the term “good governance,” if 
Doornbos’ view is accepted. It is tempting to conclude that the latter term became 
appropriated as an overarching concept to accommodate what was being sought to be 
achieved by the application of principles of decentralisation, with the result that good 
public management and administration with emphasis on accountability and 
responsiveness was seen as an aspect of good governance by donor agencies (Larbi 1999). 
We are presently concerned with a particular variant of governance, namely, local 
governance, which is a rule-governed mechanism through which “residents of a defined 
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 According to Kooiman, for the World Bank the concept of governance is “the essence of broadening its 
traditional capacity-building scope to a base in which there is room for civil society and participation as 
well. Building a pluralist institutional structure…can be seen as one of the key contributions to this shift in 















area participate in their own governance in limited but locally important matters” (Olowu 
and Wusch 2004:4), and are the principal decision-makers in what their concerns are, 
how to prioritise and respond to them, and how and where to obtain resources to deal 
with such concerns. 
Decentralisation and good (local) governance are not one and the same thing. 
Nonetheless, many of the elements of “good governance” have parallels in the concept of 
decentralisation. It has been said of decentralisation that it is fundamentally a strategy for 
improving governance (Campos and Hellman 2005), and it is submitted that this is how 
the relationship between decentralisation and good governance should best be viewed: the 
first is a tool or component of a strategy for achieving the broader objective of good 
governance as conceived above. As Olowu and Wunsch (2004) point out, decentralisation 
reforms make sense only if they lead to a working political outcome, namely, effective 
local governance. In their analysis, we are by implication therefore concerned with a two-
stage process: the first stage consists of “decentralization, which is a lengthy and complex 
process of reform which begins with constitutional and/or statutory changes at the center, 
(and which) ideally progressively distributes responsibilities, resources, authority and 
autonomy from center to periphery,” and the second is local governance, which is “the 
situation which obtains when localities are able effectively to manage their public affairs 
in a way that is accountable to local residents” (Olowu and Wunsch 2004:2).  
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
That decentralisation is one of the most widespread politico-administrative phenomena in 
recent years cannot be doubted. It is clearly a complex process and one whose driving 
forces appear to be many and varied. It is also clear that the implications of applying the 
principles of decentralisation in particular countries have not invariably been thoroughly 
considered, and it would appear that in a number of cases, those principles have been 
adopted without much reliance being placed on evidence to support the conclusion that 















of decentralisation, and what stands in the way of achieving those outcomes? These issues 
















Literature Review: Decentralisation - Objectives and Obstacles 
 
3.1 Purpose of Chapter 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is twofold. In the first place, it is to examine the expected 
outcomes of the process by reviewing the literature on decentralisation insofar as it relates 
to the objectives underlying decentralisation. The second objective is to examine the 
obstacles which may be encountered in the decentralisation process. 
 
3.2 Objectives of Decentralisation 
 
3.2.1 A Range of Desirable Objectives 
A wide range of possible objectives is discussed in the literature, and the list of objectives 
of decentralisation is potentially endless. This section focuses on those (several of which 
are interrelated) which are more commonly encountered, and are generally considered to 
be desirable, as follows: 
(i) Promoting Democracy:  It has been said that local governments are a training ground 
for democracy, whilst at the same time, provided that they are sufficiently strong, they 
can control the natural tendency of central governments to become all-powerful 
(Prud’homme 1989). Similarly, it is argued that decentralisation helps to deepen and 
consolidate democracy by devolving power to local governments (Diamond and Tsalik 
1999), and extending representative politics to lower levels.
36
 Furthermore, it can bring 
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 Reddy and Sabelo state that “at a political level, decentralization enables the people to participate in a real 















informal local mechanisms for the management of resources or the resolution of conflicts 
into the formal political process (Manor 1999).  
Examples of democratic practices which may be inculcated pursuant to decentralisation 
include allowing opposition groups and others with political ambitions, who might 
perhaps not gain access to the national stage, to play official roles in the local context, 
thereby easing frustrations; and equipping people with presentation, bargaining and 
lobbying skills and enhancing collective action potential. An additional benefit is that 
“authoritarian enclaves” may be eliminated by creating democratic institutions in regions 
were autocratic forces might have held sway (Manor 1999).There are, however, counter-
arguments: for example, it is asserted that only a small number of people can participate 
directly in local government; and multiple levels of government make it more difficult, 
not easier, to allocate credit and blame (Treisman 2007).  
 
(ii) Promoting Legitimacy: A second objective, one which flows from the preceding 
objective, is that decentralisation can stimulate the growth of civil society organisations 
and prevent widespread disillusionment with new policies from turning into a rejection of 
the entire democratic process, thereby boosting legitimacy by making government more 
responsive to the needs of citizen . This implies that local institutions, if made relevant to 
the daily lives of citizens, will have a positive effect on how those citizens view their 
larger political system (Hiskey and Seligson 2003). The greater stability which 
accompanies legitimacy can in turn facilitate economic growth, and can also reduce the 
need for the state to use coercion to maintain order, and strengthen the state's capacity to 
play non-coercive roles which foster both development and improved state-society 
relations (Manor 1999). 
 
(iii) Promoting Public Participation: Participatory democracy is an important objective of 
decentralisation. It allows citizens the opportunity to make known their preferences and 
                                                                                                                                                 
democracy, which is the real and tangible form of democracy in contrast to the theoretical and quasi-
















views to their elected officials who are thereby made accountable for their performance to 
citizens. It can promote a sense of autonomy in citizens, enhance social order by 
promoting the legitimacy of the state, and reduce pressures for separatism (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006). 
 
Goldfrank observes that “at its core, democracy means that it treats citizens equally and 
that citizens have equal rights to participate in government” (2007:148), and whilst 
acknowledging that the holding of  periodic elections for representatives is the established 
form of realising these ideals, he maintains that deepening democracy
37
 requires further 
steps towards strengthening citizenship and democratising the state: “Strengthening 
citizenship means transforming residents from passive subjects in dependant relationships 
with particular politicians or parties into active citizens who know they have rights and 
can legitimately make demands on government” (2007:148). Public participation 
mechanisms are essential for this purpose. By bringing government closer to the people, 
decentralisation creates the environment which allows for the establishment of 
mechanisms for communicating needs and preferences to the local authority; and 
provides a means to keep them informed, including in regard to services, budgets, plans 
and the actions of local government officials (Kearney 1999; Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006). 
A frequently cited condition for the success of decentralisation, and one that is of 
particular concern in the context of public participation, is that the citizenry should be 
politically aware and educated, and that civil society should be vibrant and inclusive, and 
capable of engaging effectively with local government. Similarly, the citizenry should be 
well-informed and to that end, they should have access to reliable information channels 
(Manor 1999; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Devas and Delay 2006; Kauzya 2007; 
Goldfrank 2007; United Nations Development Programme 2003). Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2006) do, however, point out that the assumption that there is the requisite 
                                                 
37
 “Deepening democracy does not entail participations of all levels of government, nor does it mean that 
representative democracy is replaced. Rather, it implies that citizens have more opportunities to participate 
















level of literacy and political awareness among citizens may be unrealistic for many poor 
countries.  
 
(iv) Promoting State Capability: Public participation is viewed as being valuable for its 
own sake. But it is also promoted as a means of improving state capability. The reasoning 
is that when citizens can express their opinions and press their demands publicly within a 
legal framework, the state acquires the credibility it needs to govern well. Furthermore, 
popular voice can reduce information problems with lower transaction costs. And finally, 
since state officials cannot anticipate all the services that citizens desire, public 
participation can back NGO’s in exerting useful pressure on government to improve the 
delivery and quality of public services (World Bank 1997).  
 
(v) Promoting Developmentalism: The ideal state is often characterised as being not only 
democratic but developmental as well (Saito 2008). The main characteristics of a 
democratic developmental state include broad-based participation; growth with 
redistribution; pro-poor policies; and responsiveness. Often decentralisation is considered 
to be the most desirable means of achieving such an ideal state, by virtue of local 
governments being in close proximity to the people and therefore they are in a more 





(vi) Promoting Demand Efficiency: A widely shared view is that decentralisation is not 
only important for the sustenance of democracy, but is also generally viewed as desirable 
for the efficient supply of public services and essential for improvement in the efficiency 
of the public sector. In this regard, it may be said that decentralisation accords with the 
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 The promotion of developmentalism is of particular interest in the South African context. Section 153 of 
the South African Constitution expressly places developmental duties on municipalities. See de Visser 
















traditional theory of federalism which holds that centralised governments are incapable of 
achieving the differentiation necessary to cater to the diverse needs and preferences of 
heterogeneous communities. This is due either to the high costs of communicating 
information concerning local preferences to a central government, or an inability of the 
central government to process such information and utilise it in its decision-making 
process in regard to the delivery of local public goods. By contrast, or so the argument 
goes, local government officials are likely to be better informed about the preference of 
local citizens and thus exhibit greater responsiveness to heterogeneous needs (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2006),
39
 or to recognise the asymmetries in tastes and to provide 




(vii) Promoting Supply Efficiency: The objective of promoting supply efficiency is based 
on the argument (which we have already encountered) that, local government being closer 
to the people, it is more likely to run public service projects in the interest of the 
stakeholders.
41
 Here it is argued that locally financed and provided services will be 
produced at a lower cost. “Time will be saved, local resources will be used, responsibility 
and oversight will be exercised, and as a consequence, costs will be lowered relative to 
what they would be if the same services were provided by the central government” 
(Prud’homme 1989:72). 
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 To put it differently, “there is an assumption that the demand for local public services varies from place 
to place, because tastes and willingness to pay differ, for geographic, cultural, ethnic, historic reasons. If 
this is the case, the central provision of local public services…is likely not to please anybody…Only the 
decentralized provision of local services will adjust to the many-faceted demand. It will result in every local 
government providing a different level and a different bundle of public services” (Prud’homme 1989:71). 
40
 Asthana makes an astute observation on an issue which is usually overlooked by writers on the subject: 
“Looking from the side of the demand efficiency, in developing countries the hypothesis on which this 
classical model rests is fragile. In the developing countries, the fine difference in preferences (for example, 




 Whilst Asthana is not persuaded by the arguments in favour of demand efficiency, he is more accepting 
of those regarding supply efficiency: “From the supply efficiency side, few scholars have challenged the 
validity of the decentralisation approach. Even those who have raised doubts are of the view that while the 
provision of infrastructure could be centralised, maintenance should be decentralised because the local 















(viii) Promoting Competition: The World Bank asserts that “decentralized service 
provision can also enhance efficiency and interjurisdictional competition in supply, 
providing consumers (at least in theory) with the option to exit to other jurisdictions” 
(1997:121) and suggests that that can have the effect of “stimulating competition between 
levels of government (1997:122). That competition among jurisdictions can enhance 
governance has been cited an important justification for decentralisation. The rationale is 
simple: officials who are corrupt or wasteful or ineffective relative to those in other 
regions will lose residents and businesses, thus reducing the tax base.  Given the mobility 
of capital not only among countries but also within countries, businesses tend to prefer 
jurisdictions where they are not subject to excessive taxation, where infrastructure is 
sound, and trust relationships with local officials can be developed. This is seen as having 
a disciplining effect on local governments, strengthening their incentives for delivering 
transparent and accountable governance (Campos and Hellman).
42
 Manor is, however, 
dismissive of the competition argument and states that the main gains of decentralisation 
“arise not from competition, but from cooperation between levels in decentralized 
systems” (Manor 1999:11; see also Manor 1999:70). In similar vein, Treisman suggests 
that the conditions for vigorous competition amongst local governments are “so 
restrictive that they will rarely be met even approximately in real countries” (2007:12). 
 
(ix) Reducing Corruption: One of the most pressing problems associated with a 
centralised system is corruption among centrally appointed bureaucrats who have 
authority over service delivery in local areas.
43
 One of the presumed arguments in favour 
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 Campos and Hellman state that “The case for decentralization is fundamentally an argument about 
governance. The case is rooted in two powerful intellectual traditions: the critique of economic centralism 
(especially central planning), and the perceived economic advantages of federalism. The first tradition 
posits that decentralization aligns government decision making more closely with local preferences, largely 
because of the information advantages associated with smaller jurisdictions. The second tradition 
emphasizes the competition among regions sparked by decentralization, as local governments have 




 “While systematic empirical evidence on corruption is scarce for obvious reasons, there are innumerable 
case studies of high rates of corruption among government bureaucrats in the process of delivering public 
















of decentralising the delivery system is that local governments are subject to electoral 
pressures from local citizens who are better placed to monitor delivery than is a distant 
central authority. Bribery and other corrupt practices will be more readily noticed by local 
residents who suffer the immediate consequences of such conduct. It is presumed that 
residents are then likely to be motivated to remove such government officials from office, 
and also apply social sanctions. This in turn has the potential to enhance accountability in 




(x) Improving Communications: It is argued that decentralisation has the potential for 
making people more aware of government policies, and better able to differentiate 
between those which are beneficial and those which are not, by enhancing transparency 
and enabling large numbers of people at lower levels in the political system to monitor 
how decisions on how resources are made. It also facilitates the flow of information 
(including discontent about policies) from people at lower levels to the upper reaches of 
government.  
By making available information regarding financial and capacity constraints, and 
thereby tempering unrealistic expectations and protecting political systems from the 
severe backlashes that can occur when inflated expectations prove to be unfounded, 
decentralisation can assist in promoting political realism, political stability and a state 
which is in many ways stronger than in the days of centralised governance.  
 
(xi) Defusing Conflicts: Finally, it is argued that decentralisation defuses conflicts – 
particularly in the ethnic context – by providing autonomy (albeit limited), allowing 
group ambitions to be fulfilled to some extent, dividing the prizes and lowering the stakes 
of politics; it can also place checks on a central government which is dominated by one 
group. But as Treisman (2007) points out, decentralisation might not be that beneficial for 
that purpose; for example, decentralisation can help only geographically concentrated 
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 Whether the anti-corruption cause is better served by a decentralised system than a centralised system is 
















minorities; and whilst distributing political offices amongst different groups avoids 
excluding them, it can turn ethnic conflicts into ethnically-motivated inter-governmental 
conflicts. 
 
3.2.2 Other Objectives 
Manor (1999) asserts that decentralisers have often proceeded both on the basis of 
statesmanlike considerations, seeking genuine empowerment, and on the basis of hard-
nosed calculations of self-interest. The objectives discussed in the preceding subsection 
might be included in what he categorises as “genuine attempts at empowerment.”
45
 On 
the other hand, a number of objectives may be said to be of a narrow or partisan 
character. Included amongst these are democratising lower levels in the political system 
as a substitute for democratisation at the apex; off-loading tasks which the central 
government finds costly or inconvenient, or both, onto sub-national authorities; and 
giving the appearance of democratising lower levels in the system, while actually limiting 
the influence of elected members of authorities to such an extent that what mainly occurs 
is deconcentration, which strengthens the central government's power. 
 
3.3 Obstacles faced by Decentralisation 
 
3.3.1 A Difficult Process, with no Guarantees 
Decentralisation has become one of the dominant themes in the discussion on governance 
in recent decades, particularly insofar as it applies to developing states and the 
international development community. Nonetheless, the shifting of powers and decision-
making, allocative, and implementation functions from the national to local governments 
has proven to be difficult. The good intentions of decentralisation are acknowledged by 
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 Manor provides an extensive list of objectives of decentralisation which he describes as “genuine 
















most, but whether such intentions can actually be realised in the harsh realities of the day, 
especially in developing countries, is another question (Heller 2001). 
According to the World Bank, decentralisation itself is neither good nor bad, and it should 
be viewed as a means to an end, often imposed by political reality. “The issue is whether 
it is successful or not. Successful decentralization improves the efficiency and 
responsiveness of the public sector while accommodating potentially explosive political 
forces. Unsuccessful decentralization threatens economic and political stability and 
disrupts the delivery of services” (World Bank 1999:107). And perhaps more bluntly, 
USAID declares that “Decentralization is about potential; it guarantees nothing” (US 
Agency for International Development 2000:8). This is a somewhat alarming conclusion, 
given the vital importance which, if the World Bank is to be believed, is attached to the 
success of decentralisation. 
 
3.3.2 Is Decentralisation Working? 
Despite the prevalence of decentralisation in recent years, there is a degree of scepticism 
about whether the vaunted benefits of decentralisation have been, or will be realised,46 
particularly because of the evident weaknesses of local level democratic processes in so 
many countries. There has been little in the way of systematic research covering the full 
range of the dimensions and objectives of decentralisation, and it is difficult to make an 
assessment of the effectiveness of decentralisation as a process, but an examination of 
such empirical evidence as there is on the success of decentralisation policies is at best 
mixed and sometimes contradictory (Devas and Delay 2006; Oxhorn 2009). There are 
several showcase successes,
47
 but there are also several far less successful experiences.  
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 Manor, writing in connection with the question of the utility of decentralisation as a force for poverty 
reduction, states that “academic analysts... fall into two main camps – those who are distinctly pessimistic 




 Such as Porto Alegre, in Brazil. This example is used in several studies as an example of a successful 
attempt at decentralisation. See, for example, Heller (2001), Goldfrank (2007) and Oxhorn (2009). Porto 
Alegre’s success derives largely from its experiment with participatory budgeting. Tendler’s research on the 
















As examples of successes, some analysts have offered evidence to suggest that 
decentralisation, when it works well, tends to enhance transparency, accountability and 
responsiveness of government institutions; this in turn increases the legitimacy of 
government, reduces apathy, and improves popular participation; this in turn improves the 
quality of governance (Manor 2006). On the other hand, other research on this aspect of 
decentralisation is less optimistic, with one study showing that in underdeveloped 
countries, decentralisation is actually associated with a poorer quality of governance 
(O’Dwyer and Ziblatt 2006).
48
  In another study, it was found that the most significant 
effect of political decentralisation was its detrimental effect on the ability of the poor to 
engage in collective action, due to the fact that decentralisation spreads scarce 
organisational resources (Schneider 2006).
49
 Research by Hiskey and Seligson (2003) 
also shows that, improperly applied, decentralisation can have the undesired effect of 
producing more negative views of the political system. Decentralisation also presents 
pitfalls for economic performance, according to the World Bank (1997), such as 
budgetary and inflationary pressures, macroeconomic instability induced by uncontrolled 
borrowing by sub-national governments, disparities and inequalities in service provision, 
and resource misallocation. One of the most frequently cited objectives of 
decentralisation, namely, the promotion of efficiency due to government being closer to 
the people, has also been called into question (Asthana 2003; Bardhan and Mookherjee 




                                                                                                                                                 
these were “less the result of decentralisation than they were of a three-way dynamic among local 
government, civil society and central government” (1997:145). 
 
48
 O’Dwyer and Ziblatt attach a particular meaning to “governance” for purposes of their research: “Our 
concept of ‘quality of governance’ is a shorthand term for what we consider to be two important measures 
of how well government does its job: efficiency and effectiveness” (O’Dwyer and Ziblatt 2006:327). 
 
49
 It must be emphasised that Schneider is referring here only to political decentralisation. His findings on 
administrative decentralisation are somewhat more optimistic: “The positive relationship between 
administrative decentralisation and social spending is consistent with literature that suggests administrative 
decentralization promotes competition, information, and innovation in government. For example, 
administrative decentralisation may create a more efficient state that can free resources to be used for social 
spending” (Schneider 2006:364). 
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In summary, despite decentralisation being generally viewed as a desirable process, 
significant difficulties are associated with decentralisation. It is useful to examine the 
more prominent challenges to any decentralisation process, the better to understand and 
guard against consequences which would otherwise not be anticipated. As is the case with 
objectives of decentralisation, the challenges to decentralisation are many and varied; 
some of the more common challenges are discussed below.  
 
(i) Uninterested, Inertia-bound and Overwhelmed Governments: One of the primary 
challenges to the implementation of the decentralisation process lies with central 
government. A number of writers point to the need for central government to have the 
political will and capacity to drive the decentralisation process and entrench it. In 
addition, they point out that the bureaucracy of central government must be ready and 
willing to facilitate the process of transferring power, authority, functions, responsibilities 
and the requisite resources. It requires politically orchestrated action from above. Heller 
(2003) demands that “Powers must be shifted, monies devolved, laws and regulations 
promulgated, and groups opposed to decentralization—recalcitrant bureaucrats, 
opposition parties, patronage politicians—circumvented or neutralized. Decentralization 
requires the agency of a programmatic, ideologically cohesive political party that has 
significant ties to grassroots organizations” (2003:14). Decentralisation will be “hard to 
pull off” (World Bank 1997:128) where there is weak central government capability to 
manage national fiscal and monetary policy and to enact and enforce appropriate rules for 
intergovernmental relations, and commitment from the centre to effective local 
governance is essential (Devas and Delay 2006).  
It also implies that central governments must be willing to relinquish power, and must 
have the political will to engage in shared exercise of power and authority (Kauzya 2007). 
It has been noted that there is a tendency amongst actors at the centre of government to 
try to retain authority and resources; once such authority and resources have been 
transferred to local governments, central government might try to recapture them – 
frequently, although not always, successfully (Wunsch 2001). Often these endeavours are 
aided by the fact that legislation permits agencies of central government to override local 















breakdown is inevitable. These, and a host of other similar factors, can lead to a de facto 
“recentralisation” process (Wunsch 2001).
51
 
One of the causes underlying these challenges this is said to be that most states (or more 
particularly, those who control them) have little interest in decentralisation, because “to 
move the locus of public authority is to shake up existing patterns of political control and 
patronage” (Heller 2001:135). Another is that central governments often fall victim to 
inertia, particularly in developing states. A third cause is that even when there is a 
commitment to decentralisation, the task at hand is enormous:  a wide-ranging legislative 
programme – often at constitutional level - is needed to incorporate the precepts of 
decentralisation; regulations have to be passed to implement them; personnel have to be 
appointed and trained; resources have to be rechannelled, and local administrative 
capacities have to be built up. In short, an enormous amount of institution-building and 




Heller’s views tend to support the World Bank’s contention that “decentralization is often 
implemented haphazardly. Decision makers do not always fully control the pace or 
genesis of the decentralisation process. Even when they do, models of decentralization are 
often exported from one country to another without regard for local political traditions, 
regulatory frameworks or property rights” (World Bank 2000:107). 
 
(ii) Intergovernmental Tensions: A further challenge is that which arises from 
intergovernmental tensions. We have seen that decentralisation is largely about 
rearranging intergovernmental relationships. Campos and Hellman (2005) point out that 
decentralisation very often remains contested terrain between levels of government for 
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 Writing in the context of African decentralisation, Wunsch observes that four functions – planning and 
capital investment, budget and fiscal management, personnel systems and management, and finance and 
revenue – are critical for effective local government. “At the same time they are areas where substantial 
resources are distributed and where, given the intense completion for resources  generally accepted as 
typical of African states...one might expect  substantial competition from actors in these states to retain or 
capture those resources” (Wunsch 2001:278).  
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 Tendler (1997) refers in the context of her research to the “paradox of decentralisation” identified by 
Hommes - this refers to the fact that decentralisation “demands more centralization and more sophisticated 
















prolonged periods. This results in a lack of cooperation between levels of government. It 
also results in lines of accountability being blurred. This in turn can reduce the 
responsiveness of local governments and weaken their authority over service providers, 
who may be responding to incentives from national hierarchies. Also, contests often lead 
to “imbalanced decentralisation,” especially between power and financial responsibility, 
distorting incentives at lower levels. For example, local governments might have 
considerable control over expenditures, but little control over the civil servants who 
provide those services; the result is that they cannot downsize the workforce, alter 
remuneration packages, or control recruitment and promotion. These factors generate 
substantial uncertainty regarding the distribution of functions and responsibilities, the 
extent of autonomy, and the balance of power between levels of government; the resultant 
uncertainty weakens accountability at every level, as it affects the expectations of all 
participants in the framework (Campos and Hellman 2005). Related to these issues is the 
ever-present jealousy of national government over its powers; it reluctantly gives them up 
in the process of decentralisation, and then expends much energy in trying to claw them 
back, which results in sub-national governments being undermined (Manor 1999; 
Campos and Hellman 2005). 
 
(iii) Elite Capture:  A number of case studies have been undertaken which show that 
development programmes have been undermined by capture of local governments by 
powerful local elites who divert and distort public programmes to benefit themselves at 
the expense of poor minorities.
53
 A major cause of local capture is to be found in lower 
levels of political awareness
54
 of the poor, 
55
 with the extent of capture of a local 
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 Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) suggest (at 677) that it was concerns about capture which led Madison, 
as long ago as 1787, to argue for the retention of powers at federal level. 
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 “While we are not aware of any evidence concerning variations in political awareness with respect to 
income or education status in developing countries, it seems plausible that acquiring and processing 
information is costly and time-consuming for the poor who are resource-constrained, illiterate, and 
overworked” (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005:683). 
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  The text from which this excerpt is taken reads “...lower levels of political awareness of the nonpoor.” 
This is assumed to be a typographical error and that it was intended to read “...lower levels of political 
















government is likely to be higher in communities with a higher poverty rate (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2005).  
All units of government are subject to elite capture, but there is evidence that local units 
are more susceptible to it;
56
 the lower the level of government, the greater is the extent of 
capture by vested interests. Khan states the problem as follows: 
“The smaller the society, the fewer will be the distinct parties and interests 
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently 
will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of 
individuals composing the majority, and the smaller the compass within 
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their 
plans of oppression” (Khan 2008: 512).
57
 
The World Bank (2001) also warns that of the many caveats concerning decentralisation, 
the most important is that it can bolster the power of elites in settings with highly unequal 
power structures. This domination or capture by elites may result in less responsiveness 
of local governments to the needs of the people, especially of poor people. 
 
(iv) Clientelism: Clientelism occurs when politicians distribute publicly funded goods to 
selected members of the electorate in return for votes and political support. According to 
Campos and Hellman (2005), it weakens political accountability by narrowing the range 
of constituents to whom politicians are responsive. By the process of withholding goods 
and services, clientelism also gives politicians a mechanism to punish voters who do not 
provide continuous support. It also creates disincentives for groups to develop collective 
forms of representation and therefore weakens interest group competition. Clientelism is 
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 See Khan 2008: 512, and the studies referred to therein. 
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 See also Campos and Hellman (2005).They find that such empirical studies as there are suggest that local 
governments are more susceptible to capture than their central counterparts. This is because capture thrives 
in an environment where highly concentrated interest groups dominate the market for influence; because 
many of the institutions normally expected to serve as checks and balances are weaker at the local level; 
and because “countervailing powers” representing a broader range of public interests such as the media and 
















common to many different types of political systems and at all levels of government, but 
it may be more pervasive at the local level, for several reasons. In the first place, in 
smaller jurisdictions, local politicians are more likely to engage in clientelist forms of 
“retail” politics to win elections and maintain political support networks. Second, 
politicians can more effectively identify individual voters for clientelist networks and 
more easily monitor their political support. Third, local clientelism rearranges the 
relationships between policy makers, providers, and clients, so that instead of citizens 
holding local officials accountable, “clientelist politics allows politicians to shape 
constituencies to their own advantage by selectively providing public services and other 
benefits” (Campos and Hellman 2005: 241). Clientelism also has the capacity seriously to 
exacerbate inefficiencies and inequalities in public service: a tendency in clientelist 
politics is to favor investments that generate jobs, which politicians can then distribute to 
build patronage networks (Campos and Hellman 2005). 
 
(v) Capacity Constraints:  Lack of capacity is often identified as a serious challenge. The 
World Bank (2000) is emphatic about the need for local capacity: “Even a well-meaning 
political team cannot overcome incompetent administration. In fact, lack of capacity at 
local level and the need for a massive increase in skilled staff are the arguments most 
frequently invoked against decentralization” (World Bank 2000:122). Campos and 
Hellman (2005) point out that decentralisation can amplify capacity constraints, and that  
the shifting of responsibilities of local government from purely implementing policy to 
both formulating and implementing policy demands a wider range of skills and 
experience, which local politicians and bureaucrats may be lacking and have to develop. 
This means that at least initially, local skill levels and policymaking processes are likely 
to lag. In addition to skills and processes, appropriate management systems such as 
accounting, budgeting, procurement, tax administration, auditing, reporting, and 
personnel management will be needed. In many developing countries, the reforming of 
these systems presents an enormous challenge to their central governments; and given 
their relative inexperience and more modest resources, local governments are likely to 















aspect of capacity. To train personnel, develop systems and processes, strengthen 
accountability, and ultimately deliver public goods and services, local governments need 
funds. And these, from whatever source, are often misapplied. The result is that local 
governments are often severely hamstrung and incapable of operating at any but the most 
basic level (Campos and Hellman 2005). 
 
(vi) Financial Constraints:  Funding of local governments is amongst the most pressing 
of issues arising from decentralisation. Here the primary issue is whether to fund them 
from central government sources or from locally derived sources. But raising revenue is 
not the only problem: in most developing countries there are huge problems of local 
expenditure management (World Bank 2000). This, of course, is inextricably linked to a 
challenge discussed earlier, that of capacity constraints. Budgets are often unrealistic, 
relying on inflated forecasts, with the result that arbitrary cuts have to be made, generally 
in a manner which is not transparent. Weak financial management and accounting skills 
at the local level are matched by the lack of capacity at the centre to audit local 
government accounts. This provides enormous scope for abuse, which results in turn in 
little public trust in the finances of local governments.  
 
(vii) Is Decentralisation even Wanted? And then, of course, there is the question of 
whether people actually want decentralisation. This is open to question. Asthana (2003) 
makes the point, so often overlooked, that it is often assumed that the people want 
decentralisation, while higher levels of government oppose it. Paradoxically, the 
decisions relating to decentralisation are taken at the central level without consulting the 
people, and there has never been any referendum to determine what people want. This 
view is supported by Manor (1999), who maintains that pressure from ordinary people at 
grassroots level has hardly at all persuaded central authorities to decentralise. Whilst there 
is some evidence of elites at intermediate level having an impact or of opposition parties 
lobbying effectively for devolution, there is generally an absence of popular pressure.
 58
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 But see Shah and Thompson (2004) who suggest that “a bottom-up process of decentralization entails 















And whilst enthusiasm may and often does develop after decentralisation takes place that 




(viii)  What’s Wrong with Centralisation Anyway? Finally, there are arguments which 
suggest that centralisation is in any event superior to decentralisation.
60
 The first such 
argument is that a centralised system is at least potentially more equitable. Inasmuch as 
income redistribution is a basic function of government, it is much better performed at the 
national rather than the local level (Asthana 2003). Furthermore, centralisation makes it 
possible to equalise levels of publicly provided services over space. Another argument in 
favour of centralisation is that it makes it easier to conduct macroeconomic policies. The 
larger the share of taxes made available to local government for expenditure, the more 
difficult it becomes to use them as instruments of fiscal policy. In addition, it is argued 
that centralisation might be better for accountability, in that it is easier for central 
government bureaucrats to resist the pressures of vested local interests. Finally, central 
bureaucrats are likely to be more competent than their local counterparts, and be less 
susceptible to corruption (Prudhomme 1999). 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Decentralisation has enjoyed a long period of respectability as the preferred vehicle for 
promoting a model of inclusive, responsive, effective and efficient governance. It is clear, 
however, that as a concept, it faces many challenges, some of which have only relatively 
recently been brought to the fore. Those challenges notwithstanding, decentralisation was 
                                                                                                                                                 
levels of government to be supportive of these efforts. This has been the dominant mode of decentralization 
in North America and Northern Europe” (2004:21). 
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 See also Oxhorn (2004). 
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 Devas and Delay point out that much work needs to be done on implementing the key elements needed 
for effective devolution in most countries, and “there is a danger that frustration with the practical problems 















embraced as a key element in the South African local government framework. The next 
































The Local Government Framework in South Africa 
 
4.1 Purpose of Chapter 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the constitutional, policy and legislative 
framework of local government in South Africa. It deals with the historical background 
of the legislative framework, the process of the development of the Constitution in the 
context of local government, the development of local government policy as reflected in 
of the White Paper on Local Government, and finally provides an overview of the statutes 
relating to local government which were enacted in response to the demands of the 
Constitution and the White Paper. The purpose of the discussion is to describe in general 
terms the framework upon which the decentralised system of local government in South 
Africa is based; it is not, it must be emphasised, intended to be an in-depth examination 
of the South African Constitution insofar as it relates to local government. That is a task 




 4.2 Background 
 
Prior to 1994, each of the then four provinces of South Africa (Cape, Natal, Transvaal 
and the Orange Free State) enacted its own legislation to regulate local government in its 
respective geographical area of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, local government reflected the 
geographic, institutional and social separation that characterised the country as a whole. 
The policy of apartheid sought, by means of spatial separation, influx control, and a 
policy of “own management for own areas,” to limit the extent to which white 
municipalities would bear the burden of servicing disadvantaged black areas (Ministry for 
Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 1998:1). “Own management” 
structures were introduced at local level, for example, in so-called “Bantustans,” where 
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traditional leaders were given powers over land allocation, and some small rural towns 
were granted administrative functions; and Coloured and Indian management committees 
were established as advisory bodies to white municipalities. This resulted in “stark 
inequality in terms of resources between the racially constituted local government 
structures” (de Visser 2005:59). The system as a whole has been described as a “weak, 
illegitimate and entirely non-developmental level of government” (de Visser 2005:60). 
 
In the course of the constitutional negotiations which took place in the early 1990’s, it 
was agreed to establish a Local Government Negotiating Forum, which represented 
formal government structures at all levels and also non-statutory structures, led by the 
South African National Civics Organisation (van Donk and Pieterse 2006). This structure 
developed a three-phase strategy for the transition of local government. 
 
The pre-interim phase began with the promulgation of the Local Government Transition 
Act (Act 209 of 1993) in 1994, which provided for the dissolution of race-based 
municipalities and the establishment of transitional councils, which consisted of members 
appointed in equal proportions from existing local government bodies and non-statutory 
bodies. These councils were responsible for local government until elections were held 
for municipalities in 1996 and 1997.  
 
These elections marked the start of the interim phase. During this period, local 
government consisted of a number of different institutions, namely a two-tier system of 





Transitional Local Councils (which were established in most urban areas), and Rural 
councils. The interim phase saw the amalgamation of previously divided jurisdictions 
which led to a massive increase in the populations served by municipalities.
64
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 This two-tier system which was established in the metropolitan areas, providing an overarching authority 
within which were located several local authorities. 
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 These were largely built on the old Regional Services Councils and Joint Services Boards. 
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 The White Paper notes that this increase in population was not accompanied by a corresponding increase 
in the tax base. Many municipalities experienced financial stress, which coincided with a loss in 
















The interim constitution came into effect in South Africa in 1994 (after, it should be 
noted, the promulgation of the Local Government Transition Act). For the first time, local 
government was granted a constitutionally protected place in the institutional framework 
of South Africa. Section 93 of the interim constitution provided that “Parliament or a 
provincial legislature shall not encroach on the powers, functions and structure of a local 
government to such an extent as to compromise the fundamental status, purpose and 
character of local government.” The interim constitution was followed by the final 
constitution in 1996 (henceforth referred to as “the Constitution”), which is discussed in 
greater detail elsewhere. 
The final phase commenced with the holding of municipal elections in 2000 under a new 
local government dispensation which had evolved during the pre-interim and interim 
phases. It is this dispensation which is the subject of this study. 
 
4.3 The Road to Decentralisation in South Africa  
 
 
It is generally assumed that the new South African Constitution enshrines 
decentralisation. It is also often assumed that decentralisation is a phenomenon which is 
new to the South African landscape. In truth, it had been practised, albeit in a rather 
different form, for years before the advent of the Constitution. Wittenberg (2006) 
identifies three broad periods of decentralisation prior to the era of the Constitution. In 
the first period, with the formation of a unitary state in 1910, South Africa had essentially 
two forms of governance, with a democratic and relatively decentralised system for white 
South Africans and a much more centralised system for black South Africans. In the 
second period, the era of “Grand Apartheid,” the state embarked on a social experiment 
involving the partitioning of the country into separate states based on the “black 
                                                                                                                                                 
Administratively, most municipalities underwent some changes, but many were still “characterised by 
hierarchical line departments, poor coordination between departments, and authoritarian management 


















 It was a coercive form of decentralisation and, as is well 
known, led to the social and economic disintegration of large parts of the country. In the 
final period, it was realised that it would be necessary somehow to include the majority of 
the people in the system, and to that end, it was deemed necessary to find ways of 
redistributing resources. The solution involved, on the one hand, centralisation (for 
example, by the abolition of elected provincial governments), and on the other, the 
creation of bridging structures that cross-cut existing administrative systems. Such 
bridging structures were implemented at regional level, with the creation of nine 
development regions which were intended to facilitate development across the borders of 
the black homelands, and also at local level, with regional services councils being created 
to support growing urban townships. The primary function of this form of 
decentralisation was always intended to be coercive in nature, aimed at maintaining 
control over the black population (Wittenberg 2006).  
 
The process of constitutional development which led to the 1996 Constitution brought 
drastic changes. It has been argued by some (for example, Kauzya (2007)) that the 
decentralised system provided for in the Constitution represents a means of dismantling 
apartheid, being the product of a “new deal” between the aspirations of the black local 
communities and the status quo of the white supremacy to implement the agenda of doing 
away with apartheid for the benefit of everyone” (Kauzya 2007:10).
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The road to decentralisation in the form in which it is presently applied in South Africa 
was not, however, quite as direct as Kauzya suggests. Friedman and Kihato (2004) state 
that the system originates directly from the nature of the political compromise which was  
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Friedman and Kihato (2004) argue that  whilst it is true that under National Party rule, regional political 
units existed which had substantial formal powers, they were not regarded in ideological terms as 




 “...in South Africa decentralized governance as it stands today was demanded from (sic) the grass-root 
black communities as a way of dismantling apartheid. The consultations about it were to determine what 
shape it would take and to solicit at least cooperation from the white communities in its decision and 
implementation” (Kauzya 2007:10). There is little evidence to suggest, however, that decentralisation was 
demanded from or  by any community as a way of dismantling apartheid (It appears that the word “from” 
















negotiated in the 1990’s and was shaped by the transition from apartheid and by the 
suspicions that national elites harboured towards local initiatives. Neither the National 
Party (“NP”) nor the African National Congress (“ANC”), which were the principal 
negotiators in the process, were naturally inclined to the view that sub-national 
government should enjoy significant powers. The approach of the ANC was somewhat 
ambivalent, it having embraced the notion of self-government in its Freedom Charter and, 
by implication, it also embraced the merits of decentralisation, yet it envisioned a unitary 
state which delegated powers to subordinate administrative units (de Visser 2005). The 
antiapartheid movement tended to be strongly centralist, and in its view, a strong central 
state was required to undo the fragmentation wrought by apartheid (Wittenberg 2006). It 
saw decentralisation as a means of diluting majority rule and retaining vestiges of 
apartheid, although it has been suggested that its suspicions were directed more towards 
decentralisation at provincial level rather than local level (Friedman and Kihato 2004).  
The ANC also argued that only a strong unitary state could effectively combat poverty 
and inequality (Friedman and Kihato 2004). In time, however, the NP as well as the 
Inkatha Freedom Party (“IFP”) pressed for stronger sub-national governments. The 
former wanted more authority for neighbourhoods (Oxhorn 2001) as well as strong 
provincial governments (de Visser 2005), with decentralisation being viewed as a means 
of limiting the power of an otherwise immoveable central government; the latter wanted 
significant authority for KwaZulu-Natal province (Oxhorn 2001) which was then the 
IFP’s traditional stronghold. 
 
In time, the ANC came around to the view that a decentralised regional dispensation was 
desirable. The areas which became the nine provinces (largely following the geographical 
areas of  the  development regions  referred to above)  were given “teeth” by being given 
functions (particularly in relation to social services) in the new Constitution; but at the 
insistence of the ANC, these would not be exclusively provincial functions. Instead, the 
central government retained overall policy-making and coordinating functions 
(Wittenberg 2006). The ANC also eventually made (at least on the face of it) a strong 
commitment to local government. By 1995, when the negotiations for the final 















were – at least publicly - largely of one mind about the desirability of a strong local level 
of government. The ANC’s view was that local government should be a feature of the 
constitution and that it should enjoy the status of a “specific level of government and not 
merely a provincial function;” the Democratic Party took the view that local government 
should be understood as a “sphere” rather than a “tier” of government (a concept which 
was incorporated in the final constitution) and that there should be no predetermined 
hierarchy amongst the spheres of government; and the NP saw local government as a 
“fully-fledged level of government” (Constitutional Assembly of the Republic of South 
Africa 1995). The parties all held views which, to varying extents, recognised the status 
of local government as not necessarily being subservient to other levels of government. 
They also all agreed that the powers and functions of local government should be 
protected by the constitution, although they differed on the details.  
 
The final result was that the constitutional framework which emerged made provision for 
a decentralised system which, on the face of it, assured the existence of local government 




The curious thing about the incorporation of a decentralised system in South Africa is that 
there does not appear to be any explicit motive behind it. It will be recalled from Chapters 
2 and 3 that a number of typical motives behind, and expected outcomes of, 
decentralisation had been identified. Yet none of these motives appears to have been a 
driving force in the case of South Africa, nor do any of the typical expected outcomes 
appear to have been foremost on the minds of the parties to the constitutional negotiation 
process. It is particularly noteworthy that the dominant party in the process, the ANC, 
was during the greater part of the process at most luke-warm in its enthusiasm for the 
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 At the second reading debate of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, the then Minister 
of Constitutional Development felt compelled to declare that “Local government is now recognised, side by 
side with the national and provincial level, as a tier of government in its own right  with the full 
constitutional protection that provincial governments enjoy...What we have done now is to remove local 
government as a mere competence or functional area of another level of government. Local Government is 
a level of government in its own right. It is not a function of provincial or national government as such, just 
as provincial government is not a function of any other level of government, including national 
government.” (Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, 6 May 1996, cols.239-240). As far as the present 
author can ascertain, not once in the course of the debates in the Constitutional Assembly on the final 















notion of decentralisation, and often somewhat hostile towards it. The smaller parties 
were, for various reasons, largely enthusiastic, but they alone would not have had 
sufficient influence to determine the course of events so unequivocally in favour of 
decentralisation. 
 
One has, therefore, to speculate as to the reasons for the adoption of a decentralised 
system. It has been suggested (Wittenberg 2006) that the reason for the ANC agreeing to 
decentralisation on a provincial basis was that it would provide a means of reining in the 
national bureaucracy and buying off the Bantustan leaders (who had largely thrown in 
their lot with the ANC). As far as the acceptance of decentralisation at local level is 
concerned, de Visser (2005) alludes to  three possible reasons for this development: first, 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme, which was a cornerstone of ANC 
policy, was linked to and placed reliance on strong local government; second, the civic 
movement which flourished in the 1980’s promoted the notion of a strong local sphere of 
government; and third, the ANC’s aversion to powers being decentralised to provincial 
governments perhaps made it relatively more palatable to decentralise powers to local 
government instead – the view perhaps being taken by the ANC that, given the balance of 
power in the provinces at the time, it would have been easier to influence  a strong local 
sphere of government than a strong provincial sphere.
68
 This last reason does not, 
however, explain why decentralisation on a regional level was in any event accepted by 
the ANC. 
 
It may, of course, also be possible that the adoption of a decentralised model was 
motivated by a genuine desire to enhance public participation and to improve service 
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 Friedman and Kihato, however, maintain that “enthusiasm for local government was more rhetorical than 
real”(2004:157), this despite the role played by the civic movement. This was said to be due to the fact that 
the civic movement was at all times an integral part of the broader anti-apartheid struggle and its members 
mostly supporters of the ANC. “This meant…that the fight for local decision-making power was always a 
means to an end – the defeat of apartheid - and that as the achievement of that goal neared the expression of 
local power receded into the background, dwarfed by the far more pressing goal.” Furthermore, the civic 
movement was always “a loyal servant” of the national movement and was disinclined to challenge 
















delivery; or because it was seen as a means of reunifying the country;
69
 there is, however, 
little to suggest that these objectives were foremost on the minds of decision-makers. 
 
There is perhaps yet another reason. It will be remembered from Chapter 3 that the wave 
of decentralisation which swept around the world was particularly strong at the time; it is 
not inconceivable that, prompted by the fashion of the time, and perhaps encouraged by 
agencies which had decentralisation as an agenda, or by other states which favoured 
decentralisation and were able to influence events in South Africa, it was inevitable that 




4.4 The New Constitution 
 
A crucial step in the decentralisation process in South Africa was the adoption of the new 
Constitution in 1996. The provisions of the Constitution which are relevant to this study 
(Mostly contained in Chapter 7 of the Construction) are dealt with in greater detail 
elsewhere,
71
 and it is not intended to discuss them in detail at this point; suffice it to say  
for present purposes that the Constitution provided for key issues which are relevant to 
decentralised government, including the distinct nature of local government, the need for 
intergovernmental cooperation, the right of a municipality to govern the local government 
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 The World Bank is quite explicit in opining that the goal of decentralisation in South Africa was to 




 Friedman and Kihato suggest that “fashionable governance ideas were accepted not because gullible 
locals were talked into adopting the latest snake oil remedy from the disingenuous North, but because the 
fashion seemed to local elites to offer a way out of real dilemmas and to provide solutions to real problems” 
(2004:142). See also Koelble and LiPuma (2008). 
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The next major phase in the process of evolution was the development of the White Paper 
on Local Government. The White Paper was itself the product of a process which 
commenced with the production of a discussion document which raised a number of 
questions on the future structure and nature of local government (Craythorne 2006). This 
led to the production of a Green Paper on Local Government in October 1997 which set 
out a potential policy on local government; and this in turn led to the White Paper on 
Local Government, which was approved by the Cabinet in 1998 and thereby became 
government policy. It formed a broad statement of policy which was to provide the 
framework for giving legislative “teeth” to the relevant provisions of the Constitution. 
 
The White Paper is partially the key to understanding the broader framework of modern 
local government in South Africa and it will therefore be appropriate and useful to dwell 
on aspects of it which are of particular relevance to this study. These are discussed in 
subsections 4.5.2 to 4.5.6 below.  
 
4.5.2 Developmental Local Government 
 
The objects of local government had already been spelled out in Section 152 of the 
Constitution by the time that the White Paper was produced. The White Paper translated 
these objects into the notion of Developmental Local Government which it defined as 
“...local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the 
community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs 
and improve the quality of their lives.”  
 
The White Paper ascribed various characteristics to the notion of developmental local 
























In the context of developmental actions, the White Paper saw local government as having 
four key outcomes: the provision of household infrastructure and services; the creation of 
liveable integrated cities, towns and rural areas; local economic development; and finally, 
community empowerment and redistribution. 
 
It was seen as necessary for significant changes to be made to the way local government 
worked in order to achieve these developmental outcomes. Three inter-related tools were 
proposed in the White Paper to assist municipalities to become more developmental, 
namely, integrated planning and budgeting; performance management, and working 
together with local citizens and partners. 
 
The first of these tools, integrated planning, was proposed as a process to enable 
municipalities to establish development plans for the short, medium and long terms. 
According to the White Paper, Integrated Development Plans (or IDP’s, as they are 
commonly known) are in effect planning and strategic frameworks to help municipalities 
fulfil their developmental mandates. The development of IDP’s was seen as a way of 
enhancing the strategic planning capacity of municipal administrations, building 





The second and third tools are of greater interest for purposes of this study. The second 
tool, performance management, was viewed as being critical to ensure the 
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 Whilst it was recognised that regulation remains an important government function, it was argued that the 
regulation function of municipalities should be supplemented with leadership, encouragement, practical 
support and resources for community action. Developmental Local Government was seen as being uniquely 
placed to combine empowerment and redistribution.  
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 The concept of the IDP has attracted enormous interest from writers as well as having absorbed an 
astounding proportion of the energies of many municipalities. Given the attention which Integrated 
Development Planning has already enjoyed, it is not proposed to devote further attention to it in this study. 
















implementation of plans, that they resulted in the desired developmental impact, and that 
resources were utilised efficiently. Performance management is often associated with the 
concept of New Public Management, but it is also an important element of 
decentralisation inasmuch as it concerns the dimension of institutional capacity, and it 
will be examined later in this study. 
 
The third tool was “working together with local citizens and partners.”  The White Paper 
declared that “Building local democracy is a central role of local government, and 
municipalities should develop strategies and mechanisms…to continuously engage with 
citizens, business and community groups.” “Working together with local citizens” is an 
aspect of community participation which, as we have seen, is an important component of 
decentralisation, and which will also be examined in some detail later. 
 
Municipalities were seen as requiring active participation by citizens at four levels: as 
voters; as citizens who express their views before, during and after the policy 
development process, in order to ensure that policies reflect community preferences as far 
as possible; as consumers and end-users, who expect value-for-money, affordable 
services and courteous and responsive service; and as organised partners involved in the 
mobilisation of resources for development via for-profit business, non-governmental 
organisations and community-based institutions. 
 
4.5.3 Co-operative Government 
 
Co-operative government is an important aspect of the White Paper,
74
 which recognised 
the need to establish a set of formal and informal processes, structures, channels and 
institutional arrangements for bilateral and multilateral interaction within and between 
spheres of government. Both National and Provincial governments were viewed as 
having a number of roles and responsibilities with respect to local government. 
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 Co-operative government is, as we have seen, one of the key dimensions of decentralisation, and is also a 
















In the context of co-operative government in practice, it was also recognised that national 
government was “increasingly looking to local government as a logical point of co-
ordination and a necessary vehicle for the implementation of policies and programmes” 
(Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 1998:52), and that 
provincial governments were also decentralising certain functions to local government.  
 
National and provincial government were seen as being in a position to build local 
government capacity through the way they executed their own programmes. One of the 
ways in which this could be achieved was working with local government directly; 
another was by integrating programmes into municipal Integrated Development Plans; 





4.5.4 Administrative Systems 
 
The White Paper declared that “little attention has been paid to rethinking the basic 
principles on which (municipal) administration is organised. In particular, new 
administrative capacities have not been built and administrative operations have remained 
locked in traditional approaches to service delivery. The potential, skills and energies of 
the majority of the workforce have not been harnessed for transformation;” and further, 
“transformation for developmental local government requires a further process of 
administrative reorga isation to gear municipalities to meet the considerable challenges 
of social, economic and material development in all communities” (Ministry for 
Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 1998:92). 
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 In this regard, it was noted that national and provincial governments are constitutionally permitted to 
devolve powers and functions to local government. It was recognised that whilst decentralisation was often 
desirable to improve the effectiveness of government as a whole, it is not without problems. Of particular 
concern was the phenomenon of the “unfunded mandate” – that is, the devolution of a function to local 
government without it being accompanied by the financial and administrative capacity required to sustain 
it. It was recognised that unfunded mandates strain local government’s limited resources which would 
















Administrative issues with which the White Paper concerned itself included “new 
approaches to service delivery” and core administrative capacities to support 
development. The latter issue is of greater interest for purposes of this study, in the 
context of the dimension of administrative capacity.  
 
4.5.5 Municipal Finance 
 
The White Paper proposed a new framework for Municipal Finance to support the 
developmental role of local government. The policy objectives as stated in the White 
paper were to be revenue adequacy and certainty, sustainability, effective and efficient 
use of resources, accountability, transparency and good governance, equity and 
redistribution, development and investment, and macroeconomic management. It was 
deemed necessary to restructure the financial and fiscal system in four areas in order to 
achieve these objectives. 
 
Local revenue instruments and policies were the subject of the first such area. Sources of 
revenue considered were property rates, fuel levies and user charges. Showing a degree of 
prescience perhaps lacking elsewhere in the White Paper, it was recognised that credit 
control would be a vital instrument for ensuring the viability of local authorities (Ministry 
for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 1998:113-119). 
 
The second area related to intergovernmental transfers. Transfers had been provided for 
in the Constitution
76
 and it was proposed in the White Paper that a new system of  
transfers would address two key issues, namely, “vertical division,” whereby funds are 
allocated to the various spheres of government, and “horizontal division, whereby the 
amount available to local government as a whole is allocated to individual municipalities. 
Transfers would take the form of either an “equitable share” of national revenue, aimed at 
supplementing the operating costs of municipalities, or conditional grants for capital 
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projects. It was proposed that a transparent, formula-based system be phased in order to 
determine the division of revenue. 
 
The third area dealt with the levering of additional investment in the municipal sector. 
There were seen to be three key areas of municipal finance which supported additional 
investment: borrowing and investment powers of municipalities; credit enhancement (in 
lieu of national guarantees
77
) and concessional finance. The view was taken that in order 
to encourage private investment, it would be necessary to achieve greater clarity with 
respect to the security of loan investments. This was intended to be facilitated by the 
development of a framework of monitoring the financial position of municipalities. The 
general approach was to emphasise the importance of achieving financial discipline 
through decentralised market relationships rather than the direct, centralised control of 
local government. 
 
The fourth area was concerned with budgeting, accounting, financial reporting and 
management. Whilst the White Paper emphasised that budgets were “a critical tool for 
refocusing the resources and capacity of the municipality behind developmental goals,” it 
recognised that budgeting, accounting, financial reporting and financial practices of 
municipalities suffered from a number of weaknesses, including unrealistic budgeting, 
poor credit control, a lack of budgetary and financial discipline, and a lack of user-
friendly and accessible information on the budget process. Curiously, the only measure 
contained in the White Paper aimed at addressing this issue relates to the establishment of 
a generally accepted accounting practice for municipalities, with recommendations for 
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 Section 218 of the Constitution provides that the “national government (and) a provincial government 
















4.5.6 The Transformation Process 
 
The White Paper proposed that the achievement of developmental local government 
depended, not just on policies and laws, but on municipalities themselves: “as they 
engage with transformation, they will - step by step – give real content to their 
developmental role” (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 
Development1998:129).The reader might be forgiven for thinking (even if only with the 
benefit of hindsight) that this was a rather unrealistic expectation; one which is further 
reflected in the statement that “over the past five years...municipalities and communities 
have built up capacity. In the process of negotiating changes in their local areas, they 
acquired skills to engage with different opinions, promote change, negotiate and mediate, 
innovate, collectively find solutions to challenges” (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development19981998:129).  
 
National government’s principal role in the transformation process was seen as preparing 
the way for nation-wide municipal elections and the creation of an enabling framework of 
laws and policies which would promote the establishment of a new developmental local 
government. In addition, national government was to facilitate the establishment of 
mechanisms to support municipal transformation. Means of achieving this last objective 
were to include the increasing of local government’s voice, the coordinated 
decentralisation of powers and functions to local government, a coherent planning 
framework for integrated development planning, support for improved service delivery, 
developing performance management systems, training and capacity-building, increasing 
financial certainty, and ongoing institutional development.  
 
4.5.7 Critiques of the White Paper 
 
The local government policy framework as captured in the White Paper has been 
described as ambitious, and as a commanding, complex, forward-looking and optimistic 















heart of an effort to achieve democratic citizenship, integrated development and 
reconciliation between the divided communities in South Africa (Pieterse 2002).  
 
Other commentators offered more incisive opinions. It was pointed out that the White 
Paper failed to state simply and accurately the core challenges that faced local 
government in 1998, or to assess the implications of this situation, with no clear 
statement of how government perceives the crisis in local government (Bernstein 1998).
78
 
Specific criticisms levelled at the White Paper included its failure to deal systematically 
with a range of complex issues, such as the perception that at the time, two-thirds of 
municipalities were financially distressed and one-third were not financially viable, with 
no hope of generating income to cover their service commitments. A further criticism 
was that although a critical component of the crisis in local government was the lack of 
administrative, managerial and financial capacity in many local authorities to enable them 
to function as viable entities, this “stark reality” was scarcely alluded to in the White 
Paper, and certainly did not form the basis upon which any policies or new approaches to 
local government would be based. Instead, the White Paper simply assumed the capacity 
in most respects and then enumerated the many and often new functions for local 
government to perform (Bernstein 1998). Issues relating to the extent and causes of non-
payment of rates and service charges where also ignored.  
 
It is interesting to note that as early as 1998, commentators had identified the existence of 
serious challenges, whilst the White Paper tended to gloss over them, with vague 
comments such as “some municipalities have inadequate financial management capacity” 
and “many administrations are still organized in much the same way as before, and most 
have not made significant progress with respect to transforming delivery systems” 
(Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development1998:8). Such statements 
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“…each challenge is dealt with as a separate element, making a mockery of notions of integration and 
coordination...unless we fully understand the nature, scope and causes of the current crisis...we will be 
unable to identify the implications for future policy. Until this is systematically addressed, we might just 
keep on repeating the same errors and making the same false assumptions.” (Bernstein 1998:298) A 
















certainly do not reveal any appreciation for the magnitude of the problems which even 
then were facing local government, and which persist today. 
 
It is also worth noting that the White Paper was considered by the Constitutional Affairs 
Portfolio Committee of Parliament in 1998. It had been suggested during the course of 
proceedings that the White Paper encouraged centralisation rather than decentralisation of 
powers and functions to the local level of government,
79
 which prompted the then 
Minister for Constitutional Affairs to counter that the White Paper set out to establish 
autonomy in the local sphere. Without any apparent sense of irony, the Minister spoke of 
a “village mentality” which, in his view, “meant that there is a notion of communities 
wanting to do things their own way irrespective of what has been decided upon by 





Following the final Constitution and the White Paper, a slew of legislation pertaining to 
local government was enacted. The Constitution sets out the broad principles and requires 
subsequent acts of parliament to determine how these principles are to be applied. The 
supportive legislation enacted in the first years after the 1994 transition does not 
primarily legislate specifics but puts in place sets of institutional arrangements to 
facilitate what was no doubt hoped would be the best substantive outcome (Fölscher and 
Cole 2006). Later legislation showed a tendency to be more detailed and prescriptive.  
 
This section enumerates the various statutes relating to local government and provides a 
brief description of their respective purposes. What emerges from the legislation is a 
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 One of the submissions criticised the White Paper for attempting to spell out measures to dictate 
outcomes in municipalities. It was argued that various local governments should have more of an 
opportunity to choose their own outcomes, and should be permitted and encouraged rather than mandated 
in their actions; if this was not to be the approach from national level, then the nature of local democracy 

















comprehensive statutory  framework which largely reflects a decentralised model of local 
governance, covering issues from demarcation of local government areas of jurisdiction, 
to funding (both from local sources and from central government), to local government 
structures, to mechanisms and systems for implementation The relevant statutes are 
discussed below in chronological order.  
 
(i) Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, no. 97 of 1997: The purpose of this Act is to 
promote co-operation between the national, provincial and local spheres of government 
on fiscal, budgetary and financial matters, and to that end, to prescribe a process for the 
determination of an equitable sharing and allocation of revenue raised nationally. The 
enactment of a statute dealing the equitable division of revenues was expressly required 
by section 214 of the Constitution. Section 227 of the Constituti n specifically provides 
that local government is entitled to an equitable share of revenues. 
 
(ii) Financial and Fiscal Commission Act, no. 99 of 1997: Section 220 of the Constitution 
establishes the Financial and Fiscal Commission. Its function is to make 
recommendations envisaged in Chapter 13 of the Constitution, which deals with general 
financial matters, including local financial matters. The Financial and Fiscal Commission 
Act gives effect to the Constitution and specifically states that the Commission acts as a 
consultative body for, and makes recommendations and gives advice to, organs of state in 
the national, provincial and local spheres of government on financial and fiscal matters. 
 
(iii) Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, no. 27 of 1998: The purpose of the 
Municipal Demarcation Act is to establish the Municipal Demarcation Board whose 
function it is to determine Municipal boundaries and to provide advice on matters relating 
to the Act. The enactment of the Act was required under section 155 (3) of the 
Constitution. 
 
(iv) Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, no. 117 of 1998 (“Structures Act”): 
The Structures Act provides for the establishment of municipalities, establishes criteria 















the types of municipality that may be established within each category, provides for the 
division of functions and powers between categories of municipality, regulates the 
internal systems, structures and office-bearers of municipalities and provides for electoral 




(v) Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act, no. 27 of 2000:  This act regulates the 
conduct of municipal elections. 
 
(vi)Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, no. 32  of 2000 (“Systems Act”): The 
purpose of the Systems Act is, amongst many other  things,  to establish the  principles, 
mechanisms and processes that enable municipalities to function, to define the legal 
nature of municipalities, to provide for the manner in which municipal powers and 
functions are exercised and performed, to establish a frameworks for community 
participation, planning and  performance management, to provide a framework for local 
public administration and human resource development and  to provide for  service tariffs 
and credit control and debt policies. 
 
(vii) Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, no. 56 of 2003 (“MFMA”): 
The aim of the MFMA is, according to its long title, to “secure sound and sustainable 
management of the affairs of municipalities…” Provision is made, amongst other things, 
for revenue management, budgets, debt, responsibilities of office bearers and officials, 
supply chain management and financial reporting and auditing. 
 
(viii) Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act, no. 6 of 2004 (“Rates Act”): 
This Act provides for municipalities to impose rates on properties, to provide for 
exemptions and exclusions, to provide for valuations and objections, and the like. 
According to the preamble to the Act, there is a need to provide local government with 
“access to a sufficient and buoyant source of revenue”; “income derived from property 
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 Interestingly, it has been said of the Structures Act that it “clearly marks the national state’s efforts to 
centralise so as to enforce its redistributive and growth goals” (Oldfield 2002:94). Is this really a case of 
centralisation or is it rather an attempt to clothe a broad decentralised framework as contained in the 















rates is a critical source of revenue for municipalities to achieve their constitutional 
objectives”; and “it is essential that municipalities exercise their power to impose rates 
within a statutory framework that …enhances certainty, simplicity and uniformity…” 
 
(ix) Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, no. 13 of 2005: The purpose of this Act 
is to establish a framework for the national government, provincial governments and local 
governments to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations and to provide for 
mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the settlement of intergovernmental disputes. 
 
(x) Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act, no. 12 of 2007: This Act is intended to 
give effect to the provisions of section 229 (1) of the Constitution which, amongst other 
things, permits the imposition by municipalities of surcharges on fees and if authorised 
by national legislation, taxes, levies and duties in addition to rates and surcharges. It 
provides that the minister of finance may authorise a municipal tax, and may prescribe 
compulsory national norms and standards for imposing municipal surcharges. As at the 
time of writing, no such municipal tax had been authorised. 
 
4.7 Categories of Municipalities 
 
One of the features which emerged from the development of the local government 
framework was the categorisation of municipalities into three types as provided for in the 
Constitution. Although the categorisation of municipalities is not especially relevant to 
the decentralisation per se, the different categories are frequently referred to in this study 
and it is therefore appropriate to discuss them briefly at this point. 
 
The first type of municipality is the metropolitan municipality (referred to in the 
Constitution as a “Category A” municipality). Metropolitan municipalities have been 
established for the major urban areas in South Africa. Such a municipality has exclusive 
municipal executive and legislative authority in its area. Metropolitan municipalities are 
authorised to perform within their areas all of the powers and functions given to local 















second type is the “local municipality” (referred to as a “Category B” municipality in the 
Constitution). The third type is the “district municipality” (referred to as a “Category C” 
municipality in the Constitution). Typically, several local municipalities are situated 
within the geographical area of jurisdiction of each district municipality. Local 
municipalities share municipal executive and legislative authority in their respective areas 
with the district municipality within whose area they are located. Powers and functions 
are allocated between the two categories of municipality in accordance with the 
provisions of the Structures Act, 
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 so that a district municipality performs specific 
functions across the entire district, whilst each local municipality situated in that district  
performs other specific functions within its own local area of jurisdiction.  
 
 As at the time of writing, South Africa has 6 metropolitan municipalities, 46 district 
municipalities and 231 local municipalities. 
 
4.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
According to the World Bank (2000), decentralisation typically takes place during 
periods of political and economic upheaval. Such conditions may not always be 
conducive to the effective application of a process of decentralisation.
82
 South Africa has 
indeed  undergone a radical transformation in its local government system, but although 
the transformation  may in many respects have been dramatic, it was nonetheless carried 
out pursuant to a process of negotiation which resulted in a general consensus as to the 
course to be taken, with due provision having been made for the orderly and rational 
implementation of a system of decentralised governance. In the course of the process, a 
new system of local government was constitutionally entrenched, and the end product is a 
battery of legislation which is intended to give effect to the constitutional features 
relevant to local government. Nonetheless, a critical component of the process - that of 
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 Structures Act, Sections 83 to 88. See Chapter 11 for further detail on this topic. 
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 “Euphoria at the fall of an authoritarian regime, an economic crisis that precipitates a regime’s collapse, 
the jockeying for power of new interest groups -all these conditions create an environment in which a 















the development of policy, as reflected in the White Paper on Local Government - is a 
cause for disquiet. The lack of appreciation in the White Paper for the nature and extent 
of the problems besetting local government at the time that it was produced, and the lack 
of a realistic, focussed response to those problems, give cause to question whether the 
legislative framework which resulted was or is capable of being properly implemented. 


















Methodology and Related Matters 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The object of a systematic study of governance is to determine “how, why, and with what 
consequences public-sector activity is structured and managed” (Lynn et al, 2000:234). 
Local government in South Africa involves, amongst other things, people, personalities, 
agendas, external pressures, internal turmoil, various functional disciplines, conflicting 
goals, and competing demands. These issues are not unique to South African local 
government – any organisation has and encounters them. One of the features of modern 
South African local government which distinguishes it as a subject for research, however, 
is the fact that it is richly endowed with a set of rules which, on the face of it, represents a 
framework for dealing with those issues, for achieving good governance, and for 
producing effective, efficient and accountable administration. As has been shown in 
Chapter 1, however, there is mounting evidence that despite these rules, the presumably 
hoped-for objectives of local government have in many respects not been attained. This 
study endeavours to establish how the framework of local government is structured, why 
it is so structured, and what the consequences of adopting that structure are. The 
methodology employed in this study as described in the next section therefore aims to 
achieve the object stated above by Lynn et al insofar as it relates to South African Local 
Government.  
 
5.2 Research Methodology 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted on various aspects of decentralisation in different 
parts of the world. Different approaches and methodologies have been used in order to 
achieve the particular objects of these studies. Hiskey and Seligson (2003), for example, 
examine the role played by decentralised local institutions in Bolivia in shaping citizen 















surveys. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) examine the consequences of local capture for 
the impact of decentralisation for potentially observable measures of performance of an 
anti-poverty programme in India. Falleti (2005) examines the set of preferences of 
national and sub-national actors in Argentina, Mexico and Colombia with regard to the 
various types of decentralisation by means of interviews with politicians and officials. 
Asthana (2003) examines and compares the efficiency of water utilities under the control 
of state and local governments in India by examining records of state public health 
engineering departments. O’Dwyer and Ziblatt (2006), by contrast, use a data set which 
includes 68 countries from Western Europe, North America, Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa 
and South America to explore the relationship between the degree of decentralisation of a 
country’s political institutions and the quality of its governance. Putnam’s (2003) famous 
study of institutional performance in Italy involved, amongst other things, personal 
interviews with regional councillors and community leaders, nationwide surveys, and 
case studies. The examples of the various studies referred to above demonstrate that 
different objectives call for different approaches and different methods. 
 
It follows that the particular objectives of the present study call for a particular approach, 
one which nonetheless borrows elements of the methods used in certain of the studies 
referred to above. Accordingly, the methodology employed in this study for purposes of 
answering the research questions referred to in section 1.5 of Chapter 1 is intended to 
achieve the following: 
 
 First, to determine a set of “dimensions of decentralisation” as a basis for 
evaluation. The term “dimensions” is really one of convenience, and encompasses 
what may be described as the essential elements of decentralisation. These 
dimensions are more fully considered and analysed in Chapter 6, but it is 
appropriate to mention them now for the sake of placing them in context. They 
are: 
 
(i) Constitutional security 















(iii) Democratic process 
(iv) Intergovernmental relations 
(v) Local government executive structure 
(vi) Administrative authority 
(vii) Institutional capacity 
(viii) Public participation and information mechanisms 
(ix) Jurisdictional scope 
(x) Legislative authority 
(xi) Revenue raising authority 
(xii) Revenue sharing.83 
 
 Second, to evaluate the local government framework against the twelve 
dimensions referred to above; this is intended to provide the answer to the first of 
the research questions, namely, “To what extent are the principles of 
decentralisation incorporated and supported in the regulatory framework of Local 
Government in South Africa?” 
 Third, to evaluate the extent to which certain of those dimensions, having been 
incorporated in that framework, are actually given effect to in practice in 
municipalities in South Africa. This is intended to answer the second of the 
research questions namely, “To what extent are the principles of decentralisation 
applied in practice within this framework?” It must be emphasised that not all of 
the dimensions are applicable to actual practice; accordingly, the evaluation of 
actual practice is limited to dimensions (v), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi) and (xii).  
For purposes of responding to the second research question, 37 municipalities in 
South Africa were involved in the process. Metropolitan municipalities- which are 
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 Putnam’s (2003) study was founded on twelve indicators (cabinet stability, budget promptness, statistical 
and information services, reform legislation, legislative innovation, day care centres, family clinics, 
industrial policy instruments, agricultural spending capacity, local health unit expenditures, housing and 
urban development and bureaucratic responsiveness). Although the present study is concerned with the 
application of the principles of decentralisation rather than with the success of individual institutions, and 
although the “dimensions” used in the present study are mostly different from Putnam’s indicators, the 
















generally considered to be better resourced - were excluded from the process, the 
objective of this study being to focus on more “typical” municipalities. The choice of 
municipalities was determined by accessibility and availability of information 
pertaining to them. Within those confines, an attempt was made to examine a 
representative sample of municipalities across various spectrums, which are described 
below: 
 Geographic Spectrum: Municipalities were selected from each of the 9 
provinces in South Africa. The 37 municipalities included in this study are 
distributed amongst the Provinces as follows: 
o Eastern Cape: 3 municipalities; 
o Free State: 4 municipalities; 
o KwaZulu-Natal: 4 municipalities; 
o Gauteng: 1 municipality; 
o Limpopo: 6 Municipalities; 
o Mpumalanga: 4 municipalities; 
o Northern Cape: 4 municipalities; 
o North West Province: 4 municipalities; 
o Western Cape: 7 municipalities. 
 
 District/Local Spectrum: The municipalities in the study were divided 
amongst the district and local categories as follows (no metropolitan 
municipalities were included in the study): 
o District: 3 municipalities 
















 “Capacity” Spectrum: The National Treasury has categorised every municipality 
as a High, Medium or Low Capacity municipality.
84
 The 37 municipalities in this 
study are represented in these categories as follows: 
o High Capacity: 5 municipalities 
o Medium Capacity: 13 municipalities ( including all 3 district municipalities 
in this study) 
o Low Capacity: 19 municipalities. 
 
 “Functionality/socio-economic” spectrum: The Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs
85
 (or “CoGTA,” as it is colloquially known), 
which is the national government department responsible for local government, 
designed a municipal classification system to devel p municipal profiles 
according to spatial location based on the following indicator sets: functionality, 
socio-economic profile, and basic service backlog status. It applies only to local 
municipalities and not to district or metropolitan municipalities. “Its purpose is to 
inform a differentiated approach to the management and governance of our 
municipalities across the rural and urban landscape of the country” (Department 
of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2009(a):76). Class 1 includes 
the most vulnerable municipalities; Class 2 includes the “second most 
vulnerable”; Class 3 represents the second highest performing; and Class 4 
represents the highest performing. The 34 local  municipalities
86
 in this study 
were divided amongst these classes as follows: 
o Class 1: 6 municipalities 
o Class 2: 11 municipalities 
o Class 3: 10 municipalities 
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 In GN 773 published in Government Gazette 26511 of 1 July 2004. The purpose of the classification was 
originally to serve as a means for granting various municipalities exemptions to delay implementation of 
various provisions of the MFMA, depending on their financial management capacity as judged by the 
National Treasury. This classification is no longer relevant to its original purpose, as all municipalities are 
now required to implement the MFMA in full, but it remains a useful classification for our purpose 
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 Formerly known as the Department of Provincial and Local Government. 
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o Class 4: 7 municipalities 
 
 The Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework is the final spectrum. It uses 
the legal categorisations contained in the Constitution, i.e. “A” category 
(metropolitan municipality), “B” category (local municipality) and “C” category 
(district municipality”), with the latter two categories being further refined as 
follows: 
 
B1: local municipalities with the largest budgets, also known as “secondary 
cities” 
B2: local municipalities with large towns at their core 
B3: local municipalities with small towns and relatively small populations 
B4: local municipalities which are mainly rural with communal land tenure 
C1: district municipalities which are not water service authorities 




The 37 municipalities in this study were represented in these categories as 
follows: 
o Category A: 0 
o Category B1: 3 municipalities 
o Category B2: 3 municipalities 
o Category B3: 21 municipalities 
o Category B4: 7 municipalities 
o Category C1: 3 municipalities 
o Category C2: 0. 
 
Appendix A (Table 1) shows the above distribution in tabulated form. Provinces are 
indicated in this table in abbreviated form, as follows: 
 Eastern Cape: EC 
 Free State: FS 
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 Gauteng: Gng 
 KwaZulu-Natal: KZN 
 Limpopo: Lim 
 Mpumalanga: Mpum 
 Northern Cape: NC 
 North West: NW 
 Western Cape: WC 
 
The same abbreviations are used in the other tables presented in this study. It should be 
noted that for reasons of confidentiality, the individual municipalities are not identified 
by name, but merely by the relevant provincial abbreviations and serial numbers allocated 
by the author. 
 
5.3 Archival and Documentary Sources 
 
Limited data on individual municipalities were to be found in public records; such 
information as was available was obtained for each municipality from public records 
from three main sources.  
 
First, the Annual Capacity Assessment Reports of the Municipal Demarcation Board for 
2008/2009 were examined for information relating to staffing issues and the performance 
by municipalities of their powers and functions.  
 
Second, each municipality’s summarised budget for the 2009/10 financial year (being the 
current year at the time of writing), as well as the budgetary projections for the following 
two financial years (these three financial years together constituting the Medium-term 
Revenue and Expenditure Framework for the period 2009-2013) was also examined, the 
objective being to determine the extent of reliance on national subsidies. These budgets 















prepared by the National Treasury, which compilation is  referred to in this study as 
“Operating and Capital Budgets for all Municipalities 2009/10 to 2001/12.” 
 
Third, the reports of the Auditor-General for each of the municipalities for the 2007/08 
financial year were examined. The purpose of this was to ascertain levels of compliance 
with certain legislation and also to ascertain certain indicators relating to good 
management practice. 
 
5.4 Information Obtained Directly from Municipalities 
 
Information was also derived directly from the 37 municipalities in the sample.  Given 
the lack of data available from public records, this proved to be an important source of 
information. 
 
Information was gathered by means of discussions and interviews with officials of the 
municipalities, and by examining documentation kept by municipalities. Where necessary 
and possible, the information which was obtained was supplemented by reference to the 
archival sources referred to above, such as reports of the Auditor-General and reports of 
the Municipal Demarcation Board. Responses were, where appropriate and possible, also 
verified by examination of supporting documents obtained from municipalities. 
 
 The process of gathering information directly from municipalities stretched over an 
extended period of some 14 months. The results of this process therefore do not constitute 
a single “snapshot” of the entire sample at a particular moment. Rather, they represent a 
series of snapshots of the respective municipalities taken over the extended period, with 
each examination of a municipality revealing the state of affairs prevailing at such 
municipality at the time it was undertaken. Circumstances at any particular municipality 

















Inasmuch as the objective of the process was to determine the extent to which the 
dimensions of decentralisation are actually applied in practice, it focussed mainly on 
those dimensions of decentralisation which are relevant to actual practice in South 
African municipalities, namely, dimensions (v), (vii), (vii), (ix), (x), (xi) and (xii).The 
collection of empirical data on municipalities was therefore confined to these dimensions 
only. 
 
Where it was not possible to obtain information from certain municipalities on specific 
issues, of necessity the sample of municipalities was reduced in respect of those issues. 
Thus whilst 37 municipalities in total were examined for purposes of this study, in a 
number of cases a lesser number was examined in relation to specific issues. In cases 
where fewer than 37 municipalities were examined in relation t  any particular aspect, 
this is noted in the text of this study. 
 
5.5 Research Challenges 
 
A challenge to any research on local government in South Africa relates to the 
accessibility of information. Many South African Municipalities are extremely opaque 
organisations in the sense that information regarding them is not easily obtained, either 
because it is not recorded or it is not readily accessible. As far as the individual 
municipalities which are the subject of this research are concerned, there may be several 
reasons for this.  
 
In the first place, a number of these municipalities had inadequate record-keeping 
systems, and information on certain topics was often simply not recorded. 
 
A second cause is the fact that in many cases, “institutional memory” had been lost. This 
was due in large part to the large turnover of staff in many municipalities. In a number of 
cases, key staff members from whom information was sought had been in office for only 
a few weeks, with little continuity between themselves and their predecessors. In other 















municipality concerned had any particular interest in or knowledge of the subject matter 
on which information was sought. 
 
A third cause is the lack of skills and knowledge. It became apparent during the course of 
this research that many municipal officials simply did not know their subjects well 
enough to provide the required information. This was sometimes true even in cases where 
the officials in question had been in office for extended periods. 
 
A fourth cause is the lack of compliance with statutory requirements relating to access to 
information. For example, municipalities are required by legislation to maintain websites 
on which a wealth of information is supposed to be available. Theoretically, therefore, 
much of the information which was required for this research sh uld have been easy to 
pluck from those websites. The reality is far different. Most of the municipalities which 
are the subject of this research either did not have websites at all, or had websites which 




These difficulties to a large extent determined the methodology employed in this research, 
as described in this chapter. As Lynn et al (2000) point out, decisions about appropriate 
models are inexorably intertwined with the limitations of available data.  
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Dimensions of Decentralisation: A Basis for Evaluation 
 
6.1 Purpose of Chapter 
 
An evaluation of the extent to which the principles of decentralisation have been 
incorporated and are applied in local government in South Africa is undertaken in 
Chapters 7 to 12. First, however, it will be necessary to determine the dimensions which 
make up the essence of decentralisation. It is against these dimensions that such an 
evaluation will be made. The purpose of this chapter is to enumerate and discuss those 
dimensions. 
 
6.2 Twelve Dimensions of Decentralisation  
 
At the outset, it would be useful to settle on terminology. “Dimensions” is a convenient 
term which encompasses the various elements which constitute decentralisation, and 
against which an assessment may be made of the extent to which decentralisation is 
applied in a particular system. There is no particular magic in the word “dimensions;” 
“components” or “elements” would have served equally well, but the term “dimensions’ 
is used in this study as it is commonly used for  this purpose in the literature. 
 
It has been said that traditionally, the most-often used measure for assessing 
decentralisation is to examine sub-national shares of revenues and expenditures and local 
government elections (Work 2002); it is submitted, however, that the assessment of 
decentralisation involves a far wider range of issues than merely these two indicators. 
Various writers have developed their own concepts of what constitutes the dimensions of 
decentralisation, including Kearney (1999),
89
 Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006),
90
 Falleti 
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 Kearney proposes 9 dimensions “designed to capture decentralization’s functional complexity.” (Kearney 
1999:1) The dimensions identified by Kearney are (i) Government Structure, (ii) Selection of the Regional 

















 and Shah and Thompson (2004).
92
 This chapter aims to develop a set of 
dimensions (based to some extent on the contributions of these writers) which reflect the 
essence of decentralisation and which are of general applicability. Guiding this process is 
the assumption that local governments must meet certain requirements if they are to 
function effectively. In the first place, local governments must have a solid constitutional 
basis for existing and functioning, accompanied by popular legitimacy. They must have 
defined functions, and have the executive and legislative authority to perform those 
functions and to govern. It follows that they must have rules, mechanisms and systems to 
govern their processes. Given that local governments are supposed to be responsive to 
local needs, they must be able to identify the demands of their populations. As is the case 
with any government, they must have defined areas of territorial jurisdiction containing 
meaningful populations.  They must have access to resources, derived either from their 
own areas of jurisdiction or from other sources; and they must be accessible, accountable 
and responsive to their populations.
93
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Revenue Sharing, (vii) Authority for Education, (viii) Infrastructure and (ix) Policing. Kearney uses these 
dimensions as a basis for an index for measuring decentralisation. 
 
90 The list of what Bardhan and Mookherjee refer to as “dimensions of design”, which does not purport to 
exhaustive, categorises the dimensions somewhat differently. They are concerned with (i) constitutional 
authority (ii) the electoral process, (iii) the range of expenditure and management responsibilities, (iv) 




 Falleti, in  categorising the “operationalisation” of the intergovernmental balance of power, refers to  five 
dimensions: (i) the sub-national share of revenues, (ii) the sub-national share of expenditures, (iii) the 
policymaking authority, (iv) the type of appointment of sub-national officials (are mayors, for example, 
elected or appointed?) and (v) the territorial representation of interests in the national legislatures. 
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 Shah and Thompson, without specifically using the term “dimension,” categorise those elements which 
in their analysis constitute the components of political and administrative decentralisation. In the case of 
political decentralisation, these elements are (i) the existence of constitutional safeguard against arbitrary 
dismissal of local government; (ii) popular elections of local council members; (iii) popular election of 
heads of local councils; (iv) degree of popular participation in local elections; (v) provisions for popular 
recall of local officials; (vi) contestability in local elections; (vii) security of existence for local 
government; and (viii) overall political decentralisation. In the case of administrative decentralisation, these 
are (i) freedom to hire/fire/set terms of employment of local government employees; (ii) freedom to 




 These requirements are similar in several respects to those suggested by Olowu and Wunsch (2004) as 
being essential if local governance is to be considered operational, namely, that instiutions must be able to 
identify problems, set priorities, mobilise resources, implement programmes, evaluate results, learn from 
















It is submitted that the twelve dimensions discussed below, although they are not 
exhaustive, when taken together reflect those requirements and incorporate the essence of 
decentralisation, and should be provided for in any decentralised system. They are as 
follows: 
 
Dimension (i) - Constitutional Security:  The first dimension describes the formal 
political structure of a country and the extent to which it is secured. Of primary concern 
here is whether the country has a constitution which recognises decentralised 
government; and whether local governments have an independent authority enshrined in 
the constitution and are protected against arbitrary dismissal by central government, or 
whether they exist at the mercy of upper-level governments.
94
 Also of relevance here is 
the number of levels of sub-national government. Devas and Delay (2006) maintain that 
except in the smallest countries, there is a need for a level between central and local 
government to provide co-ordination between local governments and to ensure that 
services with scale economies are properly provided. What needs to be decided is whether 
such an intermediate or regional tier of government should be part of the central 
government apparatus (that is, a deconcentrated tier) or a democratically elected tier of 
devolved government.  
 
Dimension (ii) - Size: The second dimension relates to the size – both in relation to 
population and geographical extent – of the decentralised units. The issue here is whether 
a country which pursues a purportedly decentralised path provides a means for 
determining the size of such units. The choice of size is of importance for a number of 
reasons, including the impact on democratic participation and political accountability,
95
 
                                                                                                                                                 
authority and resources proportionate to the problems they face, and be working institutions that make 
decisions and enforce accountability. In addition, the political process must provide accountability and be 
open to widespread political participation. Finally, they must have a stable set of rules to organise local 
affairs (see Olowu and Wunsch 2004:7). 
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 See Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006); Shah and Thompson (2004); Kearney (1999). 
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 See also van Assche and Dierickx: “If small scale politics are likely to generate more trust and legitimacy 















service provision, policy co-ordination, and, critically, overall viability.
96
 The empirical 
evidence about the impact of size on citizen participation is, however, not especially clear. 
Beneficial effects of smaller units often seem at to be mixed (Devas and Delay 2006). In 
certain  parts of the world, on the other hand,  decentralisation has often been to relatively 
large units,
97
 and “it is questionable how far such decentralisation can deliver the benefits 
of increased democratic control and accountability when decision-making remains almost 
as remote from ordinary citizens as that of the central government” (Devas and Delay 
2006:680). The issue of economies of scale is also frequently raised as an important 
element for determining size; it has been argued, however, that there is little conclusive 
evidence relating to the supposed benefits of economies of scale (Dollery and Crase 
2006). 
 
Dimension (iii) - Democratic Process: A functional local democracy is frequently 
identified as a prerequisite for effective decentralisation.  Key questions here are whether 
elections to executive or legislative bodies occur at all, or whether appointments are made 
by central government (Kearney 1999; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Shah and 
Thompson 2004); whether if elections occur, they are mandated by law to occur 
periodically (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006); whether there are any constraints on 
electoral contestants or on electoral mobilisation efforts (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006); 
and whether political parties are allowed freely to participate (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006; Shah and Thompson 2004). A further key issue is  whether there are adequate 
                                                                                                                                                 
central alike...A choice has to be made between a reform of the local administration, emphasising the output 
of the local authorities (or effectiveness), and a reform of local politics, emphasizing their input (or 
legitimacy). In order to avoid this dilemma the normative question is how to determine the optimal size for 




 Writing on the tendency in Australia to amalgamate local authorities into large units, Dollery and Crase 
(2006) state that numerous problems arise from amalgamation, especially in rural and regional areas. 
Amongst these are a reduction in the vibrancy of local democracy, less political representation and lower 
public participation, and retardation of local economic development, including decreased economic activity, 
rising unemployment and the formation of ‘ghost’ towns. 
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 For example, in South Africa, the process of demarcation conducted in 1999 and 2000 reduced the 
number of municipalities from 843 to 284 (and since further reduced to 283- of which 46 are district 
municipalities, which have concurrent geographical jurisdiction with local municipalities), thereby making 
















safeguards to ensure the conduct of free and fair elections (World Bank 2000; Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2006); also of concern here is the question of ward-based or proportional 




Dimension (iv) -  Intergovernmental Relations:  The fourth dimension relates to the 
mechanisms which exist to promote intergovernmental relations. The term 
“intergovernmental relations” refers to the interdependent relationship amongst the 
various levels of government in a notionally decentralised system as well as the 
coordination of public polices between those levels. The concept incorporates various 
components of the governance, administrative and fiscal arrangements established 
between these various levels, including legislation and regulations, instruments (such as 
guidelines and mechanisms for monitoring and communication), structures (such as 
forums), processes (such as budgeting)  and dispute resolution procedures.  
 
The World Bank (1997) warns that government actions at the centre can be undermined at 
local level if there are no enforceable rules governing intergovernmental relations. Most 
countries adopt models which provide for a sharing of powers and functions over the 
various levels, and whilst such arrangements can be complex, they can work well when 
they are clear, and when each level of government’s roles are clearly defined. 
 
An important aspect of intergovernmental relations is that of the provision of oversight 
and support by central government to sub-national governments. Devas and Delay  (2006) 
note that given the weaknesses of local democratic practices in many developing (and 
transitional) countries, and the fact that much of the resources for local services comes 
from the central budget, central governments have a continuing role in ensuring that 
services are delivered effectively and resources are properly used at the local level. 
Central governments can use any of a wide range of instruments to oversee the activities 
of local government. These instruments do, however, raise serious questions about the 
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 Ward-based elections provide a direct link between citizens and their councillors, and are said to 
contribute to accountability.  Proportional representation systems, on the other hand, are said to produce a 
















nature of decentralisation and about the balance between central objectives and local 
choice. After all, it makes little sense to devolve responsibilities to elected local 
governments if the centre then seeks to control in detail the activities of these local 
governments. 
 
Dimension (v) - The Local Government Executive Structure: The fifth dimension 
concerns the choice of executive structure at local level. Democratisation at this level 
raises questions about which models of local executive structure have the greatest chances 
of achieving democratic accountability and responsiveness while also delivering essential 
local public services effectively and efficiently. The appropriate choice depends largely 
on the particular economic, social and political context, and on the details of the system 
adopted. There are two main models of executive structure in local government: the 
single executive, which provides for a directly elected executive mayor, and the plural 
executive, which provides for a mayor plus executive committee (or functional 
committees) elected indirectly from the council. The ostensible advantages of the single 
executive model are that it provides effective decision-making and clear lines of 
accountability. The plural executive model, on the other hand, offers greater opportunities 
for council members to have a voice on behalf of their constituents in the council’s 
decisions. The issue is, however, somewhat wider than the mere choice of system by 
which the mayor is elected; also of concern are the roles of other political office bearers, 
political structures and the administration, and the relationship between them. 
 
Dimension (vi) - Administrative Authority:  The concern here is whether the local 
government has the right to manage its own affairs, and whether the decentralisation 
process is both de iure and de facto, or whether decisions continue to be taken by upper 
levels of government. In other words, at issue is the manner in and extent to which the 
balance of actual control rights has shifted from central bureaucrats to elected government 
officials (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). The World Bank (2000) points out that central 
governments in decentralising countries tend to compensate for their loss of control by 















counterproductive if central governments with only a limited knowledge of local 
conditions begin micromanaging local functions. 
 
 Particular issues include the autonomy the local government has over the hiring, firing 
and paying of personnel;
99
 over contracting out its own responsibilities; and over the 
administration of its procurement processes (Shah and Thompson 2004; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006).  
 
Dimension (vii) - Institutional Capacity: This dimension relates to the administrative 
capacity of local governments, the competence of local officials, and whether their 
administrative and technical skills are adequate for the task at hand. Capacity building, 
both in terms of human resources and financial support, has ften been cited as the 
principle obstacle in furthering decentralisation processes, and several writers emphasise 
the need for the existence of administrative and technical expertise, not only at local 
government level, but also at national level (Manor 1999, 2006; Work 2002; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006; United Nations Development Programme 2003).  
 
The World Bank insists that improving local services requires an effective administration, 
and even a well-meaning political team cannot overcome incompetent administration. “In 
fact, lack of capacity at local level and the need for a massive increase in skilled staff are 
the arguments most frequently invoked against decentralization” (World Bank 2000:122). 
Appropriate measures to counter this as suggested by the World Bank are the devolving 
of appropriate staff during the decentralisation process, permitting local government to 
hire and fire and offer attractive packages, and the implementation of privatisation 
measures, whereby local authorities would contract out privatised functions and not 
actually manage them. 
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 Wunsch (2001) notes, in the context of African decentralisation, that several issues relating to personnel 
in decentralised systems are crucial.  For example, do administrative personnel retain a civil service status? 
Are they members of a national civil service, a special unified local government civil service or employees 
of the local authorities? What are there conditions of service? To whom are they responsible? Who 















Dimension (viii) - Public Participation and Information Mechanisms: With the eighth 
dimension, we are concerned with whether local citizens have mechanisms for 
communicating their needs and preferences to the local authority; and whether there are 
means to keep them informed, including in regard to services, local government budgets, 
plans and the actions of government officials (Kearney 1999; Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006). The traditional model of representative local government provides for periodic 
elections, which are often seen as the sole means of achieving citizen participation and 
accountability. This model is regarded in some quarters as inadequate, as elections are a 
crude mechanism for achieving local accountability and for ascertaining citizens’ views 
about specific local policy choices (Devas and Delay 2006). It is therefore widely 
recognised that widespread popular participation is vital to successful decentralisation, 
and that local elections need to be supplemented by mechanisms which provide for more 
direct citizen participation in decision-making, and by greater information about the 
availability and use of resources (World Bank 2001; World Bank 2003(a); Sullivan et al 
2004). A further benefit of such mechanisms is that they can also help to build 
accountability, since those who have participated in discussions about the local issues are 
more likely to demand accountability.
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 It does, however, require the emergence of a 
civil society that is capable of engaging effectively with local government on behalf of all 
sectors of the public, including, especially, the poor.
101
 As Sullivan et al point out, there 
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 At least one study suggests that public participation improves performance. See Isham et al (1995). 
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 Sullivan et al refer to a number of factors that are key to securing public engagement: an expectation that 
participation will impact on outcomes; ownership of the process and a hand in developing the rules of 
engagement; and a focus on issues likely to be perceived by the public as both accessible and important. 
(Sullivan et al 2006).  
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 “These include issues of scale and scope; representative democracy operates at a macro level but within 
relatively narrowly defined channels of ‘the political’, while participative democracy favours smaller scale 
action but offers wider scope for what might be included. Representative democracy is associated with the 
practice of advocacy and representation on behalf of ‘the public’, while participative approaches emphasise 
‘the public’s’ involvement in and deliberation of core concerns, acknowledging lived experience as a 
legitimate basis for contributions alongside technical expertise. Finally, there are tensions about how 
decisions should be made, for example whether it is possible to reconcile the recommendations emerging 
from participative processes with the formal decision-making mechanisms of representative democracy” 

















Dimension (ix) -  Jurisdictional Scope: The ninth dimension examines the jurisdictional 
scope of responsibilities devolved to local governments. “Jurisdictional scope” refers to 
the range of services, powers and functions which a particular level of government 
performs. Many writers tend to consider this subject in the context of fiscal 
decentralisation, or more specifically, in the context of decentralised expenditure; there is, 
however, more to it than just a fiscal dimension. We should, it is submitted, be concerned 
here also with questions of administrative capacity, logistical issues and local needs for 
the services in question. There are also wider strategic and policy considerations to be 
taken into account.  
 
Here the issues include the precise functions and decisions t  be devolved to local 
government; whether the local government can decide on the allocation of fiscal 
resources across those areas and across citizens or localities within the community; 
whether other spending responsibilities are devolved; whether there is significant 
ambiguity in allocation of responsibility across different tiers of government; whether 
there are likely to be significant community spill-overs
103
 (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006).  
 
Given the wide range of motives and objectives which are said to apply to 
decentralisation, it is only to be expected that the jurisdictional scope of local 
governments will vary from country to country. Some services are certainly more 
susceptible to decentralisation than others. Several criteria can be utilised to determine 
which services are suitable for decentralisation. The first such criterion is that their 
benefits should be local, and this would exclude, for example, higher education or 
defence. Second, their production should be relatively simple, and not lend itself to 
economies of scale. Third, the number of services decentralised should be sufficiently 
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 Spill-overs occur when residents from outside the area of a local authority make use of or benefit from 























Why is the issue of jurisdictional scope so important? First, and most obviously, it defines 
what a local government is supposed to do. Second, as was alluded to earlier, there is a 
fiscal dimension to jurisdictional scope: it determines the demands for funding, and how 
that funding is applied. Third, it has to do with prestige and credibility – not only in 
relation to individual local authorities, but also in relation to local government in general. 
It is therefore essential that local governments be endowed with sufficient powers and 
functions in order for them to exercise substantial influence within the political system 
(Manor 1999; De Visser 2005; Goldfrank 2007). Fourth, the extent of jurisdictional scope 
determines the level of capacity required of a local authority, which must match its 
jurisdictional scope. Finally, jurisdictional scope is relevant in the context of 
intergovernmental relations – it determines which level of government performs 
particular functions, and it is therefore vital that the jurisdictional scope be clearly defined. 
 
Dimension(x) -  Legislative Authority:  This dimension is concerned with the authority of 
the decentralised government to make and enforce its own by-laws within its 
geographical area of jurisdiction and its sphere of competence. This is a critical inquiry, 
yet it is an issue which is often overlooked by writers who seem to ignore the importance 
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 The World Bank suggests a division of powers and functions amongst various levels of government as 
follows: 
 
Central Government: Tertiary health care; Control of infectious diseases; Research; University 
education; Roads and highways (intercity); Public transportation (intercity); Natural resource 
management; Defence. 
State Government: Secondary health care; Curative care; Roads and highways (intercity); Public 
transportation (intercity); Air and water pollution; Natural resource management; Police protection. 
Local Government: Primary health care; Primary and secondary education; Roads and highways 
(intracity); Public transportation (intracity); Air and water pollution; Solid waste disposal; Water; 
Sewerage; Fire protection; Land use regulation and zoning; Housing; Cultural policy; Promotion of 
tourism; Police protection. 
 
















of the power of sub-national governments to legislate as an element of decentralisation.
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That this should be so is somewhat surprising, as it submitted that the authority to enact 
legislation and determine policy is absolutely fundamental to the issue of political 
decentralisation. Of particular importance here are the constitutional protection offered to 
a sub-national government’s capacity to legislate; whether or not approval is required 
from a higher level of government to initiate local legislation; whether the coming into 
effect  of  such legislation is subject to approval by a higher level of government; the 
range of issues on which a sub-national government may legislate; and the standing of 
local legislation in relation to legislation enacted by other spheres of government. 
 
Dimension (xi) - Revenue Raising Authority: The eleventh dimension is concerned with 
whether and to what extent sub-national governments have formal authority to raise their 
own revenue. The issue of which level of government controls which resources has been 
described as perhaps the thorniest issue of decentralisation. This is so because the ability 
of sub-national governments to act independently of the central government depends to a 
considerable extent on whether they have access to independent tax bases and sources of 
credit (World Bank 2000). Revenues derived from local sources are often seriously 
inadequate to finance the responsibilities assigned, and as a result, attempts at 
decentralisation often founder on issues of capacity and resources, and of financial 
resources in particular (Devas and Delay 2006). 
 
Key questions concern the extent to which the local government has the authority to raise 
resources, whether through local taxes, user fees or borrowing; and the extent of the 
autonomy accorded to them over such decisions - for example, what proportion of local 
government budgets are self-financed, and who sets local tax rates or user-fee tariffs
 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006)? 
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 Shah and Thompson (2004) are amongst the few authors who expressly recognise that “local 
governments should have the authority to pass by-laws in their spheres of responsibility without having to 
















Sub-national borrowing is another thorny issue for decentralisation. Whilst the borrowing 
transaction is between the local government as borrower and the lender, the central 
government is often drawn in because it is ultimately responsible for the stability of the 
financial system. In consequence, sub-national borrowing is usually subject to the 
assumption that the central government will fund a bailout if necessary, an assumption 
that leads banks to lend to uncreditworthy local governments (World Bank 2000).
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 The 
World Bank warns, however, that central governments must demonstrate early on that 
they are committed to imposing  a hard budget constraint on sub-national governments, as 
the “mere possibility of a central government bailout can prompt excess spending and 
deficit financing at the subnational level” (World Bank 2000:124). Fiscal indiscipline, 
according to the World Bank, is one of the greatest challenges facing multi-tiered systems 
of government.
107
 Central governments therefore need to develop means to protect 
themselves from excessive exposure to sub-national debt. Worldwide, several approaches 
are used to control sub-national borrowing. The first relies on market discipline; the 
second on cooperation between central and local governments; the third involves 
administrative control; and the fourth, rule-based control.
108
 In practice, many countries 
rely on a combination of all four methods. Other countries prohibit borrowing by local 
governments outright (World Bank:2000). 
 
Dimension (xii) - Revenue Sharing: The twelfth dimension is concerned with whether a 
country’s central government regularly and unconditionally transfers a portion of national 
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 According to Rodden, “In fact, credit rating agencies are very explicit in assuming that in countries with 
high levels of ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’…the central government implicitly backs the debt of the 
subnational governments. In such systems the central government’s own creditworthiness might be called 
into question if it fails to enforce a loan contract against a defaulting subnational government. Approached 
by creditors and facing the prospect of failing in its obligation to enforce property rights, the central 
government might see a bailout as the simplest solution” (Rodden 2002:672). See also Treisman (2007:108 
et seq) on the issue of “soft budget” constraints.  
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 A similar pattern has emerged in both developed and developing countries with free-spending sub-
national governments building up unsustainable deficits and calling upon central governments to provide 
special bailout transfers or otherwise assume their liabilities. Several case studies have demonstrated that 
decentralisation may be dangerous if it allows sub-national governments to expand their expenditures while 
“externalizing” the costs to central government (Rodden 2002).  
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 Interestingly, the World Bank (2000) states that South Africa practices a combination of market 
discipline and cooperative control; more recent developments suggest that rule-based control now plays a 















taxes to lower levels of government. Given that sources of local revenue are not adequate 
to meet fully the demands for expenditure, the ability of a sub-national government to 
function is dependent on the extent to which sub-national governments receive regular, 
predictable and unconditional funds from the central government (Kearney 1999). It is 
also concerned with the manner in which fiscal transfers from national or regional 
governments are determined, and how much scope is given to local governments to effect 
these transfers via processes of decentralised budgeting or planning and whether the 
transfers are formula-bound or subject to political discretion of upper-level government 
officials or negotiation between upper and lower levels (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). 
As Devas and Delay (2006) point out, just as local revenue sources are often inadequate, 
intergovernmental transfers are also problematic, being vulnerable to political 
manipulation, poorly designed allocation formulae and inappropriate conditions. 
According to Shah and Thompson (2004), intergovernmental transfers are the dominant 
source of revenues for sub-national governments in most developing and transitional 
economies. Given the reliance placed on them as a source of income for sub-national 
governments, their design is a critical factor in the success of decentralisation.  
 
The World Bank (2000) distinguishes three variables pertaining to transfers. The first 
variable is the amount to be distributed, which can be fixed as a percentage of national 
taxes or it can be an ad hoc decision. The second variable is the basis for distributing 
transfers among jurisdictions. This may, for example, take the form of a predetermined 
formula or it may be decided on the basis of need from time to time; the decision might 
also be based on purely political considerations. The third variable concerns the 
conditionalities which are attached to the transfers. They can be earmarked for a specific 
purpose, such as a capital project (and may be repayable if not used for that purpose), or 
may be used for unspecified purposes, such as general operating expenditure. The World 
Bank (2000) maintains that certain basic principles should apply to all countries and to all 
types of transfers. They should be determined as openly, transparently and objectively as 
possible; they should be kept stable from year to year, to enable local governments to plan 
their budgets; and they should be distributed according to simple, predetermined rules. In 
















6.3 Excursus: Fiscal Imbalance 
 
At this point, it will be useful to embark on a brief excursus in order to examine an issue 
which is inextricably bound up with dimensions (xi) and (xii), those of revenue raising 
authority and revenue sharing; this is the issue of “fiscal imbalance.” Fiscal imbalance 
arises when the sources of locally raised revenue are exceeded by the expenditure of local 
governments. It has been argued (for example, by Prud’homme 1989) that a desirable 
system is one in which a large share of expenditures is decentralised together with a small 
share of taxes; others (for example, Watt 2004) suggest local governments should be 
responsible for a greater share of revenues. 
 
But even the supporters of a system which provides for a small share of local taxes 
acknowledge that such a system is not without difficulties. It gives rise to grant-
dependency, which undermines a responsibility mechanism: in an unbalanced system,
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in which local governments can spend more than they tax, why should they refrain from 
spending? (Prud’homme: 1989). A second problem is that of accountability. It is far less 
likely that an administration will be accountable to an electorate which does not fund that 
administration’s activities. After all, in such circumstances, why should the electorate 
care?
110
 The inconsistency between centralised taxing authority and decentralised 
spending authority is a serious obstacle to sub-national autonomy and accountability 
(Putnam 1993). A third problem connected with grant-dependency is that it persuades 
local politicians, together with their voters and creditors, to believe that central 
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 “With any given set of expenditure responsibilities local government will either have adequate powers of 
taxation to finance these responsibilities, or will need to receive grants from the central government. When 
powers of taxation match expenditure responsibilities there is said to be vertical fiscal balance. However, 
much more common worldwide is vertical fiscal imbalance where taxation powers are inadequate to finance 
expenditure responsibilities” (Watt 2004:613). 
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 Watt states that “When there is a high level of vertical fiscal imbalance… the imbalance seriously 
impairs accountability... The local residents’ right to control their local government stems from their 
supplying its resources…If, within this framework, central government pays a grant to the local authority, 
accountability becomes confused. Based on their respective contributions, local residents now share the 
right to control the local authority with those contributing to funding via central government taxes. Hence, 
















governments will in the long run be unable to ignore their fiscal troubles. When a highly 
transfer-dependent local government experiences a fiscal shock, it may not have the 
flexibility to raise additional revenue, which forces it to cut services, run deficits, or rely 
on arrears to employees and contractors. In that event, the sub-national government might 
well claim that it is not responsible for the situation, and pressure from voters and 
creditors is likely to be directed at the central government. With this knowledge, local 
governments which are transfer-dependent face weak incentives to be fiscally responsible. 
Even if they could take steps to avoid fiscal crises, it may make more sense for them to 
press for bailouts as this course of action might prove to be politically less costly (Rodden 
2002). 
 
Nonetheless, unbalanced systems, in which local authorities raise relatively little of their 
own revenue with the central government making up the rest, are widespread, and prevail 
almost everywhere, both in developing and developed countries (Prud’homme: 1989).
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It seems, therefore, that subsidisation of local government by national government is an 
inevitable concomitant of decentralisation. The choice, perhaps, is a stark one: Local 
governments have the option either to be responsible for wide-ranging functions and be 
heavily dependent on central government for finance, or be satisfied with a narrow range 
of municipal duties, but have a high degree of self-sufficiency (Alam 2006).  
 
6.4 Evaluation  
 
The next six chapters aim to provide an evaluation of decentralisation in South African 
local government against the 12 dimensions discussed in this chapter. For the sake of 
convenience, the dimensions (following the order in which they are discussed above) are 
divided amongst those six chapters as follows: 
 
 Chapter 7 deals with dimensions (i) to (iv) - respectively, constitutional security, 
size, democratic process, and intergovernmental relations.  
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 Writing in 2004,  Watt found that at the time, on average, central funding  supported 75 percent of local 















 Chapter 8  deals with dimensions (v) and (vi), namely, the executive structure and 
administrative authority;   
 Chapter 9 deals with dimension (vii) - institutional capacity;  
  Chapter 10 deals with dimension (viii) - public participation and information 
mechanisms;  
 Chapter 11 deals with dimensions (ix) and (x) - jurisdictional scope and legislative 
authority; and 
  Chapter 12 deals with the “fiscal” dimensions, (xi) and (xii) - revenue raising 
authority and revenue sharing - which are concerned with the fiscal or funding 
aspects of local government, and hence referred to as “fiscal” dimensions.  
 
The approach adopted in the next six chapters is to examine the extent to which each of 
the dimensions is reflected in the constitutional and statutory framework which regulates 
local government in South Africa. In addition, in the cases of dimensions (v), (vii), (viii), 
(ix), (x), (xi) and (xii)), the extent to which those dimensions are actually applied in 
practice in municipalities will also be examined. As has been indicated previously, it is 
only the cases of these dimensions that the actual practice in municipalities is relevant and 




















Evaluation: Constitutional Security, Size, Democratic Process 
and Intergovernmental Relations 
 
7.1 Purpose of Chapter 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which dimensions (i) to (iv), 
namely, constitutional security, size, democratic process, and intergovernmental relations 
are reflected in the South African local government framework. These dimensions are not 
reflected in the actual operational practice of municipalities. For that reason, this chapter 
is concerned only with the constitutional and statutory aspects of these dimensions and 
does not seek to examine municipal practice.  
 
The four dimensions are considered in sections 7.2 to 7.5 below. 
 
7.2 Constitutional Security  
 
The primary concerns around dimension (i) relate to, first, whether South Africa has a 
constitution which recognises decentralised government; second, whether local 
governments have an independent authority enshrined in the constitution, and third,  
whether they are protected against arbitrary dismissal by central government, or they 
exist at the mercy of upper-level governments. Finally, the issue of the number of levels 
of sub-national government is of importance. 
 
By the time that South Africa’s final Constitution was adopted in 1996, most of the 
participants in the negotiating process were agreed on the need for establishing local 
government as an independent sphere of government; this notion is clearly reflected in 
Section 40 (1) of the Constitution, which provides that “government is constituted as 

















 Local government is therefore one of the three levels or 
spheres of government in South Africa, reflecting an arrangement which is typical of a 
decentralised system. 
Section 41 of the Constitution provides that all spheres of government must, amongst 
other things,  respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of 
government in the other spheres; not assume any power or function except those 
conferred on them in terms of  the Constitution; and exercise their powers and perform 
their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or 
institutional integrity of  government in another sphere; and co-operate with one another 
in mutual trust and good faith.  
Section 154 prescribes the role that national and provincial governments are required to 
play in relation to municipalities, and provides that they must support and strengthen the 
capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers and 
perform their functions. 
 Section 151 of the Constitution is a key provision as far as this dimension is concerned. 
It deals with the status of municipalities, and provides that the executive and legislative 
authority of a municipality is vested in its Municipal Council; it also provides that a 
municipality “has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs 
of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation...” It provides further that 
the national or provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s 
ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions.” The particular importance 
of these provisions is that local government is by virtue thereof “a level of government in 
its own right” (de Visser 2005:65).  
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 De Visser describes the three spheres in the relationship which is thus created as “three partners in 
government” (de Visser 2005:54), with each enjoying autonomy, subject, (in the cases of sub-national 
spheres) to supervision, and each being required to exercise its autonomy to the common good of the 
country by cooperating with other spheres (de Visser 2005:214). Note that the key phrases are “distinctive,” 
















It should be noted, however, that the right of a municipality to govern is, according to 
Section 151(3), “subject to national and provincial legislation;” it may therefore be 
concluded that the autonomy of local government as a sphere of government is somewhat 
restricted in relation to that of the other spheres. Furthermore, and notwithstanding the 
ostensible autonomy conferred on a municipality under the constitution, it remains 




It should be noted that Section 139 of the Constitution provides a radical mechanism for 
intervention in local government by provincial government in the event that a 
municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation
114
 (that concept not being 
defined, although the power to intervene almost certainly does not extend to the failure of 
a municipality to perform any legislative function, such as the passing of by-laws) in 
terms of the Constitution or legislation.
115
 In such circumstances, the provincial executive 
may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that function, 
including issuing a directive stating steps required to meet its obligations, assuming 
responsibility for the relevant obligation in that municipality, and dissolving the council 
and appointing an administrator. Such an intervention is subject to the monitoring and 
concurrence of the national cabinet minister responsible for local government and of the 
provincial legislature, as well as of the National Council of Provinces. Provision is also 
made for intervention in the event of the failure of a municipality to approve a budget or 
certain revenue raising measures, or in the event of being in serious or persistent breach 
of its obligations to provide basic services as a result of a crisis in its financial affairs.
116
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 By virtue of Section 155(6) of the constitution, which provides that each provincial government must by 
legislative or other measures provide for the monitoring and support of local government. 
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 Examples of failure to fulfil an executive obligation probably include the failure to  provide access to 
water (if the municipality is a water authority); failure to supply electricity; failure to collect refuse; failure 
to collect outstanding debts; and failure to apply obligatory supply chain management procedures. 
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 Similarly, Section 100 of the Constitution provides that National Government may intervene in 
Provincial Government if the latter does not fulfil an executive function. In addition, sections 136, 137, 138 
and 139 of the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act provide for discretionary and 





















How do South Africa’s constitutional provisions on decentralisation measure up to this 
dimension? Certainly, the constitution recognises decentralised government, and the 
authority of municipalities to govern within their spheres of jurisdiction is clearly spelled 
out.  On the face of it, therefore, the South African local government sphere is provided 
with the constitutional security envisaged by this dimension. An intervention of the kind 
contemplated in Section 139 of the Constitution does, however, go to the root of the 
autonomy of the local sphere of government, enabling provincial government in effect to 
circumvent the local sphere. Such a power has been described as “potentially draconian” 
(de Visser 2005:185). Nonetheless, it is argued that “intervention is an integral part of an 
institutional framework that seeks development initiated at local level. It is a necessary 
corrective when a municipality fails to govern and thus jeopardises the enterprise of 
development” (de Visser 2005:185). It boils down, in effect, to a balancing act between 
the principle of autonomy and the need for effective oversight.  
 
One view is that this provision represents the recognition of the reality that local 
government is inherently susceptible to failures that demand intervention; a somewhat 
more ominous view on an intervention of this kind is that it provides a means for senior 
governments to claw back power.
 
It is certainly not impossible to conceive of the power 
of intervention being abused (de Visser 2006), whether in South Africa or elsewhere.
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Nonetheless, drastic though the power granted to provincial governments under Section 
139 may be, it hardly constitutes a power of “arbitrary dismissal” by central or any other 
level of government, and, at least as far as the provisions of the Constitution are 
concerned, it cannot be said that municipalities exist only  at the mercy of upper-level 
governments.  
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 Manor observes that most politicians are preoccupied with maintaining and enhancing their own 
influence, and they fix on the influence which they lose through decentralisation. In such circumstances, 
many politicians try to claw back their power. This sort of jealousy, according to Manor, is the “greatest 
(and an omnipresent) threat to decentralization” (1999:61). It may be argued that interventions of the kind 
















7.3 Size of Decentralised Unit 
 
The size of the decentralised unit (dimension (ii)) is critical. The difficulty that will 
inevitably have to be encountered in a decentralisation process is how to determine that 
size. The South African solution was to establish the Municipal Demarcation Board 
(“MDB”) under the Municipal Demarcation Act.
118
 One of the functions of the MDB is to 
determine municipal boundaries in accordance with the Act and other appropriate 




Section 24 of the Municipal Demarcation Act sets out the objectives that the MDB should 
aim for when establishing the boundary of a municipality, namely, to establish an area 
that would- 
 
(a) enable the municipality for that area to fulfill its constitutional obligations, 
including- 
(i) the provision of democratic and accountable government for the local 
communities; 
(ii) the provision of services to the communities in an equitable and sustainable 
manner; 
(iii) the promotion of social and economic development; and 
(iv) the promotion of a safe and healthy environment;
120
 
(b) enable effective local governance; 
(c) enable integrated development; and 
(d) have a tax base as inclusive as possible of users of municipal services in the 
municipality. 
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 Section 155(3) of the Constitution required the passing of national legislation to establish criteria and 
procedures for the determination of municipal boundaries by an independent authority. This legislation took 
the form of the Municipal Demarcation Act. 
 
119
 Section 4(a) of the Municipal Demarcation Act. 
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 The provisions of section 24(a) of the Municipal Demarcation Act reflect almost exactly those of 
















Section 25 of the Act sets out a lengthy list of factors which must be taken into account in 




At the time that the demarcation of municipalities was carried out in 1999 and 2000, the 
MDB took the view that the size of the municipality in most cases correlates with 
capacity and viability (Savage 2008). According to that view, the smaller the 
municipality (as defined in terms of small population and narrow economic base) the 
greater the tendencies to experience capacity constraints and serious viability challenges, 
and these in turn undermine the constitutional and developmental obligations of a 
municipality.
122
 Research emanating from outside of South Africa tends to indicate, 




The MDB proposed to draw the boundaries of local municipalities widely so as to cover 
core urban areas and their large rural hinterlands, the rationale being that such 
arrangements would direct residual capacity that existed in core areas towards providing 
services in rural areas (Savage 2008). Of course, this assumed that such capacity existed 
in the first place, whereas in fact capacity was in many cases seriously lacking.  A further 
concern was that the wide boundaries proposed by the MDB would adversely affect the 
ability of municipalities, whose financial viability would thereby be impaired, to raise 
private finance to expand services (Savage 2008). Other criticisms of the MDB’s 
approach include that it lacked sound theoretical approaches; that it used commuting as a 
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 These are (a) the interdependence of people, communities and economies; (b) the need for cohesive, 
integrated and unfragmented areas; (c) the financial viability and administrative capacity of the 
municipality to perform municipal functions efficiently and effectively; (d) the need to share and 
redistribute financial and administrative resources; (e) provincial and municipal boundaries; (f) areas of 
traditional rural communities; (g) existing and proposed functional boundaries, (h) existing and expected 
land use, social, economic and transport planning; (i) the need for coordinated municipal, provincial and 
national programmes and services, (j) topographical, environmental and physical characteristics of the area; 
(k) the administrative consequences of its boundary determination on municipal creditworthiness, existing 
municipalities, their council members and staff; and any other relevant matter; and (l) the need to 
rationalise the total number of municipalities within different categories and of different types to achieve 
the objectives of effective and sustainable service delivery, financial viability and macro-economic stability. 
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 It is understood, however, that the MDB is presently investigating the question of how crucial the size of 
a municipality is and whether there is an ideal size for a municipality. 
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solution to address illogical spatial distortions inherited from the apartheid era; that it 
relied overly on the idea of economies of scale (and as a result used a somewhat arbitrary 
minimum geographical size); and that many areas were “over-bounded,” resulting in 
communities with little in common being flung together (Cameron 2006). In addition, 
certain external factors were ranged against the Board which compromised the 
demarcation process. Amongst these was, quite simply, a lack of time available to carry 




The legacy of the MDB’s work gives rise to several issues. Several of these relate to the 
size of the average South African municipality. Prior to the commencement of an initial 
round of demarcations carried out by the MDB in 1999 and 2000, the country had 843 
municipalities.
125
 Following the demarcation process, which was largely driven by 
economies of scale imperatives, South Africa now has 283
126
 municipalities which serve 
a population of close to 48 million people, and cover a land mass of 1,2 million square 
kilometres. Although there are enormous variations in size between municipalities, many 
of South Africa’s municipalities are, by global standards, vast in geographical extent and 
population. This size has inevitable consequences for administration. Logistical 
challenges arise in regard to servicing far-flung parts of a municipality. Finding and 
retaining staff in such locations present enormous difficulties for institutional capacity. 
Remoteness also erodes one of the primary purposes of decentralisation, which is 
bringing government closer to the people. A further major challenge constituted by the 
activities of the MDB is that a large number of municipalities are simply not financially 
viable, given their revenue bases. The MDB’s own research showed that at the time of the 
demarcation process, 102 new municipalities were weak and had limited financial 
resources (Cameron 2006). Subsequent developments have shown that many 
municipalities are so lacking in financial viability that they are largely, and sometimes 
almost entirely, dependent on grants.  
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 See Cameron (2006) for an account of the municipal boundary reorganisation process. 
 
125
 These municipalities served mostly only “white” South Africa, to the exclusion of the greater 
geographical extent and population of the country. 
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In summary, it may be said that whilst the South African local government framework 
provides a comprehensive mechanism for determining the size and boundaries of 
decentralised local units, the application of that mechanism has proven to be difficult and 
has resulted in the creation of units which are in many cases of limited capacity and 
doubtful viability.  
 
7.4 Democratic Process 
 
Dimension (iii) is concerned with the existence of a functional democracy, which is 
usually seen as a prerequisite for effective decentralisation, the rationale being that 
decisions relating to local issues should be taking by representatives elected by local 
people. The student of the Constitution will find much to support the incorporation of this 
dimension into the South African local government framework. According to Section 1(d) 
of the Constitution, one of the values on which South Africa is founded is that of 
“universal suffrage, a national common voters’ role, regular elections, and a multi-party 
system of democratic government.” Section 157 (2) of the Constitution provides that 
elections to municipal councils must take place in accordance with national legislation, 
which  must provide either for a system of proportional representation, or a system of 
proportional representation combined with a system of ward representation; subsection 
(3) provides that whatever system is chosen, it must result, in general, in proportionate 
representation; and  subsection (4) provides that  if it includes ward representation, 
delimitation of wards must be performed by an independent authority.
127
 Section 158 sets 
out the requirements for membership of councils.  
 
As it happened, the system of representation which was chosen was the combined 
proportional representation/ward representation model. The national legislation envisaged 
by the Constitution is the Structures Act, section 22 of which, read with Schedule 1 to the 
Act, sets out procedures for election to local and metropolitan councils, whilst Section 23 
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deals with election and appointment to district councils. The act also deals with the term 
of councils (which is 5 years), by-elections, and terms of office of councillors. The actual 
conduct of municipal elections is governed by the Local Government: Municipal 
Electoral Act, 27 of 2000, and elections are held under the auspices of the Independent 
Electoral Commission. It is not proposed to analyse the Structures Act insofar it relates to 
elections or the Municipal  Electoral Act in any detail; suffice it to say, for present 
purposes, that formally the system of local government elections in South Africa duly 
reflects all of the elements contemplated in this dimension.  
 
One issue relating to the democratic process has, however, become controversial; this is 
the question of holding municipal elections concurrently with national and provincial 
elections. At present, the electoral cycle is such that municipal elections are held some 
two years after national and provincial elections. There are, however, clear indications in 
national government circles that it is considered desirable to hold national, provincial and 
municipal elections simultaneously. The principal argument which has thus far been 
offered in support of holding elections simultaneously is that such an arrangement would 
be more cost effective. Those in favour of retaining the current staggered arrangement 
argue that it allows national and local issues to be contested independently of each other, 
and this allows proper expression of voters’ preferences on local issues without their 
being unduly influenced by national election campaigns, which might otherwise 
overwhelm and dominate local issues.  
 
7.5 Intergovernmental Relations  
 
We have already encountered section 41 of the Constitution
128
which deals with principles 
of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations. For purposes of the present 
inquiry, which concerns dimension (iv),  section 41(1)(g) is of particular interest to us, in 
that it provides that all spheres of government and all organs of state must co-operate 
with one another in mutual trust and good faith by fostering friendly relations, assisting 
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and supporting one another, informing one another of, and consulting one another on, 
matters of common interest, coordinating their actions and legislation with one another, 
adhering to agreed procedures, and avoiding legal proceedings against one another. 
Section 41(2) goes on to require that an Act of Parliament must provide for structures and 
institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations and provide for 
appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate intergovernmental disputes.  
 
That requirement was fulfilled with the passing of the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act in 2005.
129
 The Act provides for various levels of intergovernmental 
structures. One such structure is the President’s Coordination Council, whose  functions 
include consulting with provincial government and organised local government on the 
implementation of national policy and legislation in provinces and municipalities, and the 
coordination and alignment of priorities, objectives and strategies across national 
provincial and local governments. Provision is also made for the establishment by cabinet 
members of National Intergovernmental Forums, whose objective is to promote and 
facilitate intergovernmental relations in functional areas for which the respective cabinet 
members are responsible. In an effort to promote provincial-municipal relations, the Act 
provides for the creation of provincial Intergovernmental Forums (known as Premier’s 
Intergovernmental Forums). Their purpose is to facilitate and promote intergovernmental 
relations between provincial and local governments. Local government participation on 
these forums is provided for by means of representation through the provincial 
associations of local government, and by means of direct representation of municipalities 
through the mayors of metropolitan municipalities and of district municipalities. The final 
level of forum provided for by the Act is the district intergovernmental forum between a 
district municipality and the local municipalities within the district. As far as integrated 
service delivery is concerned, the Act provides a framework for “Implementation 
Protocols” as a mechanism by which two or more organs of state (including 
municipalities) cooperate in order to exercise a statutory power, perform a function, 
implement a policy or deliver a service. 
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The Intergovernmental Framework Relations Act is a relatively new piece of legislation, 
and it is premature to make any assessment of its effectiveness; in any event, there is little 
published information on the application of the Act.
130
 In addition to the Act, however, 
the Constitution provides in Section 154 that national government and provincial 
government must support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their 
own affairs, to exercise their powers and to perform their functions. Support of this nature 
is an important component of intergovernmental relations. National and Provincial 
governments have had ample time to implement this provision, but these governments 
have been less than effective in assisting municipalities to develop viable systems of 
management, operation and maintenance of infrastructure, and have done little to assist 
municipalities to improve standards of service delivery (Atkinson 2007). In some areas of 
governance (such as the introduction of integrated development planning), government 
has provided support, but in other respects (for example, development of policies, 
infrastructure maintenance programmes and information systems), local governments 
have largely been left to their own devices. According to Atkinson (2007), sectoral 
departments have, with few exceptions, barely begun to provide sustained assistance to 
municipalities. Municipalities have found themselves at the receiving end of new 
responsibilities, with little meaningful support from government departments. Atkinson 
suggests that the problem is not only due to weak systems of capacity building, but also 
to unresolved systems of intergovernmental allocation of powers and functions. As will 
be shown in this study,
131
 the nature and extent of powers and functions which 
municipalities are required to perform, despite their having been provided for in the 
Constitution, remain unclear. 
 
Atkinson points out  that in the unclear intergovernmental relations system which 
prevails, it is very difficult for new and inexperienced municipalities to comprehend their 
powers and functions, and to comprehend the financial and human resources required to 
exercise such functions; and if the terrain is so unclear, it is difficult to budget for staff 
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and capital expenditure, and  almost impossible to develop technical competence in new 
developmental fields in the absence of assistance and mentoring by national and 
provincial departments.  The consequences of unresolved intergovernmental relations are 
significant:  
“The state architecture is still very uncertain, with unresolved questions 
regarding powers, functions and capacity-building responsibilities…Simply 
put, the demands on municipal services completely outstrip (municipalities’) 
capacity, and they have largely been left to cope with these demands on their 
own. The state has simply not comprehended the scale of the task of 
transforming municipalities into developmental institutions, or that of 
creating municipalities from scratch, particularly in the rural areas” 
(Atkinson 2007:72).  
 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
In summary, it may be said that the local government framework reflects the dimensions 
of constitutional security, size of decentralised unit, democratic process and 
intergovernmental relations. The issue of constitutional security for a decentralised 
system of local government is thoroughly entrenched in the constitution, albeit subject to 
intervention by provincial governments. Although such intervention may be viewed as 
being “potentially draconian,” it is argued that it represents a necessary balancing 
between the demands of decentralisation and the recognition that local governments are 
susceptible to failure. The size dimension is also provided for both in the constitution and 
in national legislation with clear objectives and criteria for the demarcation of municipal 
boundaries; the actual process of establishing those boundaries has, however, created 
conditions which lead to institutional weakness. The democratic process provided for in 
the framework is, apart from the question of the timing of elections, uncontroversial. 
Finally, we have both constitutional and statutory provisions designed to promote 
intergovernmental relations.  Whilst there is little information available to indicate 















is clear that a vital aspect of intergovernmental relations - that of providing support to 

















Evaluation: Executive Structure and Administrative Authority 
 
8.1 Purpose of Chapter 
 
This Chapter provides an evaluation of the local government framework in the context of 
dimensions of executive structure and administrative authority, dimensions (v) and (vi) 
respectively. These dimensions have in common the fact they are concerned with the 
means and mechanisms available to municipalities to enable them to govern, whether at 
the executive or administrative levels.  
 
8.2 The Local Government Executive Structure 
 
8.2.1 Choice of Models 
 
It will be recalled that the choice of local executive models lies, in essence, between the 
single executive model (a directly elected mayor) and the plural executive model (mayor 
and committees elected from the council). South Africa has opted for the latter model, but 
has in turn developed variations on it. The Structures Act provides for three types of 
executives. The first is the collective executive system which allows for the exercise of 
executive authority through an executive committee in which the executive leadership of 
the municipality is collectively vested.
132
 The second is the mayoral executive system 
which allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive mayor in whom 
the executive leadership of the municipality is vested and who is assisted by a mayoral 
committee.
133
 The third system is the plenary system in which the exercise of executive 
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authority is limited to the council itself.
134
 The plenary system is infrequently 
encountered and then mainly in municipalities with small councils, and this system need 
not detain us further. 
 
 The executive system which a municipality is determined according to the type of 
municipality as which it is established.
135
 A somewhat curious provision is that the type 
of municipality is determined by the Provincial Member of the Executive Committee 
responsible for local government when the municipality is established under section 12 of 
the Structures Act. Depending on the type of municipality as which it is established, it 
may either have a collective executive system or a mayoral executive system.  In effect, 
therefore, the executive system used in a municipality depends on the decision of the 
relevant provincial government, and not on the municipality itself. 
 
8.2.2 Key Components 
 
The executive structure of any municipality reflects an elaborate inter-relationship 
between various structures, office bearers and its administrative arm. The key 
components of this structure are the office of the mayor, the office of the speaker, 
committees, and the municipal manager. These components are discussed below. 
 
(i) Mayors and executive or mayoral committees: In a collective executive system, 
political parties represented in the council are also represented on the executive 
committee, with proportionality being the guiding principle. One executive council 
member is elected to serve as mayor, who presides over meetings of the executive 
committee and performs such other functions as may be assigned by the council or the 
executive committee. The executive committee members report not to the mayor but to 
the council. In the executive mayoral system, by contrast, members of a mayoral 
committee are appointed by the executive mayor and report directly to and are 
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accountable to the mayor, who may dismiss them. It will be immediately appreciated that 
the choice of executive system will influence power relationships within a municipality. 
An executive mayor is a large presence in his or her particular municipal pond. A mayor 
in a collective executive system may, by contrast, be subject to the dictates of the 
executive committee. It should be kept in mind that the powers and functions imposed on 
an executive committee
136
 are much the same as those imposed on an executive mayor,
137
 
and as a result, enormous powers are concentrated in a single office in the case of an 
executive mayor. This in turn has consequences for effective and efficient action on the 
part of the executive. In either system, the mayor is the head of the executive and is the 
link between the council and the administration. 
 
(ii) Committees of the Council: A municipality’s committee system and the manner in 
which it is applied can have a considerable influence on the effectiveness of the 
municipality as a whole. Apart from executive or mayoral committees, a municipality 
may establish committees “necessary for the effective and efficient performance of any of 
its functions and the exercise of any of its powers.”
138
 Such a committee is appointed by a 
council from amongst its members, and the council determines its function and delegates 
duties and powers to it. In addition, a council may appoint “committees of councillors to 
assist the executive committee or executive mayor.”
139
 Again, it immediately becomes 
clear that the extent to which committees are appointed, and the type of committees 
which are appointed, have implications for the accountability of the executive to the 
council. 
 
(iii) The Speaker: An office which is an innovation in South African local government is 
that of the Speaker. In the previous dispensation, the council would have been chaired by 
the mayor. The greater executive burden placed on the mayor under the current 
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arrangement gave rise to the perception that the task of chairing the council should be 
assigned to a more neutral figure, and hence provision was made for the office of the 
Speaker.
140
 The Speaker’s primary functions relate to presiding at meetings, disciplinary 
issues, and specifically assigned duties. It is common practice to delegate to the office of 
the Speaker responsibilities concerning councillor support, community participation (de 
Visser 2009) and particularly, the responsibility of supervising the ward committee 
system. These roles are highly political in nature, and there exists a real danger that 
speakers may not limit themselves to organisational duties and become active 
participants, “often to the chagrin of the municipal executive” (de Visser 2009, section 5). 
In addition, the councillor support function may give rise to the practice of petty politics 
(de Visser 2009) with the power to approve activities by councillors, a useful tool in the 
hands of an ambitious Speaker. Importantly, it should also be kept in mind that unlike the 
national and provincial legislatures, municipal councils have both a legislative and an 
executive function. The fact that the holder of a supposedly neutral office presides over a 
body with executive functions must inevitably lead to that office playing an executive 
role which may lead to tensions with structures and office bearers whose roles are more 
overtly of an executive character (de Visser 2009). In short, strictly speaking, the Speaker 
is not a member of the executive, but the office can and often does play a leading role in 
the executive function of a municipality. 
 
(iv) The Municipal Manager: Although the municipal manager forms part of the 
administration rather than the council, the office is a vital one and together with that of 
the mayor, it provides the link between the council and the administration. The municipal 
manager is the head of the administration of a municipality with extensive powers as set 
out in Section 55 of the Systems Act. A municipal manager is appointed by the municipal 
council,
141
 as are the managers directly accountable to him or her.
142
 This arrangement 
was intended to provide for a senior management structure in the municipality that 
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understands and operates in unison with its political principals in the executive of the 
municipality (de Visser 2009). Whatever the advantages of such an arrangement, the 
disadvantages are obvious. Senior managers are subject to the vagaries of council politics, 
which results in dismissals, suspensions and sidelining of officials who may not be in 
favour with the party or faction in power at the time. It also results in undue pressure 
being placed on officials, creating tensions between the dictates of good governance and 
party-political demands. Furthermore, appointments may become politically motivated, 
with party or factional loyalties becoming more important than merit as criteria for 
appointment (de Visser 2009; Atkinson 2007). 
 
8.2.3 A Mechanism to Regulate Relationships 
 
It will be readily appreciated that unless there is a mechanism which regulates the 
relationship between these structures, office bearers and officials, competing agendas 
might rapidly render a municipality dysfunctional. This difficulty has been anticipated by 
legislation, in this case, in the form of Section 53 of the Local Government: Systems Act 
(“Systems Act”),  which requires that each municipality define in precise terms, by way 
of separate terms of reference, the specific role and area of responsibility of each political 
structure,
143
 each political office bearer
144
 and the municipal manager. It provides that 
when defining the respective roles and areas of responsibility, the municipality must 
determine: 
 
 The relationships amongst each structure, office bearer and the municipal 
manager, and the manner in which they interact; 
 Appropriate lines of accountability and reporting; 
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 Mechanisms, processes and procedures for minimising cross-referrals and 
unnecessary overlapping of responsibilities; 
 Mechanisms, processes and procedures  for resolving disputes between them; 
 Mechanisms, processes and procedures for interaction with staff members and 
between councillors and staff and the municipal manager. 
Although such a definition of roles and responsibilities might be complex, it is 
immediately obvious that it serves a vital function in promoting executive effectiveness, 
and that it should be one of the priorities for municipalities to develop such an instrument. 
In a sense, it serves as a type of “mini-constitution” of the municipality, governing 
relations between key players and structures. This requirement is an example of 
appropriate decentralisation in theory, with national legislation setting out in broad 
outline a mechanism for achieving a governance outcome, with the sub-national unit 
being left to determine the details of the mechanism and to implement it. Unfortunately, 
however, as is so often the case, the good intentions of the legislature have been largely 
ignored, as is shown in the next sub-section.  
 
8.2.4 Implementation in Practice 
 
Inquiries were made at the 37 municipalities in the sample in order to ascertain the extent 
to which they complied with the requirement relating to the adoption of definitions of 
roles and responsibilities. It emerged that only 9 could indicate (with certainty) that they 
had adopted definitions of roles and responsibilities as required by the Systems Act (See 
Appendix B (Table 2), Column (i)). The remainder either: 
 
 did not have any document at all incorporating such definitions ( 22 cases); or 
  were in the process (some 8 or 9 years after the relevant legislation came into 
force) of developing  definitions of roles and responsibilities (3 cases); or  
  indicated that such an instrument had been developed but it could not be located 
















No reasons were forthcoming as to why definitions of roles and responsibilities had not 
been adopted. 
 
The dysfunctional nature of the council, executive, other structures and administration 
(and the poor relationship between them) of many a municipality in South Africa is 
notorious. A recent study
145
 highlights a number of disturbing elements which undermine 
the effective carrying out of executive functions, including a lack of council oversight 
over the administration; a lack of appropriate council structures; interference by 
councillors in the administration; fraught relationships between mayor, speaker, chief 
whip
146
 and councillors; and interference by political parties. In addition, it was found in a 
report of the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee on Coordinated Oversight on Service 
Delivery that there is a need to clarify the respective roles of c uncil structures, office 
bearers and officials, the lack of clarity having resulted in “paralysis” in certain 
municipalities; this report also pointed to an “overwhelming lack of clarity” on the roles 
of mayors, speakers and chief whips, as well as the relationship between politicians and 
officials.  
 
The findings referred to above are supported by the present author’s own observations 
regarding relations between structures and office bearers in many municipalities. 
Institutional paralysis, in-fighting, poor oversight, duplication of activities, and a lack of 
understanding of the roles of structures and office bearers were frequently complained of. 
 
To what extent can the existence of a definition of roles and responsibilities prevent the 
situation described above? At a minimum, it is submitted, it would provide a framework 
which, if properly constructed and duly observed, would ensure the existence of 
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appropriate relationships, proper accountability, clear definition and performance of roles, 
minimising of disputes, and proper interaction with the municipal administration. Of 
course, this assumes that if such a definition of roles and responsibilities exists in a 
municipality, it would actually be implemented. The mere existence of such an instrument 
does not ensure application. In fact, of the 9 municipalities in our sample which had 
adopted such a definition, it was indicated in 5 cases that theirs were not properly 
implemented, with at least occasional – and sometimes frequent - deviations from the 
channels and roles provided for in the instrument. The point remains, however, that 
implementation must be preceded by adoption, and in the absence of such an instrument, 
a functional relationship between the various structures and office bearers cannot be 
established.  
 
8.3 Administrative Authority 
 
8.3.1 De Iure Administrative Authority 
 
With dimension (vi) - administrative authority - we are concerned with whether the 
decentralised unit has the right to manage its own affairs. Once again, our starting point 
in this inquiry lies with the constitution, which provides in Section 151(3) that “a 
municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of 
its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the 
Constitution.” Section 151 (4) goes on to provide that the national or a provincial 
government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise 
its powers or perform its functions.
147
 Finally, Section 160 of the Constitution provides, 
amongst other things, that a municipal council may make decisions concerning the 
exercise of all the powers and performance of all the functions of the municipality, and 
may employ personnel that are necessary for the effective performance of its functions. 
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A municipality is legally defined as an organ of state exercising legislative and executive 
authority within a determined area, and consists of the political structures and 
administration of the municipality, and (and this is an interesting innovation) the 
community of the municipality. It functions in accordance with the political, statutory and 
other relationships between its political structures, political office bearers and 
administration and its community; and has a separate legal personality which excludes 
liability on the part of the community for the actions of the municipality.
 148
 
Mirroring section 151(3) of the Constitution, section 4 of the Systems Act provides that a 
municipal council has the right to govern on its own initiative the local government 
affairs of the local community; the Systems Act goes on to provide that a council has the 
right to exercise the municipality’s executive and legislative authority, and to do so 
without improper interference; and to finance the affairs of the municipality by charging 
fees for services and imposing surcharges on fees, rates on property and, to the extent 




On the face of it, the legislative framework supports the contention that municipalities in 
general terms enjoy clear de iure administrative autonomy. Three areas in particular, 
however, bear closer examination. The  are (i) autonomy of a municipality to establish its 
own systems for the administration of its own affairs and the performance of its functions; 
(ii) the appointment of staff; and (iii) financial administration. These are discussed in turn 
in subsections 8.3.2, 8.3.3 and 8.3.4 below. It should be noted at the outset that this 
discussion is concerned only with the extent to which the legislative framework deals 
with these areas of administrative authority. Accordingly, the discussion does not involve 
an examination of actual practice in municipalities. Where aspects of administrative 
authority are relevant to actual practice, they are discussed elsewhere, for example in 
chapters 9, 10 and 12. 
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8.3.2 The Autonomy of a Municipality to Establish Systems  
 
Municipalities are required by the Systems Act to establish systems, mechanisms, 
processes and procedures in relation to a number of specified aspects of its administration, 
in particular, in regard to community participation, integrated development planning, 
performance management, municipal services and credit control and debt collection. In 
the context of decentralisation, there can be little quibble with the fact that municipalities 
are required to develop and implement these mechanisms and procedures. What is a 
matter of concern, however, is the fact that there are embedded in the legislation certain 
elements which betray recentralising tendencies. Various provisions in the Systems Act 
give the minister in central government who is responsible for local government the 
power to make regulations and issue guidelines on a wide range of issues - for example, 
in relation to: 
 
 community participation (including regulations and guidelines in regard to 
minimum standards for funding and any matter that my facilitate the participation 
of the local community in the affairs of the local community);
149
  
 integrated development planning (including regulations and guidelines regarding 
the detail of integrated development plans, criteria to be taken into account when 
planning, drafting, adopting or reviewing integrated development plans, and the 




  performance management (including regulations and guidelines to provide for 
incentives to ensure that municipalities establish performance management 
systems, the setting of key performance indicators, the setting of  a framework for 
performance targets, systems for monitoring and measurement of performance 
systems, and the like);
151
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 local public administration and human resources (including regulations and 
guidelines for the setting of uniform staff establishments, municipal staff systems 
and procedures, any other matter concerning personnel administration, the 
establishment of job evaluation systems, remuneration and other conditions of 
service for members of staff, the measuring and evaluation of staff performance, 
and corrective standards in the case of substandard performance); 
152
 
  municipal services (including regulations and guidelines regarding municipal 
tariff policies, the subsidisation of tariffs for poor households, measures against 
malpractice in selecting and appointing service providers, standard draft service 
delivery agreements and performance guarantees by service providers); 
153
  
 credit control and debt collection (including regulations and guidelines regarding 
user agreements, the rendering of accounts, action that may be taken to secure 
payment of arrear accounts, extensions for the payment of arrears, and any other 




The power to make regulations on a wide range of issues which may affect the 
administrative authority of municipalities certainly encroaches on the decentralised 
character of local government. Whilst ministerial power to make regulations pursuant to a 
statute is a common legislative dev ce (and it must be emphasised that it is not intended 
to suggest here that the use of such a device in the Systems Act is contrary to the 
Constitution
155
), it is somewhat ironic that this power should be so extensive in a statute 
which purports to give effect to the precepts of decentralisation.
156
 These regulations 
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relate to issues which influence the administration of local government and which may 
affect local citizens closely but over which they have absolutely no say. It may be argued 
that this is entirely contrary to the basic premises underlying decentralisation. Perhaps 
this reflects the jealousness with which central governments tend to cling to their powers, 
or betrays a distrust on the part of central government in the ability of local government 
to manage its own affairs.
 157
 
8.3.3. The Appointment of Staff 
 
It will be recalled that in the discussion of the dimension of administrative authority in 
Chapter 6 that one of the key issues concerned the right of the local government to hire 
personnel. The Local Government: Structures Act (“Structures Act”) and the Systems Act 
provide respectively for the appointment of municipal managers
158
 and managers directly 
accountable to municipal managers.
159
 According to these provisions as presently 
formulated, these senior officials are appointed entirely at the discretion of the council, 
whilst other staff members are appointed by the municipal manager;
160
 in other words, 
staff appointments are entirely an internal municipal matter, with municipalities being 
responsible for, and having the powers for, recruiting, disciplining and dismissing their 
own staff. 
161
 As such, municipal employees do not form part of the civil service and are 
not subject to national or provincial civil service regulation. From time to time, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
157
 The potential that these regulations have to erode the decentralised character of local government has 
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the possibility of creating a single public service has been raised by central government. 
This proposal, which involves the unification of national, provincial and municipal staffs 
into a single public service, appears to be a direct response to the lack of institutional 
capacity at municipal level. The rationale behind it is that it will deepen integrated service 
delivery, strategically align the institutions that comprise the machinery of the 
developmental state, and create common norms and standards for human resource 
management. It implies the adoption of a common wage policy across all spheres of 
government, harmonised conditions of service, common norms and standards of human 
resource management, and mobility (Department of Public Service and Administration 
2007). Whether the establishment of a single unified public service will have an impact 
on the functions, skills and competencies needed for local government is open to 
question. It is, however, clear that the inevitable consequence of the implementation of 
such an arrangement would be to reduce the administrative autonomy of municipalities, 




8.3.4 Financial Administration 
 
The Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act (“MFMA”), which was 
enacted in response to the fiscal crisis which had gripped local government almost 
continuously under the new dispensation, imposes even tighter central control over the 
administration of municipal finances.
163
 Virtually every aspect of financial management – 
from the operation of bank accounts, to preparing of budgets, to incurring of debt, to 
general financial management, and to supply chain management, is closely regulated 
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 During the second Reading Debate on the Municipal Finance Management Bill, Dr G Woods (IFP) 
remarked of the bill: “It became clear…that its paternalistic character emerged from a belief that municipal 
officials are generally incompetent, dishonest, lazy and devious, leading to a Bill designed to control and 
macro(sic)-manage these devious officials, rather than the opposing new-era approach, which is to 
stimulate human potential towards the attainment of results” (Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 
Thursday 11 September 2003, cols.6504-6505) It is not clear whether the “new-era” approach to which 
Woods was referring was New Public Management, which by then was no longer so new. That said, it is 
difficult to find any hint of the principles of decentralisation in it. In fact the MFMA tends to promote 
















either by the MFMA itself or by regulations made thereunder.
164
 This is not to suggest 
that, given the state of municipal finances, this close regulation is not necessary; on the 
contrary, many would argue that the MFMA needs to be more strictly applied, and that 
decision makers in a decentralised structure should be made responsible for the financial 
consequences of their decisions. This objective, it is argued, would be facilitated by the 
existence of the existence of a set of laws relating to budgeting, financial reporting, 
procurement and the like (Niksic 2004).  
 
It is arguable that, however necessary it may be to regulate financial management in local 
government by means of national legislation, interference of this nature could well 
amount to a contradiction of the objectives of decentralisation. A particular cause for 
concern is the fact that in a supposedly decentralised system, such strict regulation, 
whether pursuant to the MFMA or the regulations which may be made under the Systems 
Act, is necessary in the first place. It speaks, perhaps, of a country which is not ready for 
decentralisation and in which sub-national governments require close control from central 
government. 
 
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The executive structure of a municipality is a key dimension of decentralisation and 
consists of a complex set of relationships between various office bearers, structures and 
officials. A means of regulating those relationships is essential to ensure an effective 
executive function, and whilst statutory provision has been made for a mechanism to 
regulate those relationships, we see that in practice, municipalities have often ignored this 
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 The MFMA relies to a large extent on regulations made by the Minister of Finance as instruments of  
implementing or enforcing  policy; these regulations are often quite sweeping in scope. Included amongst 
these regulations are the Municipal Investment Regulations of 2005 (published under GN R 308in 
Government Gazette 27431 of 1 April 2005), the Supply Chain Management Regulations of 2005 
(published under GN 868 in Government Gazette 27636 of 30 May 2005), Municipal Regulations on Debt 
Disclosure of 2007 (published under GN R 492 in Government Gazette 29966 of 15 June 2007), the 
Municipal Regulations on Minimum Competency Levels of 2007 (published under GN R 493 in 
Government Gazette 29967 of 15 June 2007), and the Municipal Budget and Reporting Regulations of 
















mechanism and have failed to adopt it. The consequences for effective governance are 
obviously negative. As far as administrative authority is concerned, we note that both the 
Constitution and subsequently enacted legislation (in the form of the Systems Act) 
establish a framework for notional administrative autonomy which is consistent with a 
decentralised system of governance, but that by means of both regulatory and statutory 
devices, the decentralised character of that system is threatened. The juxtaposition of the 
dimensions of the executive structure and administrative autonomy illustrate the twin 
dangers presented to decentralisation by the inability or unwillingness on the part of 
municipalities to implement essential features of decentralisation, and the tendency of 

















Evaluation: Institutional Capacity 
 
9.1 Purpose of Chapter  
 
Institutional capacity - dimension (vii) - is about the ability of municipalities to perform 
appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently and sustainably (Cloete 2002). Municipalities 
depend on the organisational experience and proper conduct of people who are capable of 
managing large organisations, producing and implementing substantial budgets, 
implementing complex legal requirements and taking decisions on sophisticated technical 
matters (Atkinson 2007). Capacity building has often been cited as the principle obstacle 
in furthering the decentralisation process. It follows that an essential dimension of a 
decentralised system is the provision of a mechanism for building and sustaining 
institutional capacity.  
 
A heavy burden is placed on the capacity of a municipality to deliver. The Local 
Government: Systems Act (“Systems Act”) requires a municipality to establish and 
organise its administration within its administrative and financial capacity in a manner 
which enables it to achieve a daunting list of objectives.165 Nonetheless, the Act makes 
extensive provision for systems and mechanisms designed to assist municipalities to 
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 Namely, the following objectives as required by Section 51 of the Systems Act: to (a) be responsive to 
the needs of the local community; (b) facilitate a culture of public service and accountability amongst 
staff;(c) be performance orientated and focused on the objects of local government; (d) ensure that its 
political structures, political office bearers and managers and other staff members align their roles and 
responsibilities with the  integrated development plan; (e) establish clear relationships, and facilitate co-
operation, coordination and communication, between its political structures and political office bearers and 
its administration, and  its political structures, political office bearers and administration and the local 
community; (f) organise its political structures, political office bearers and administration in a flexible way 
in order to respond to changing priorities and circumstances; (g) perform its functions  through 
operationally effective and appropriate administrative units and mechanisms, including departments and 
other functional or business units; and when necessary, on a decentralised basis; (h) assign clear 
responsibilities for the management and co-ordination of these administrative units and mechanisms; (i) 
hold the municipal manager accountable for the overall performance of the administration; (j) maximise 
efficiency of communication and decision-making within the administration; (k) delegate responsibility to 
the most effective level within the administration; (l) involve staff in management decisions as far as is 
















achieve these ends. This chapter will focus on the application of mechanisms aimed at 
advancing institutional capacity insofar as it relates to staff matters, namely, on the 
subjects of staff establishments, human resources development, capacity building and 
professional norms and standards, which are dealt with in sections 9.2 to 9.5 respectively, 
and on performance management, which is dealt with in section 9.6. 
 




The Systems Act166 provides that within a policy framework determined by the council 
and subject to legislation, a municipal manager must approve a staff establishment for the 
municipality, provide a job description for each post on the staff establishment, attach to 
those posts the remuneration and other conditions of service as may be determined in 
accordance with applicable labour legislation, and establish a process or mechanism to 




Inquiries were made at th  municipalities in the sample to ascertain the extent of 
compliance with the above requirements of the Systems Act. Of the 37 municipalities, it 
emerged that: 
 
 with one exception, none had, or at least was aware of having, a policy framework 
relating to the staff establishment as determined by the council (See Appendix B, 
Column(ii)); 
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 notwithstanding the absence of policy frameworks, every municipality in the 
sample had a staff establishment approved by the municipal manager (See 
Appendix B, Column (iii)); 
 in 18 cases, however, the staff establishment was described as  inadequate, in that 
it did not reflect the purported staffing needs of the municipality; 
  in 22 cases, it was indicated that the staff establishment (whether it was described 
as adequate or not) was in any event not adhered to, in that appointments were 
made to the staff which were not provided for in the staff establishment,
167
 or with 








 conditions of service were attached in all cases  insofar as they were contained in 
Collective Agreements (See Appendix B, Column (v)); 170 
 only one municipality had a formal process or mechanism for evaluating and 
reviewing  its staff establishment  (See Appendix B, Column (vi))  
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 In one case, it was reported that the practice was to make temporary appointments which were 
continuously renewed, in the belief that that would avoid compliance with the staff establishment 
requirements. In a number of other cases, persons who had been temporarily employed were appointed to 




 The present author recalls the Chief Financial Officer of a small, rural municipality complaining about 
the inappropriate qualifications of staff in the finance department. One staff member apparently held a 
certificate in fire-fighting, and another a degree in theology. Given the state of the municipality’s finances, 
and that a visit by the Auditor-General was looming, perhaps the CFO should have appreciated that these 
two individuals were probably admirably qualified, each in his own way, to deal with the crisis. 
 
169
 It was reported in one case that job descriptions were “tailored” so as to correspond with the 
qualifications of applicants for posts who were deemed politically acceptable. 
 
170
 Service Conditions are largely contained in the South African Local Government Bargaining Council 
Main Collective Agreement, as supplemented by divisional agreements. These agreements, as well as the 
grievance procedures and disciplinary procedures referred to later in this chapter, are renegotiated from 
time to time between  the South African Local Government Association (a body which represents organised 
local government) and municipal trade unions, under the auspices of the Bargaining Council. Section 71 of 
the Systems Act requires that municipalities comply with “any collective agreements concluded by 
organised local government within its mandate on behalf of local government in the bargaining council 
















A common feature amongst municipalities in the sample was the high rate of vacancies 
on the staff establishments. As far as senior staff members were concerned, it was found 
that of the 37 municipalities in the sample: 
 




 30 did not have full complements of permanently appointed managers directly 
accountable to the municipal manager (in two cases, ALL such managers were 
serving in an acting capacity, whilst in the remaining 28 of these 30 cases, 25% to 
60% of such posts were filled by persons serving in an acting capacity or were not 




An attempt was made to quantify the overall vacancy rates (i.e. at all levels), but the 
information provided by municipalities in many cases proved to be unreliable. Reliance 
was therefore placed in those cases on the findings of Municipal Demarcation Board 
assessment for 2008/9; in summary, vacancy rates in the sample of 37 municipalities rates 
were as follows:  
 
 3 (or 8%) had vacancy rates of   more than 40% (ranging from 43% to 48%); 
 7 (or 19%)  had vacancy rates of 30% or more;   
 17 (or 46%) had vacancy rates of 20% or more 
 25 (or 68%) had vacancy rates of 10% or more (See Appendix C ( Graph (1)). 
 
12 of the municipalities (or 32%) had vacancy rates of less than 10%; 2 had zero vacancy 
rates and one even had a 106% occupancy rate. In the latter case, as also in 6 other of 
these 12 cases, it was indicated that the high occupancy rates were due at least in part to 
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 As at March 2010, countrywide, 87% of municipal manager posts were reported to be filled. The 
situation varied greatly from province to province, however, with all posts in Kwa-Zulu Natal being 
reportedly filled, but only 71%, 74% and 80% of posts being filled respectively in Mpumalanga, Gauteng 
and Limpopo ( SA Local Government Briefing, September 2010, p3).  
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 As at March 2010, countrywide, 86% of posts for managers directly accountable to the municipal 
















persons being appointed to positions which did not exist in the staff establishment - in 




The reasons given by individual municipalities for the large vacancy rates were many and 
varied. Amongst them was the reluctance of qualified staff to live in distant, rural areas; 
the lack of qualified staff in general; allegedly low salaries; applicants being politically 
unacceptable to councillors; and insufficient cash resources to pay salaries, either due to 
posts not having been budgeted for in the first place, or because of shortfalls arising in 
salary budgets because of poor budgeting. 
 
In the cases of several individual municipalities in the sample, it was clear that certain  
individual vacancies would have had little effect on the functionality of the institutions 
concerned, as several posts provided for in municipal staff establishments appeared to be 
sinecures or to contribute very little to the effectiveness of the institution concerned. In 
most cases, however, vacancies lead to genuine operational dysfunctionality. In most of 
the municipalities in our sample, inadequate staff complements were referred to as being 
a major cause of the inability of municipalities to perform their functions. There was 
clearly a lack of priority skills which result in high vacancy rates, a situation exacerbated 
by the filling of posts in an acting capacity or by officials occupying dual positions.
174
 
Often, tasks were performed on an ad hoc basis by personnel filling unrelated posts 
because no proper appointment could be made for the position in question. For example, a 
situation which was encountered on more than one occasion in the course of conducting 
the present study was the use of traffic officers to serve as temporary fire-fighters in the 
absence of properly trained personnel. In addition, the simple fact that job descriptions 
were not provided in many cases gave rise to complaints that staff members were unsure 
as to their roles, which reportedly led to uncertainty and low morale.  
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 It is worth noting that the National Treasury has found that the practice of appointing persons to 
positions which are non-existent on staff establishments is widespread (National Treasury 2008). 
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 The problem is more pronounced in rural areas, where there is a lack of training and education centres 



















The Systems Act 
175
 requires a municipality to develop and adopt appropriate systems and 
procedures to ensure fair, effective and transparent personnel administration, including 
systems and procedures for the recruitment, selection and appointment of staff; the 
service conditions of staff; the supervision and management of staff; the monitoring, 
measuring and evaluation of staff performance; the promotion and demotion of staff; the 
transfer of staff; grievance procedures; disciplinary procedures; the investigation of 
allegations of misconduct and complaints against staff; and any other matter prescribed 
by regulation.176 
 
Grievance Procedures, disciplinary procedures and, to a large extent, service conditions, 
of staff are determined by the South African Local Government Bargaining Council and 
are applicable to all municipalities. For present purposes, their application in all 
municipalities is assumed. The other systems and procedures are, however, left to 




It should be noted that whilst municipalities are permitted to develop their own systems 
tailored to their own requirements, the Systems Act provides that they “must develop and 
adopt” them - in other words, development and adoption are not optional. That 
notwithstanding, the following emerged regarding the development and adoption of 
systems relating to human resources development in the 37 municipalities in our sample: 
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 Section 67. 
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 the recruitment, selection and appointment of staff: All but 4 municipalities had 
adopted systems and procedures for this function (See Appendix B, Column (ix)); 
it was indicated in 18 cases, however, that such systems were inadequate (by 
reason of being poorly drafted, or out of date); in 19 cases, it was indicated  that, 
whether adequate or not in form, the systems were improperly applied. For 
example, in one case, it was indicated that positions were filled at the request of 
councillors or office bearers without any reference to the staff selection procedure; 
in another case, the staff selection procedure was almost  entirely bypassed with 
all appointments (except for the lowliest positions) being made entirely by the 
mayor or his delegate. It should be noted, however, that whilst a large number of 
municipalities reported improper application of the procedures, very few were 
willing to be specific as to the way in which they were improperly applied.
177
  
 the supervision and management of staff:  Only two municipalities had such 
systems in place (See Appendix B, Column (x)); 
 the monitoring, measuring and evaluation of staff performance: 33 of the 37 
municipalities had  systems relating to staff performance, but in only three cases 
did these systems apply across the board to all staff; in all other cases, they 
applied only to senior management (See Appendix B, Column (xi) ;
178
 
 the promotion and demotion of staff: Only two municipalities had systems relating 
to the promotion and demotion of staff (See Appendix B, Column(xii)) ; 
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 A phenomenon which is encouraged by the absence of or improper application of recruiting policies is 
that of “cadre deployment,” a practice whereby individuals loyal to the governing elite are “deployed” to 
government positions not necessarily by reason of their suitability for those positions, but because of their 
political reliability. This practice has become quite notorious in South Africa and is particularly widespread 
within the sphere of local government, this notwithstanding the fact that is not permitted by legislation and 
is of doubtful constitutionality (see Mlokoti v Amathole District Municipality 2009(6) SA 354). In this 
practice, normal recruitment practices are ignored and the individual concerned is installed in the position 
at the instance of a party structure, usually a “deployment committee,” with the cooperation  of officials 
and councillors, who consider it in their best interests to comply with the deployment committee’s wishes.  
Whilst the practice is no doubt not unique to South Africa, the term “cadre deployment” probably is. The 
consequences of this practice for the proper administration of municipalities are obvious, and it is 
frequently blamed as one of the leading causes of maladministration in local government in South Africa. 
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 The fact that these evaluation processes are applied to senior staff at all is probably not unrelated to the 
fact that according to Section 57(4B) of the Systems Act, bonuses based on performance (as is the case 
with Municipal Managers and Managers who are directly accountable to Municipal Managers) may be paid 
















 the transfer of staff: only two municipalities  had systems relating to the transfer 
of staff (See Appendix B, Column (xiii)); 
 grievance procedures:  by virtue of grievance procedures having been adopted by 
the South African Local Government Bargaining Council, all municipalities in 
effect have a system for grievance procedures (See Appendix B, Column (xiv)); 
however, it was indicated in the cases of 18 of the 37 Municipalities in the sample 
that the grievance procedures were either not properly applied or ignored; in 10 
other cases, no comment was forthcoming; only in 9 cases was it indicated that the 
grievance procedures were properly applied. 
 disciplinary procedures: again, by virtue of disciplinary procedures having been 
adopted by the Local Government Bargaining Council, all municipalities in effect 
have systems for disciplinary procedures (See Appendix B, Column (xv)) 
179
; 
however, application of the disciplinary procedures was considered to be “poor” 
in the cases of 21 of the municipalities in the sample; in 5 it was considered it 
“fair”, and in 2 it was considered it “good.” No opinion was expressed in the 
remaining 9 cases. In 14 of the cases in which the application of the procedures 
was considered to be poor, it was indicated that staff were inadequately trained to 
prosecute or chair disciplinary hearings. In 5 cases, it was indicated that 
disciplinary cases were not prosecuted due to disinterest or favouritism on the part 
of senior management, whilst at 2 municipalities the failure to prosecute cases was 
ascribed to “intimidation” - that is, of staff who were potential appointees as 
prosecutors or chairs and who had been warned (by unspecified persons) not to 
accept such appointment on pain of unpleasant consequences. In one case, it was 
indicated quite simply that a moratorium had been placed on disciplinary action, 
although no reason could be furnished for this.
 180
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 Senior managers (i.e. municipal managers and managers directly accountable to them) fall outside of the 
purview of the Bargaining Council and are not subject to the standard disciplinary procedures. Draft 
regulations providing for separate disciplinary procedures for senior manager were published for comment 
by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs in November 2009, but at the time 
of writing, they had not been promulgated.  
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Until recently, it was common practice amongst municipalities to appoint external experts to serve as 
prosecutors and chairs at disciplinary inquiries, due to the lack of internal capacity. The practice of 















 the investigation of allegations of misconduct and complaints against staff: one 
municipality in the  sample had adopted a system to regulate this (See Appendix 
B, Column (xvi)); 
 the dismissal and retrenchment of staff: only one municipality had adopted a 
system to regulate the dismissal and retrenchment of staff (See Appendix B, 
Column (xvii)) . 
 
It is striking to note that with very few exceptions, those systems described above which 
had actually adopted by municipalities had been developed, not internally by the 
institutions concerned, but by external consultants, and then usually with little, if any, 
input from municipal officials. The frequent result was that  systems enjoyed little 
credibility amongst staff who, not having had any involvement in the process, often did 
not understand or appreciate the purpose and import of  the systems concerned, and had 
little interest in ensuring the implementation of those systems. It was also apparent that 
there was a widespread lack of knowledge regarding the specific requirements of 
legislation regarding the development and implementation of mechanisms and systems 
relating to human resources development. This may explain to some extent the low levels 
of compliance with its requirements. 
 
The practical consequences of the poor application of systems and mechanisms directed 
at human resource development were apparent in the majority of the municipalities in the 
sample. Complaints were frequently raised in the course of discussions with officials 





                                                                                                                                                 
procedures agreed in 2010 at the SA Local Government Bargaining Council. It remains to be seen what 
















9.4 Capacity Building 
 
The Systems Act requires that a municipality develop its human resource capacity to a 
level that enables it to perform its functions and exercise its powers in “an economical, 
effective, efficient and accountable way.”181  
 
In the absence of any performance management or evaluation system that is meaningfully 
applied,
182
 it is difficult to assess in an objective fashion the extent to which local 
government meets the standards laid down by the Act. Officials at the 37 municipalities 
were, however, asked to assess their respective municipalities against the “economical, 
effective, efficient and accountable” criteria.  Their responses indicated that: 
 
 considered their level of compliance to be good; 
 16 considered their level of compliance to be fair; 
 15 considered their level of compliance to be poor. 
 
It is immediately acknowledged that the responses reflect subjective views of the capacity 
of municipalities; nonetheless, it is instructive that such a large proportion considered 
their compliance “poor” or only “fair.” Although a number of municipalities indicated 
that, given the circumstances, their situations were “manageable,” most municipalities 
complained of a shortage of skills,183 ranging from specific skills, to general management 
skills to literacy skills, which impaired their capacity to perform their powers and in “an 
economical, effective, efficient and accountable way.” The reasons given for this state of 
affairs are interconnected with the question of high vacancy rates discussed previously 
(including lack of funding, inability to attract and retain staff, and a country-wide lack of 
skills in general), inappropriate recruitment processes (including as a result of political 
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 Systems Act, Section 66 
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 See section 9.5 below. 
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 Skills which have been identified as lacking include strategic management (policy and leading, 
developing, monitoring and evaluating the IDPs); financial management; contract management with 
emphasis on good procurement practices; political and administrative leadership; project management; and 
















interference), poor training, poor matching of skills to the requirements of posts, and a 
lack of interest and commitment on the part of employees. There seems in many cases to 
be an air of resignation about the inability to enhance capacity at municipalities; as one 
official remarked, “It’s just part of the municipal environment - it always has been there 
and always will be.” 
 
9.5 Professional Norms and Standards 
 
An issue which has a strong bearing on institutional capacity is the quality of senior 
management. With three exceptions, there are, however, at the time of writing no 
professional norms or standards to which senior staff members are required to adhere. 
The first exception is to be found in section 82 (b) of the Local Government: Structures 
Act (“Structures Act”), in terms of which a municipal manager is under present 
arrangements appointed. This provides that a person appointed as a municipal manager 
must have the relevant skills and expertise to perform the duties associated with the post. 
The second is Section 56 (b) of the Systems Act, which similarly provides that a manager 
who is directly accountable to a municipal manager must have the relevant skills and 
expertise to perform the duties associated with the post in question (taking into account 
the protection or advancement of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination). These 
two provisions scarcely go any way towards providing any meaningful standards, and 
provide little clue as to what constitutes “relevant skills and expertise.” The third 
exception does provide a somewhat more concrete standard; this is in the form of the 
Municipal Regulations on Minimum Competency Levels made in terms of the Local 
Government: Municipal Finance Management Act.
184
 These regulations provide for 
minimum standards of financial competency for Municipal Managers and financial staff, 
and whilst already these regulations are in force, they take full effect only in 2013. It is 
therefore fair to say that apart from these regulations, the field is wide open to the 
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appointment of any person to a senior position to a municipality.
 185
 Anecdotal tales of 
senior managers completely lacking in any relevant qualification being appointed to posts 
only by reason of nepotism or patronage (or, let it be said, sometimes simply for want of 
any other candidate) abound; as do tales of office bearers in political parties being 




The position is set to change somewhat. As at the time of writing, an amendment bill
186
 to 
the Systems Act had been approved by the cabinet which in effect provides that municipal 
managers and managers directly accountable to the municipal managers must have the 
skills and expertise to perform their duties as prescribed by regulation. The bill also 
provides that “a municipal manager or manager directly accountable to a municipal 
manager may not hold political office in a political party, whether in a permanent, 
temporary or acting capacity.” A “political office” is defined as a position of chairperson, 
deputy chairperson, secretary, deputy secretary or treasurer of the party nationally or in 
any province, region or other area in which the party operates. This prohibition does not 




These proposed changes are of interest to us for a number of reasons. They at least 
constitute some recognition of the extent of the problem of lack of managerial 
competency. In fact, the Bill has been widely publicised as a direct response to the crisis 
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 An interest finding of the Auditor-General (2010) contained in the Consolidated General Report on 
Local Government Audit Outcomes 2008-09 was that of 247 municipalities analysed countrywide, 204 used 
consultants to assist with accounting related services; of those 204 municipalities, 127 used consultants,  
despite the fact that all their critical posts were filled, as a result of lack of technical expertise on the part of 
officials occupying those posts. This speaks volumes of the skills levels available even in supposedly 
adequately staffed municipalities. It is also worth noting that 66 of those 204 municipalities used 
consultants because of vacancies existing in the positions of Chief Financial Officer or other financial 
positions ( See Auditor General 2010, pp 51-54). 
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 The Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Bill, published for general comment under GN 
394 in Government Gazette 33189 of 14 May 2010. 
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The prohibition on holders of political office being appointed as senior managers has been promoted as 
being necessary to prevent political interference in the administration of municipalities, and in so doing, to 
bring municipalities in line with the best practice of civil service neutrality. One is left wondering why, if 
government were so concerned about promoting civil service neutrality, this new provision applies only to 
















in local government as such, it forms part of Government’s “turnaround strategy” for 
local government.
188
 But at the same time, the bill reinforces the tendency noted earlier to 
interfere with local affairs by means of ministerial regulation, something which has the 
potential to limit the right of the decentralised unit to appoint whom it wishes to whatever 
post it chooses. And it also reveals a tendency, which has been noted as being not unusual 
in states which have undergone processes of decentralisation, for central governments to 
attempt to claw back the powers which have been devolved to sub-national governments. 
Whilst it might be quite necessary to ensure that municipalities should be properly 
managed, the question arises as to whether centrally-exerted control of this nature is 
compatible with the concept of decentralisation; it is submitted that once again, we have 
an example of the erosion of the notion of decentralised local government. That said, the 
fact that interventions of this nature are considered necessary in the first place supports 
arguments that local attempts at decentralisation are falling short of expectations; it also 
demonstrates how tensions can arise between the demands of decentralisation and those 
of efficient administration. 
 




A Performance Management System (“PMS”) is intended to establish explicit standards 
and measurements of performance, requiring definitions of goals and targets and the 
establishment of indicators of success. As such, the idea of a PMS is often associated with 
New Public Management, but it is also relevant to decentralisation in the context of 
institutional capacity, which is a key dimension of decentralisation. It will be recalled that 
the White Paper on Local Government proposed the adoption of performance 
management principles as a means of making municipalities more developmental. It was 
argued by writers that performance management in the South African context would be a 
useful approach and would enhance performance of municipalities, even whilst warning 
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against the pitfalls of designing and implementing Performance Management Systems 
(Curtis 1999; Atkinson 2001). In the event, section 38 of the Systems Act made it an 
express requirement that  each municipality establish a PMS, promote a culture of 
performance management, and administer its affairs in an economical, effective efficient 
and accountable manner. Section 39 emphasises the importance which was placed on the 
PMS by charging the executive mayor or executive committee with the responsibility of 
managing the development of the system; section 41 describes the core components of a 
PMS, whilst section 42 requires the municipality to involve the community in the 
development of the PMS. Section 43 allows the minister responsible for local government 
to prescribe key performance indicators that are appropriate and can be applied to local 
government generally. Section 49 permits the Minister to make a host of regulations 






At the outset, there appears to be widespread confusion amongst municipalities as to what 
constitutes performance management and a performance management system. As we 
have seen, Section 38 of the Systems Act provides for an institutional PMS. Sections 57 
and 67 of the same act refer respectively to performance agreements for senior managers 
and a human resource system for monitoring, measuring and evaluating performance of 
staff. Only 3 of our 37 municipalities seemed to be aware of the fact that that Section 38 
provided for an institutional PMS, with many of the remainder apparently believing that 
the provisions of the senior managers’ performance agreements constituted a 
performance management system. 
 
Of the 37 municipalities in the sample, it was found that:  
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 The Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations, 2001, 
Published under Government Notice R 796 in Government Gazette 22605 of 24 August 2001. This “top-
down” approach” suggests that there may be a conflict between the implementing of objectives which are 
aimed at promoting both NPM and adherence to principles of decentralisation Something which is 



















 only two had  performance management systems that were fully compliant with 
legislation and which were being properly implemented; 
 one municipality had recently adopted a new, fully compliant PMS, but had not 
been able  to implement it and did not expect to do so in the foreseeable future, as 
there was “no-one on the staff to manage it;” 
 the remaining municipalities had no PMS at all (apart from the human resource 
system for monitoring, measuring and evaluating performance of staff, referred to 
above, which is not what is contemplated in the legislation relating to PMS) (See 
Appendix B, column (xviii)) . 
 
As was so often the case with non-compliance by municipalities with statutory 
requirements, it was extremely difficult to ascertain the reasons for the failure of 
municipalities to develop and adopt performance management systems. The most 
common reason that could be extracted was that municipalities lack the necessary skills 
to develop and implement performance management systems; another was the equally 
perennial reason that there were insufficient funds available for purposes of developing 
such systems. 
 
Considerable importance is placed on performance management systems in the relevant 
legislation. Amongst other things, such a system is intended to provide a yardstick for 
managing performance, for setting measurable performance targets, for monitoring 
performance, for reviewing performance and for improving performance.
190
 The 
designers of the local government framework had clearly placed considerable reliance on 
the concept of performance management as a means of enhancing delivery by local 
government. The failure on the part of the vast majority of municipalities in the sample to 
adopt such systems suggests a widespread indifference to the need for any such system, 
and places these institutions at risk of becoming goalless and aimless, with no means of 
determining their effectiveness 
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9.7 Concluding Remarks. 
 
The capacity crisis in South African municipalities is notorious. It has been suggested that 
the wholly inadequate capacitation process has resulted in the public sector, in many 
cases, returning “to its default position...(an) administrative order characterized by lack of 
transparency, by arrogance, and by a disregard for individual integrity, which , as might 
be expected, gave rise to a strong degree of general distrust. It is in this context, 
particularly, that we can understand the tyranny of petty bureaucrats at the local level and 
their seeming disinterest in effective service delivery” (Tapscott 2008:219).191  
 
 There can be little doubt that the demands placed on many municipalities are unrealistic 
in relation to their administrative capacities. The need to strengthen routine administrative 
functions is frequently neglected (Tapscott 2008), and it is evident that little attention has 
been paid, whether at local, provincial or local level, to the strengthening of basic 
administrative skills and reform of the systems which they support. This situation is 
exacerbated by what is clearly a widespread failure to apply the statutory provisions 
described above; this in turn gives rise to several factors which contribute to this lack of 
capacity: poor recruiting practices, poor discipline, poor or non-existent job definitions, 
and inadequate knowledge and skills of officials, and ill-designed and poorly 
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 A skills audit performed at a small rural municipality in our sample is instructive. The following is a 
verbatim extract from the audit report:  “More than 80% of the workforce in this Municipality is unskilled 
labour; more than 60% of the workforce is over the age of 50 years; more than 75% of the workforce is 
semi-illiterate; more than 55% of the above mentioned staff report for duty drunk almost every day. There 
is a big skills gap between the Management and the workers and this is solely due to there being no middle 
or junior management sections. Here you find a foreman reporting directly to the Head of the Directorate 
and the Senior Managers are more implementers than strategists of the Institution.” The inclusion of this 
extract is not intended to suggest that the situation which it describes is typical of all municipalities. It does, 


















Evaluation: Public Participation and Information Mechanisms 
 
10.1 Purpose of Chapter 
 
Public participation and information mechanisms (dimension (viii)) constitute what is 
widely considered to be a critical feature of decentralisation. The form of participatory 
democracy which public participation provides is considered to be a vital adjunct to the 
more formal forms of representative democracy. In this regard, it will be recalled that 
“working together with local citizens and partners” was considered one of three inter-
related approaches which were proposed by in the White Paper on Local Government to 




The Constitution itself is quite explicit about the question of public participation. Section 
152(1)(c) states that one of the objects of local government is “to encourage the 
involvement of communities  and community organisations in the matters of local 
government.” Both the Local Government: Systems Act (“Systems Act”) and the Local 
Government: Structures Act (“Structures Act”) provide amply for mechanisms, processes 
and rules designed to promote public participation and disseminate information. 
Nonetheless, it has been suggested that there is a growing culture of non-accountability 
within municipalities, with regular complaints about unresponsiveness of officials and 





The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the dimension of public participation in the 
context of the South African local government framework. 
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 The other two being integrated development planning and performance management. 
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 The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee on Coordinated Oversight and Service Delivery (2010) 
recognised the lack of visibility and accountability of councillors, and emphasised the importance of 

















Given the importance attached to public participation and communication, it is 
appropriate to consider the applicable provisions in the framework in some detail. The 
essential features of the statutory framework are as follows: 
 
(i) Development of culture of community participation: Section 16 of the Systems Act 
specifically requires a municipality to develop a culture of municipal governance that 
complements formal representative government with a system of participatory 
governance. To that end, the municipality must encourage and create conditions for the 
community to participate in the affairs of the community, contribute to the building of the 
capacity of the local community to enable it to participate and to the capacity of 
councillors and staff to foster community participation, and use its resources and allocate 
funds for these purposes. 
 
(ii) Mechanisms, processes and procedures for community participation: Section 17 
provides for a range of channels (such as political structures and councillors) and 
mechanisms (such as consultative sessions, processing of petitions, public meetings and 
community report-backs) for public participation. Municipalities are specifically enjoined 
to take into account the needs of people who cannot read and write people with 
disabilities, women, and other disadvantaged groups.  
 
(iii) Communication of information: Section 18 requires municipalities to communicate 
its community information concerning mechanisms for and rights and duties relating to 
community participation.  
 
(iv) Notice of and admission to council meetings: Section 19 requires the municipal 















terms of Section 20, meetings of the council and its committees are open to the public 




(v) Communications to local community: Section 21 requires that if anything must be 
notified by a municipality through the media to the local community, it must be done 
through the local newspaper or a newspaper circulating in the area or by means of radio 
broadcasts. Every notice that the municipality is required to publish in the Provincial 
Gazette must also be placed on municipal notice boards. Provision is made for assistance 
to illiterate people. 
 
(vi) Documents to be made public: Section 21A requires that all documents that must be 
made public by a municipality must be conveyed to the local community by displaying 
them on notice boards, by displaying them on the municipality’s website, and by 
notifying the local community where details of these documents may be obtained. 
 
(vii) Official website: section 21 B provides that a municipality must establish its own 
website (or if it cannot afford one, it must make the relevant information available for 
display on an organised local government website). All information required to be made 
public must be placed on the website and be regularly updated. The municipal manager is 
expressly required to maintain and regularly update the website. The website is intended 
to be a rich source of information regarding the affairs of the municipality, and as such, it 
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 Those circumstances being that it is reasonable to close the meeting, having regard to the nature of the 
business being transacted, and that such closing is authorised by a by-law or resolution of the council 
specifying the circumstances in which a meeting may be closed.  
 
195
 Of particular importance are documents which are  required to be displayed on the website in terms of 
Section 75 of the MFMA; these  include budgets, budget-related policies, performance agreements, service 
















The Structures Act, in turn, makes provision for ward committees. It provides
196
 that 
certain types of municipalities may establish ward committees. The object of a ward 
committee is specifically stated
197
 as being to enhance participatory democracy. Ward 
committees consist of the ward councillor representing the ward in question (who also 
chair the committee), and not more than ten other persons. Municipalities are required to 
make rules regulating procedures for the election of members, for the frequency of 
meetings, and the vacation of office. A municipality may also make administrative 
arrangements to enable ward committees to perform their functions and exercise their 
powers effectively, and must develop policies for the payment of out of pocket expenses. 
A ward committee is empowered to make recommendations on any matter affecting its 
ward to the ward councillor, or through the ward councillor, to the council, executive 
committee or executive mayor or relevant metro sub-council.
198
 It must be emphasised, 




Inquiries were made at municipalities in the sample in order to determine the extent to 
which they complied with the requirements regarding public participation and 
communication. Findings regarding the various requirements are set out below. 
 
Development of Culture of Participatory Governance:  At 28 of the  municipalities in the 
sample (information could not be obtained regarding the remaining 9), it was indicated 
that as required by section 16 of the Systems Act, they were endeavouring to develop a 
system of participatory government, and that citizens were encouraged to participate in 
the affairs of the community. In all 28 cases it was reported that funds were allocated in 
their budgets for promoting community participation. As far as contributing towards the 
capacity of councillors to foster community participation is concerned, this is generally 
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 In Section 72. 
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 In Section 72(3). 
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interpreted in practice as requiring that councillors receive appropriate training in their 
roles and responsibilities with particular reference to legislation applicable to local 
government.  
 
Mechanisms for Public Participation: The requirement that a municipality establish 
appropriate mechanisms, processes and procedures to enable the local community to 
participate in the affairs of the community is generally interpreted in practice as, at a 
minimum, requiring the developing, adopting and implementing of  a policy on public 
participation which provides, amongst other things, for matters such as consultative 
sessions, notification and public comment procedures, processing of petitions, public 
meetings and community report-backs.
199
 It was ascertained that of the 37 municipalities 
in the sample, only 11 had any formal mechanism such as a policy for community 
participation in place (See Appendix B, Column (xix)).
200
 The 26 municipalities which 
did not have such a mechanism apparently operated on an ad hoc basis, with no policy 
directive from their councils, except, in one instance, where the council provided 
occasional resolutions dealing with specific issues.  
 
Communications: Related to the question of community participation is that of 
communications. Section 18 of the Systems Act requires that a municipality must 
communicate to its community certain information specified in that section. Although the 
section does not specifically require any system or mechanism to be put in place to 
promote communications, the then Department of Provincial and Local Government 
(now known as the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs) 
produced guidelines in 2006 for municipal communications which urged municipalities 
to adopt communications policies. 
201
 Again, of the 37 municipalities in the sample, only 
11 had purportedly adopted such policies (See Appendix B, Column (xx)).
202
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 These are all matters specifically mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 17(2). 
 
200




 Such policies are required under the guidelines to deal with and provide for issues such as official 
languages, appropriate language usage, corporate identity, diversity, publications, public environment, 
















It is worth noting that even though the vast majority of municipalities had no formal 
mechanisms for community participation and communications, they all purported to 
practice some or other form of community participation and communications. It is 
difficult to imagine how it would be possible for any effective participation and 
communication strategy could be carried out in the absence of such guiding mechanisms. 
 
Council Meetings:  There was general compliance amongst the municipalities in the 
sample with the requirements of Sections 19 and 20 of the Systems Act, with only 4 
municipalities indicating that they did not as a matter of course give notice of meetings  
as required. Of the 37 municipalities, all but two203  indicated without qualification that 





Whilst compliance with sections 19 and 20 appears to be good on the whole, it is of great 
concern to note the responses relating to attendance levels by the public. As a rule, 
statistics of actual attendance by the public at council meetings were not kept by 
municipalities, so it is not possible to state with any accuracy what actual attendance 
levels were. Of the 37 municipalities in the sample, 8 indicated that attendance by the 
public was either “good” or “fair,” whilst the remaining 29 indicated that attendance was 
either “poor” or “very poor.” One municipality indicated that not a single member of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
relations, events management, advertising and marketing, events management, internal communications 
and communications cycles. 
 
202
 Of those 11, only 6 had also adopted community participation policies. 
 
203
 Of the two exceptions, it was indicated in one case that members of the public were sometimes barred 
from meetings without justification (but that meetings were in any event not held frequently), whilst in the 
other it was indicated that members of the public were not actively encouraged to attend for the simple 
reason that there was simply not enough space to accommodate them in the boardroom which served as a 
council chamber.  
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 Responses regarding meetings of committees of the council were less unequivocal, in most cases, it 
















public had attended any one of the 10 council meetings immediately preceding the 
interview. 
 
Communications to Local Community and Publications of Documents: All 37 
municipalities indicated general compliance with these provisions, although a number 
indicated that illiteracy amongst the public and the inability to publish or broadcast in all 
languages used in the area limited the effectiveness of these methods. A number also 
indicated that costs of broadcasting and publication had become prohibitive. All 37 
municipalities indicated full compliance with the requirement relating to displaying 
notices at offices and libraries, but compliance with the provision relating to websites, 
was, as will be shown below, extremely poor. 
 
Websites: As we have seen, municipalities are required to ensure that certain information 
as provided for in the Systems Act and the MFMA is displayed on a website. Of the 37 
municipalities, 8 did not have websites nor had they made alternative arrangements on a 
local government website referred to above. On the face of it, this might not seem to be as 
poor a rate of compliance as one might have feared; yet of the 29 municipalities which 
indicated that they had websites: 
 
 One indicated  that its website  had “no content at all”; 
 seven indicated  that their websites were “dysfunctional”; 
 sixteen   indicated that their websites were “outdated” or “not updated,” 
 
therefore leaving only five websites compliant with the provisions of the Act (See 
Appendix B, Column (xxi)). 
 
Reasons given for this state of affairs varied. In a number of cases, lack of funding was 
indicated; in others, the failure to appoint an official to manage the website was given. 
Indeed, in only three cases could a municipality identify an individual who had been 
given that responsibility. In most cases, however, no specific reason could be given for 
















Ward Committees: The stated object of a ward committee, according to Section 72 (3) of 
the Structures Act, is to enhance participatory democracy in local government. There is 
considerable evidence, however, that the ward committees system has not been effective. 
Attendance by the public at ward committee meetings is poor, and the common 
perception even amongst those who do attend is that their attendance has no impact. In 
addition many ward committees remain uncertain about their functions because 
municipalities have failed to flesh out their functions (Atkinson 2007). 
 
Section 73(3) of the Structures Act provides that a council must make rules regarding the 
procedure for elections of members to ward committees (taking into account the need for 
women and a diversity of interests to be represented), the circumstances under which 
those members must vacate office, and the frequency of meetings of ward committees. 
Section 73(4) of the Systems Act provides that a council may make administrative 
arrangements to enable ward committees to perform their functions and exercise their 
powers. Section 73(5) requires a council to develop a policy and determine criteria for the 
payment of out of pocket expenses for members. A common practice is for a municipality 
to provide for all of these matters in ward committee policy. 
 
Of our total sample of 37 municipalities, 3 are district municipalities, and therefore do not 
have any direct involvement with wards. Of the remaining 34, information on ward 
committees was not obtained from 12 of them. The sample of municipalities available for 
purposes of examining ward committees is therefore limited to 22. The findings regarding 
various aspects of ward committees are set out below. 
 
 Rules adopted: Of these 22 municipalities, all had purportedly implemented ward 
committee systems (See Appendix B, Column (xxii)).
205
 Of these, however, 10 
had not established any rules or formal policy relating to the establishment and 
operation of ward committees (See Appendix B, Column (xxiii)).  Of the 12 
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 It should be kept in mind that municipalities are not obliged to implement ward committee systems; in 
fact, only certain types of municipalities are authorised to establish ward committees, and then these in 















municipalities which had adopted policies, it was indicated at 3 of them that there 
was generally poor implementation, either due to financial constraints or due to 
lack of staffing capacity.  
 
 Administrative Support: Of the 22 municipalities (whether operating under the 
guidance of a policy or rules or not), 4 indicated that they did not provide any 
administrative support at all; at a further 3 municipalities, it was not possible to 
ascertain whether or not any support was provided; whilst at 8 municipalities it 
was indicated that only “rudimentary” or “poor” administrative support was 
provided, usually limited to the provision of basic office space. One municipality 
provided support consisting of office space, telephones and secretarial support. At 
the remaining 6 municipalities it was indicated that support was provided, but no 
indication could be obtained as to the level of such support.  
 
 Out of Pocket expenses: All municipalities provided out of pocket expenses, 
although it must be remembered that at least 10 of the 22 municipalities did not 
have any policy dealing with these expenses. 
 
 Regular Meetings Held: 15 of the 22 municipalities indicated that ward 
committees held regular meetings as and when they were required to, although 6 
of the municipalities at which regular meetings were purportedly held did not 
have rules setting out the frequency with which meetings are to be held, so it is 
difficult to imagine against what measure “regular” is defined; in not a single case 
was it possible to produce any minutes of any meetings, and in most cases, it was 
not known if minutes were even kept. 
 
 Attendance by Members: 4 Municipalities could not give an indication of the 
levels of attendance by committee members of committee meetings. 12 indicated 

















 It is interesting to note, however, that of the 12 
municipalities at which good or fair attendance was indicated, at 4 it was 
suggested that the only reason that any members attended was so that they could 




 Attendance by Public: At 3 municipalities, no indication could be obtained as to 
levels of attendance by the public; of the remaining 19, “good” or “fair” 
attendance was indicated at 8, “poor” attendance was indicated at the other 11. 
 
 Various issues: At 12 of the municipalities, the view was expressed that public 
opinion of the ward system as applied in those municipalities was “poor” or “very 
poor,” whilst at 7 the view was expressed that public pinion was “good” or 
“fair.” No views were expressed at the remaining 3 municipalities. All of the 
municipalities which indicated a poor or very poor public perception also 
indicated that citizens were frustrated by the fact that proposals emanating from 
the ward committees seemed inevitably to become blocked at council level and 
progress no further, with the result that citizens were becoming disillusioned with 
the system. One official indicated that citizens had a “sense of hopelessness” 
whilst another reported that its community had “seen it all before” and placed no 
faith in the ward system.
208
 Frequent complaints were that the ward systems were 
under-resourced, and that the areas served by individual ward committees were 
geographically too large for them to cope with. Dissatisfaction was also expressed 
with ward councillors, who serve as chairs of the ward committees, in that they 
did not provide proper leadership to the committees. Finally, concerns were 
                                                 
206
 It should be emphasised that in the absence of minutes and formal attendance registers, the levels of 
attendance reflect somewhat subjective views of the individuals from whom the information was obtained. 
207
 These anecdotal reports cannot be verified, but if true, they would underline the harsh economic realities 
which prevail in many municipal areas. Often, some of the few sources of income in unemployment-hit 
areas are those which accompany election as municipal councillor or ward committee member. 
 
208
 An anecdote which was repeated by officials at several different  municipalities was that the main reason 
that the public attended ward council meetings was in the hope of being provided with a meal - how true 

















expressed at 9 of the municipalities that the ward committee systems were 
becoming politicised, with the result that they were being used as platforms for 
political agendas, which is quite contrary to the intended purpose of ward 
committees. 
 
10.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Public participation is widely considered to be both an important objective of 
decentralisation and a critical element of decentralisation. It will be recalled that 
“working together with local citizens and partners” – which is what community 
participation is all about - was considered in the White Paper on Local Government to be 
one of the approaches which could assist municipalities to become more developmental. 
On the face of it, South Africa  has a comprehensive framework of public participation 
designed to ensure free communication, responsiveness and accountability, and one 
which, also on the face of it, is a truly “grassroots” system. Yet the findings of this study 
suggest that many municipalities have failed to develop and give proper effect to 
mechanisms for participatory democracy. This being the case, it is perhaps inevitable that 
participatory systems fail to yield results. This is reflected in the widespread 
disillusionment with the performance of municipalities and a loss of trust in the 
institutions of local governance. 
 
The performance of ward committees has been subjected to particular scrutiny. The 
effectiveness of these committees has been variable with many structures becoming 
ineffective or dysfunctional (Reddy and Maharaj 2006), and actual participation by the 
public being poor in many cases.
209
 Recent research has indicated that ward committees 
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 A study by Andrews (2003) suggests that administrative reforms such as NPM and participatory reforms 
such as those discussed in this section may not complement each other; and this in turn has much to do with 
the locus of revenue dependence. He states that his findings support the “differential relationship influence 
support hypothesis” and indicate that higher-level governments have a positive influence over the adoption 
of administrative procedures only, and that local influence is evident over participation mechanism 
adoption only. Further, the higher the proportion of revenue collected from local citizens, the higher the 
level of participation, with higher local revenue dependence leading to greater participatory mechanism 
adoption; on the other hand, higher dependence on central government for revenue leads to lower 















were not discharging their developmental mandate by enhancing participatory democracy 
at local level (Tapscott 2008). Ward committees may have the potential to promote 
effective public participation, but given their present state of neglect it is difficult to 





                                                                                                                                                 




 Piper and Deacon (2009) believe that it is unlikely that ward committees will help deepen local 
democracy in South Africa. In a study conducted by them of ward committees in Msunduzi Municipality 
(which includes Pietermaritzburg) it was found that the functioning of ward committees was overly 

















Evaluation: Jurisdictional Scope and Legislative Authority 
 
 11.1 Purpose of Chapter 
 
This chapter deals with dimensions (ix) and (x), namely, jurisdictional scope and 
legislative authority. The importance of the jurisdictional scope of powers and functions 
exercised by a local authority was referred to in Chapter 6. It makes little sense to 
implement a decentralised system and then fail to clothe the decentralised units with 
meaningful and appropriate powers. Failure to do so would leave a system that is 
decentralised in name only. By the same token, it is difficult to conceive of any level of 
government within a decentralised system not having the capacity to make laws. Such a 
system would likewise be decentralised in name only. The objects of this Chapter, then, 
are in the first place to examine the extent to which South African local government is 
granted such powers and functions, and applies them in practice; and in the second place, 
to examine the extent to which local government has the authority to make by-laws 
(particularly insofar as by-laws are necessary for the administration of those powers and 
functions), and the extent to which that authority is used in practice. 
 
11.2 Jurisdictional Scope of Powers and Functions 
 
11.2.1 Constitutional Authority 
 
“Jurisdictional scope” is a convenient term to refer to the scope of services, powers and 
functions which a municipality is authorised to perform. Section 156 of the Constitution 
deals with the powers and functions of a municipality. Subsection (1) (a)  provides that a 
municipality has executive authority in respect of, and the right to administer the local 
government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4,
211
 and the local government matters 
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Namely,  Air pollution; Building regulations; Child care facilities; Electricity and gas reticulation; Fire-















listed in Part B of Schedule 5.
212
 Prior to the enactment of the Constitution, local 
authorities performed a variety of powers and functions. Those which were performed by 
a particular municipality depended, amongst other things, on the framework provided by 
the relevant Provincial Ordinance which applied the municipality’s capacity and the 
racial group which it was supposed to serve (de Visser 2005). The enshrinement of these 
powers and functions in the constitution provides - in theory, at least - a guarantee of  the 
right of local government to perform specified powers and functions, and is indicative of 
the importance which was attached to the notion that municipalities should have such 
rights. 
 
Earlier drafts of the Constitution provided that powers, functions and other features of 
local government would be determined by national legislation. This would have had the 
result that although “local government’s autonomy was recognised, its powers and 
functions would be determined by provincial or national statute, rendering it a creature of 
statute as opposed to a constitutionally protected sphere of government” (de Visser 
2005:64-65). In the event, the final constitution granted original powers and functions to 
municipalities by virtue of Section 156(1)(a). As these powers and functions are allocated 
directly by the Constitution, municipalities are not dependent on any statutory or 
executive assignment or delegation for their exercise, although the national government 
and provincial governments may in terms of section 155(7) regulate the exercise of those 
powers and functions by municipalities. 
 
The constitutional protection described above has, however, recently been subject to 
pressure in the form of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill which was 
                                                                                                                                                 
Municipal public transport; Municipal public works; Pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers, and harbours; Storm 
water management systems in built-up areas; Trading regulations; Water and sanitation services. 
 
212
 Namely, Beaches and amusement facilities; Billboards and the display of advertisements in public 
places; Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria; Cleansing; Control of public nuisances; Control of 
undertakings that sell liquor to the public; Facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals; 
Fencing and fences; Licensing of dogs; Licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public; 
Local amenities; Local sports facilities; Markets; Municipal Abattoirs; Municipal parks and recreation; 
Municipal roads; Noise Pollution; Pounds; Public places; Refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste 
















published for comment in 2009. The bill, if enacted, would permit other spheres of 
government to take over the performance of any of the powers and functions of local 
government referred to in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. In essence, the bill 
allows for the passing of national legislation which regulates the executive authority of 
municipalities in respect of their powers and functions when “it is necessary to achieve 
regional efficiencies and economies of scale in respect of a specific municipal 
function.”
213
  The provisions of the bill enable national government to intervene in local 
government matters not only in particular circumstances, but also potentially whenever it 
deems it appropriate. It will be recalled that Section 40 of the Constitution provides that 
there are to be “distinctive, inter-dependent and inter-related” spheres of government, 
something which the amendment could render fundamentally meaningless. As such, the 
bill reveals a weakened commitment to the principles of decentralisation.  That said, the 
initial enthusiasm for the bill which prevailed in certain quarters appears to have receded 
somewhat, but it remains a reminder of the vulnerability of constitutional protections.  
 
Whilst section 156(1)(a) grants original powers and functions to municipalities, powers 
and functions may also be allocated to municipalities by way of assignment of powers by 
legislation,
214
 by way of assignment by executive acts,
215
 by way of delegation of powers 
and functions
216
 and by way of contracting out matters on an agency basis.
217
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 Ostensibly, according to the explanatory memorandum on the objects of the Bill, its primary purpose is 
to facilitate the establishment of the Electricity Distribution Industry (“EDI”) and the establishment of 
regional electricity distributors (“REDs”). A brief examination of the bill suggests that the explanatory 
memorandum is disingenuous in the extreme. Not once in the bill itself is the notion of EDI or RED 
mentioned. Whilst the facilitation of these objectives might well have been promoted by the bill, the scope 
of the bill is far wider than merely facilitating those objectives. Be that as it may, in December 2010 it was 
announced on behalf of the cabinet that the concept of regional electricity distributors was to be abandoned; 
it was not clear at the time of writing, however, what consequences this held for the Constitution 
Seventeenth Amendment Bill, and whether or not it would be withdrawn. 
 
214
 Section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution provides for national and provincial legislation to assign additional 
powers and functions to municipalities; Section 44(1)(a)(iii) of the Constitution  empowers the National 
Assembly to assign additional legislative powers, in addition to their original constitutional powers to make 
by-laws, to Municipal Councils; and Section 104(1)(c) of the Constitution which empowers provincial 
legislatures to assign additional legislative powers within the provinces’ competence to Municipal Councils 
in their respective provinces. 
 
215
 Section 156(4) of the Constitution  provides for the national or a provincial government to assign by 
agreement and subject to any condition, the administration of any of the matters listed in Part A of 















11.2.2 Scope and Division of Powers 
 
The choice and arrangement of local government powers and functions has been 
criticised on grounds that they do not reflect local government’s new developmental 
mandate (de Visser 2005; Christmas and de Visser 2009). In particular, the fact that 
housing is not a local government power has been questioned as being inconsistent with a 
developmental approach, as has the absence of clinical health services.
218
 In addition, 
although it is stated in the White Paper on Local Government that local economic 
development is a crucial issue for local government, it is not listed as a power or function 
under the schedules (de Visser 2005), although it must be said that Section 152(1)(b) of 
the Constitution does refer to the promotion of social and economic development as one 
of the objectives of local government. It has been argued that additional powers should be 
granted to local authorities in order for them better to fulfil their developmental mandate 
(de Visser 2005; Christmas and de Visser 2009). Whilst in theory this may seem 
attractive, it must be questioned whether, given that many local governments are already 
overburdened by their existing responsibilities, they are capable of assuming additional 
responsibilities. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
member to assign by agreement any power or function that is to be exercised or performed in terms of an 
Act of Parliament, to a Mun cipal Council; and Section 126 of the Constitution  authorises an MEC to 
assign by agreement any power, or function that is to be exercised or performed in terms of an Act of 
Parliament or a provincial Act, to a Municipal Council. 
 
216
 Section 238(a) of the Constitution authorises executive organs of state to delegate to municipalities 
powers or functions that are to be exercised or performed in terms of legislation; and Section 238(b) of the 
Constitution authorises municipalities to exercise any power or function for any other executive organ of 
state on a delegation basis. 
 
217
 Section 238(b) of the Constitution authorises municipalities to exercise any power or function for any 
other executive organ of state on an agency basis. 
 
218
 “Municipal Health Services” is included as a municipal function in Schedule 4, but The National Health 
Act, no. 61 of 2003 (in one of the few cases were a recognisable definition of  a power or function is 
provided) includes matters such as water control monitoring, food control, waste management, health 
surveillance of premises, prevention of communicable diseases, and the like under “municipal health 

















The Local Government: Structures Act (“Structures Act”)
219
 provides for the division of 
powers between district and local municipalities, adjustments of such divisions, 
resolution of disputes concerning the performance of powers, and the like. Of particular 
note is the fact that Section 84 of the Act imposes on district municipalities the primary 
task of performing certain specified powers and functions,
220
 with the remaining powers 
being the responsibility of local municipalities. The national government cabinet minister 
responsible for local government may, however, authorise a local municipality to perform 
certain of the functions otherwise reserved to district municipalities;
221
 and the provincial 
Member of the Executive Council (“MEC”) responsible for Local Government in a 
particular province may adjust a division of powers by re-allocating them between the 
local and district municipalities concerned.
222
 To this end, the Municipal Demarcation 
Board (“MDB”) - which we encountered in Chapter 7 - is required to make an assessment 
of the capacity of the relevant municipality to perform the power or function. Strictly 
speaking, the MDB is required to make such an assessment only when requested by the 
MEC to do so. In practice, however, the MDB annually carries out a country-wide 
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 Sections 83 to 89 (Chapter 5). 
 
220
 Namely, those specified in section 84 (1) (a) to (p). 
 
221
 By virtue of section 84(3) of the Structures Act. These are the powers provided for in Section 84(1) (b), 
(c), (d) and (I) - respectively, potable water supply systems, bulk supply of electricity, domestic waste 
water and sewage disposal systems, and municipal health services. 
 
222
 By Virtue of Section 85 of the Structures Act. This authority does not, however, extend to the powers 
and functions referred to in Sections 84(1) (a), (b), (c), (d) (o) or (p). A “Policy Framework for the 
Adjustment of Division of Functions and Powers” has been promulgated in the form of regulations (GN 
2592 in Government Gazette 21370 of 12 July 2000) which sets out the circumstances in which an MEC 
may adjust the allocation of powers and specifies the objectives of any such allocation, for example, “the 
equitable, efficient, affordable, economical and sustainable access to basic municipal services by all 
consumers;” and “minimising costs of services to consumers and customers.” 
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 Assessment Reports, compiled district by district, were published annually by the MDB for every annual 
period until the 2008/09 period; due to a re-evaluation of its assessment process, the MDB, as at the time of 
















In addition to the powers and functions referred to in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of 
Schedule 5 to the Constitution, municipalities may have powers and functions delegated 
to them pursuant to legislation or other arrangements. This study, however, focusses only 
on those powers and functions referred to in the two schedules to the Constitution. The 
object of the exercise is to ascertain the extent to which the municipalities which are the 
subject of this study actually fulfill their constitutional mandates. 
 
11.2.3 The Exercise of Powers and Functions in Practice 
 
This subsection examines the extent to which municipalities actually exercise in practice 
the powers and functions which they are empowered (if not necessarily compelled) by the 
Constitution to perform. 
 
The relevant parts of the Schedules list a total of 38 powers and functions. 37 of those 
functions are traditionally assessed by the MDB (the exception being municipal public 
works) and for the sake of consistency, this study will be confined to the same powers 
and functions as are assessed by the MDB.
224
 In addition, given that powers and functions 
of district municipalities are somewhat different from those exercised by local 
municipalities, it should be noted the present inquiry is, for the sake of comparing like 
with like, confined to those 34 municipalities in this study which are local municipalities. 
 
For present purposes, information on the performance of powers and functions by 
municipalities was obtained both from the MDB assessment reports for the 2008/09 
period and directly from municipalities in the sample.
225
 It should be noted that for the 
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 it should be noted that “water and sanitation” are referred to as a single service in Schedule 4 to the 
Constitution; the MDB consistently treats them as separate services for purposes of its report and that 
practice is, for the sake of consistency, followed in this study. 
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 In a number of cases, the information contained in the MDB report differs from that gathered directly 
from municipalities. In such cases, information gathered directly from municipalities was relied on. The 
MDB report is essentially derived from a “desk-top” analysis of municipalities which is based on data 
extracted from questionnaires completed by municipalities. The author has noted a tendency amongst many 
municipalities to insert inaccurate or incomplete data in these questionnaires which are then carried over 















purposes of this study, a municipality was taken to perform a power or function if it 
performed it at all; no account was taken of the quality, regularity, or consistency of the 
performance of the service. It should also be noted that certain municipalities are not 





The number of powers and functions performed by each of the 34 municipalities is set out 
in summary below, and is also shown in graph form in Appendix D (Graph 2). Of those 
34 municipalities:  
 
 1 performed 8 powers and functions; 
 2 performed 11 powers and functions 
 2 performed 13 powers and functions 
 2 performed 14 powers and functions 
 1 performed 15 powers and functions 
 2 performed 16 powers and functions 
 1 performed 17 powers and functions 
 4 performed 18 powers and functions 
 4 performed 20 powers and functions 
 2 performed 22 powers and functions 
 1 performed 23 powers and functions 
 1 performed 24 powers and functions 
 2 performed 25 powers and functions 
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 Cases of municipalities not being authorised to perform functions are to be found in the fields of fire-
fighting, potable water provision, sanitation and electricity reticulation, where, by reason of intra-provincial 
reallocations, these powers and functions are in some cases to be performed by district municipalities. Of 
our sample of 34 local municipalities, however, as best as can be ascertained, 10 are not authorised to 
perform the fire fighting function; 7 are not authorised to perform the potable water function; 7 are not 
authorised to perform the sanitation function, and 7 are not authorised to perform the electricity reticulation 
function. In addition, by virtue of the Structures Act, municipal health functions are supposed to be 
performed by district municipalities, and not local municipalities, and strictly speaking, therefore, no local 
municipalities should perform the municipal health function. Nonetheless, as is shown below, a number of 
















 4 performed 26 powers and functions 
 1 performed 27 powers and functions 
 1 performed 28 powers and functions 
 1 performed 31 powers and functions 
 1 performed 32 powers and functions 
 1 performed 33 powers and functions. 
In other words, 19 of the 34 municipalities, or 56% of the sample, performed 20 powers 
and functions or fewer; only 9, or 26% of the sample, performed more than 25 powers 
and functions. 
 
The extent to which individual powers and functions are performed is indicated below 
(unless indicated to the contrary in footnotes, all of the 34 local municipalities are 
authorised to perform each of these powers and functions): 
 The air pollution function is performed by 12 municipalities 
 Building regulations, by 34 municipalities 
 Child care facilities, by 8 municipalities 
 Electricity and gas reticulation, by 27 municipalities 227 
 Fire-fighting services, by 14 municipalities228 
 Local tourism, by 23 municipalities 
 Municipal airports, by 3 municipalities 
 Municipal planning, by 34 municipalities 
 Municipal health services, by 8 municipalities229 
 Municipal public transport, by 5 municipalities 
 Pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers, and harbours, by 1 municipality; 
 Storm water management systems in built-up areas,  by 31 municipalities 
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 27 local municipalities in the sample are authorised to perform this function 
. 
228
 24 municipalities in the sample are authorised to perform the function 
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 Strictly speaking, none of the local municipalities in the sample is authorised to perform this function; it 
















 Trading regulations,  by 10 municipalities 
 Water  services, by 27 municipalities230 
 Sanitation services, by 27 municipalities231 
 Beaches and amusement facilities, by 5 municipalities 
 Billboards and the display of advertisements in public places, by 23 municipalities 
 Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria, by 31 municipalities 
 Cleansing, by 30 municipalities 
 Control of public nuisances, by 16 municipalities 
 Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public, by 6 municipalities 
 Facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals, by 7 municipalities 
 Fencing and fences, by 10 municipalities 
 Licensing of dogs, by 6 municipalities 
 Licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public, by 
11municipalities 
 Local amenities, by 25 municipalities 
 Local sports facilities, by 33 municipalities 
 Markets, by 3 municipalities 
 Municipal Abattoirs, by 0 municipalities 
 Municipal parks and recreation, by 31 municipalities 
 Municipal roads, by 33 municipalities 
 Noise Pollution, by 12 municipalities 
 Pounds, by 11 municipalities 
 Public places, by 21 municipalities 
 Refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal, by 34 municipalities 
 Street trading, by 23 municipalities 
 Street lighting, by 23 municipalities 
 Traffic and parking, by 25 municipalities. 
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 27 local municipalities in the sample are authorised to perform this function. 
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Functions which are purportedly widely performed by municipalities in the sample 
include what are considered to be the basic services: potable water supply, sanitation, 
electricity, and refuse removal. 232 The provision of these basic services has been a 
preoccupation of national government - perhaps, it sometimes appears, at the expense of 
other powers and functions. “Basic municipal services” is rather inadequately defined in 
the Local Government: Systems Act (“Systems Act”) as “a service that is necessary to 
ensure an acceptable and reasonable quality of life, and if not provided, would endanger 
public health or safety of the environment.”
233
 The received interpretation of this 
definition appears, rightly or wrongly, to encompass the aforementioned four services and 
little else. Other powers and functions which appear to be widely performed across the 





Whilst the “basic services” are fairly uniformly provided by municipalities (to the extent 
to which they are authorised to perform them), it is striking that many of the other 
services are inconsistently performed by municipalities. Of course, geographical and 
other factors render the performance of certain services inapplicable in certain cases - for 
example, if municipalities do not have airports or abattoirs or beaches, they of course 
cannot perform related services. Similarly, very few municipalities have any need to 
regulate pontoons and ferries. The same cannot, however, be said of powers and 
functions such as air pollution, child care facilities, public transport, control of public 
nuisances, animal facilities, fencing, licensing of undertakings that sell food to the public, 
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 It appears that it is only in respect of these powers and functions that any statistics are kept to indicate 
the level of success achieved. As far as can be ascertained, there is no measure whatsoever or record of 
levels of achievement of any of the other powers and functions. 
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 The same definition is found in both the Systems Act and the MFMA. This definition, it is submitted, is 




 The present author’s experience is that whilst municipalities may claim to perform, and notionally do 
perform, services relating to sports facilities and parks and recreation, those services are often rudimentary 
in the extreme. For example, the performance of the “local sports facilities” function might involve nothing 
more than the occasional grading of a dirt football field. Similarly, the state of roads in many municipalities 















markets, trading regulations, public places and pounds. These are all issues which require 
regulation and administration wherever the municipality may be situated, yet many or 
most of the municipalities in our sample do not perform the associated functions, and it  
appears that there is little concern or interest, at any level,  for exercising those powers 
and functions. It is true that Section 73(1)(c) of the Systems Act requires that a 
municipality ensure that “all members of the local community have access to at least the 
minimum level
235
 of basic municipal services,” and that Section 153(b) of the 
Constitution  requires municipalities “to give priority to the basic needs of the 
community,” 
236
 but it is difficult to imagine that the drafters of the Constitution or other 
relevant legislation would have envisaged the wide-scale abandonment of the other 
powers and functions as being a necessary consequence of these provisions. 
 
The phenomenon of non-performance of powers and functions by municipalities is an 
issue of particular concern in that if municipalities fail to perform them, then it is highly 
unlikely that any other level of government will perform them in their stead. The result is 
that local citizens are left without the benefit of services which might have been expected 
to be provided as a mater of course in a purportedly developmental society. In this regard, 
it should be mentioned that Section 155 (6) (b) of the Constitution requires provincial 
governments to promote the development of local government capacity to perform their 
functions. The neglect which has been shown in regard to many local powers and 
functions tends to suggest that provincial governments have in many respects fallen short 
of their constitutional obligations. 
 
11.2.4 Causes of non-performance 
 
Much has been made of the fact that local government’s powers and functions are 
expressly protected by the Constitution, and it might have been expected that in a truly 
decentralised system, these powers and functions would be vigorously performed by the 
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sphere of government to which they are allocated. Nevertheless, our sample of 
municipalities tends to suggest that many local authorities are unwilling or unable to 
exercise, or are uninterested in exercising, their rights in relation to many of these powers 
and functions. The question which inevitably arises is why this should be so. During the 
course of obtaining information from municipalities for the purpose of this study, it was 
not possible to obtain any particular insight into the reason for this. In most cases, 
suggested explanations for the low levels of performance of powers and functions were 
not forthcoming. For the most part, in the few cases in which suggested explanations 
were forthcoming, they were to the effect that the performance of particular powers and 
functions was not a municipal priority, or that funds for carrying out functions were 
lacking. It may, however, be inferred from circumstances that several serious barriers 
exist to the effective exercising of these powers and functions. S me of the most critical 
of such barriers are discussed below. 
 
The first relates to concurrent jurisdictional scope over the local government sphere’s 
powers and functions with other spheres of government. Both the national government
237
 
and the provincial government
238
 (in addition to the local authority) have the power to 
legislate on and administer (through their legislative and executive branches respectively) 
matters referred to Part B of Schedule 4 to the Constitution, whilst the provincial 
government has the power (in addition to the local authority) to legislate on and 
administer the matters referred to in Part B of Schedule 5 to the Constitution.
239
 This 
concurrency must, it is submitted, give rise to considerable confusion as to what precisely 
municipalities are supposed to do in the exercise of their powers and functions.  
 
A second barrier is to be found in the statutory provisions permitting the switching of 
powers between local and district municipalities, which were discussed in subsection 
11.2.2. They certainly do not lead to stability in the performance of powers and functions 
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 Section 44(1) (a(ii) read with Section 85 (2)(a) of the Constitution. 
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Section 104(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution read with Section125 (2) (a) of the Constitution. 
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and have themselves been the cause of considerable confusion (de Visser 2005; 
Ramutsindela 2008). 
 
The third barrier is constituted by the fact that the powers and functions are simply not 
defined at all in the Constitution, and only partly and poorly (and then only in the case of 
a limited number of powers) in other legislation (such as the Systems Act and 
occasionally in national legislation dealing with specific powers).
240
 Poorly defined 
powers have been a cause of great concern ever since the adoption of the new local 
government dispensation and it is inevitable that inadequate definition will lead to 
confusion (Christmas and de Visser 2009).
241
 As a result, municipalities are not provided 
with clarity as to what is encompassed by a particular power or function. A striking 
feature common to many municipalities in the sample was the apparent lack of awareness 
amongst officials, not only of the scope of the powers and functions provided by the 
Constitution, but also of the extent  of the powers and functions which particular 
municipalities are authorised to perform and do actually perform.  
 
A fourth barrier, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, concerns the 
apparent inability of local authorities to support the exercise of powers and functions with 
by-laws. 
 
The last barrier is an obvious one: a lack of capacity within local government.  The lack 
of institutional capacity is notorious, and as we have seen in Chapter 9, the failure on the 
part of many municipalities to implement systems aimed at enhancing capacity 
exacerbates the situation. This lack of capacity translates into an inability to perform 
powers and functions which require both general managerial and specialised skills.  
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 See also IDASA 2004. 
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 The Municipal Demarcation Board, in an attempt to address this shortcoming, began a process in 1999 
of defining the powers and functions of local government as contained in the schedules, which culminated 
in 2003 with the publication of a set of definitions, norms and standards of local government powers and 
functions (Municipal Demarcation Board 2003). Necessary though such an exercise was, the end product 
has no statutory authority, and in most cases the definitions are obscure and often provide little assistance. 
The result – so infrequently acknowledged – is that local governments are left with almost no guidance as 

















11.2.5 Concluding Remarks on Jurisdictional Scope  
 
The scope of the powers and functions performed by individual municipalities in our 
sample varies enormously from case to case, but what clearly emerges is that there is a 
widespread unwillingness or inability on the part of many of them to perform their 
constitutionally mandated powers and functions. This state of affairs may be due to any 
of the various causes discussed above. Given the importance accorded by the Constitution 
to the performance of such powers and functions, this phenomenon is a matter of serious 
concern  and constitutes one of the most serious challenges to local government.  
 
11.3 Legislative Authority 
 
 11.3.1 The Power to Legislate 
 
In the previous section, we saw that a municipality has the executive authority in respect 
of, and the right to administer, certain specified powers and functions, as provided by 
Section 156 (1) of the Constitution. Section 156(2) goes on to provide that “a 
municipality may make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the 
matters which it has the right to administer.” 
 
There is some debate in constitutional circles as to whether by-laws made by a 
municipality are based on delegated powers as opposed to original legislative authority, 
and whether they have only executive authority over the powers and functions provided 
by the Constitution (de Visser 2005). It seems clear, however, that the Constitution 
recognises that the municipal council is the highest legislative and executive authority 


















 makes it quite clear that the council of a municipality has the right to 
govern on its own initiative the local government affairs of the local community, and to 
exercise the municipality’s executive and legislative authority, and to do so without 
improper interference. The Act goes on to provide
243
 that the executive and legislative 
authority of a municipality is exercised by the council of the municipality. It also 
provides
244
 that a municipality exercises its legislative authority by, amongst other things, 
developing and adopting policies, plans, strategies, and programmes, and implementing 
applicable national and provincial legislation and by-laws. Whilst the debate regarding 
the precise scope and extent of a municipality’s legislative authority may continue, it is 
clear that a municipality does have the right to make by-laws for the effective 
administration of the matters which it has the right to administer. The Systems Act 
establishes procedures for the passing of by-laws, their publicati n and the keeping of a 
municipal code.
245
 The passing of by-laws is one of the few functions which the council 





Whilst the formal framework caters adequately for the legislative authority of local 
government, as we shall see below, this is an authority which in practice is often 
neglected.  
11.3.2 Rationalisation and Municipal Codes: Practice 
 
The demarcation of municipalities in the process previously described
247
 in many cases 
involved amalgamation or incorporation of areas which previously did not form part of 
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 Section 4. 
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 Section 11(1). 
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 Section 11(3). 
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 Sections 12, 13 and 15 respectively. 
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 By virtue of Section 160(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
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any municipality. The Structures Act
248
 provides that a municipality established in a 
particular area supersedes the existing municipality or municipalities to the extent that the 
existing municipality or municipalities fall within that area, and the superseding 
municipality becomes the successor in law of the existing municipality. The Structures 
Act goes on to provide
249
 that if any existing municipality is wholly or partially 
superseded, the by-laws, regulations and resolutions of that municipality must be 
reviewed and, where necessary, rationalised by the superseding municipality. 
 
An inquiry made for purposes of this study at each municipality in the sample was 
whether the municipality had in fact carried out such a review or rationalisation. It was 
alarming to learn that, some nine years after the Structures Act had come into force, only 
4 of the 34 local Municipalities in the sample indicated that such a review had been 
carried out (See Appendix E (Table 3) Column(i)); in addition, with one exception, no 
indication could be given as to which, if any, of the by-laws applicable to the superseded 
municipalities were still in force and to which of the constituent parts of the new 
municipality they applied.  In other words, it was quite possible that different parts of the 
municipality were regulated by different by-laws, and apparently no-one was any the 
wiser. 
 
This state of affairs is hardly surprising in the light of the responses to the next inquiry. 
As we have seen, the Systems Act requires a municipality to compile, maintain and 
constantly update a municipal code containing all of its by-laws. Apart from the obvious 
purpose of providing a centralised and accessible compilation of by-laws to the public, it 
has the very practical function of providing a record for officials of what by-laws are or 
are not in force. Despite this requirement, inquiries revealed that of the 37 municipalities 
in the sample (including district municipalities), only 6 had (or at least, the officials of 
whom the inquiries were made were aware of their having), municipal codes (See 
Appendix E Column(ii)). In all of the other cases, officials could not state definitively 
what by-laws had been passed since the superseding process referred to above, let alone 
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 Section 14. 
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provide any indication at all of which  by- laws enacted prior to the superseding process, 
if any, were still in force. 
11.3.3 Legislative Activity in Practice: “Compulsory” By-laws 
 
As far as by-laws enacted after the superseding process are concerned, it is convenient to 
divide them between those specifically required by statute (i.e. where a statutory 
provision expressly requires the municipality to adopt a by-law on a particular subject) 
and those which are not (for example, section 156(2) of the Constitution provides that a 
municipality may make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the 
matters which it has the right to administer (namely, the powers and functions discussed 
in the previous section). 
 
There are three by-laws which (subject to limited exceptions) every municipality is 
expressly required by statute to adopt: 
 
 Section 75 of the Systems Act provides that a municipal council must adopt by-
laws to give effect to the implementation and enforcement of its tariff  policy; 
 Section 98 of the Systems Act provides that a municipal council must adopt by-
laws to give effect to its credit control and debt collection policy, its 
implementation and enforcement; 
 Section 6 of the Rates Act provides that a municipality must adopt by-laws to give 
effect to the implementation of its rates policy (except in the case of a district 




Furthermore, Section 160(6) of the Constitution provides that a municipal council may 
make by-laws which prescribe rules and orders for its internal arrangements, business and 
proceedings and other matters. Whilst the provision states that the council may make such 
rules and orders, other statutory provisions (notably Sections 28, 37 and 51 of the 
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 District Municipalities do not levy rates unless they have included in their areas of jurisdiction a so-
called “district management area” (Rates Act, Section2). Of the three District Municipalities in our sample, 
















Structures Act) make it clear that the existence of such rules and orders is presumed; to 
all intents and purposes, therefore, a by-law dealing with rules and orders is considered 
obligatory. 
 
That notwithstanding, of the 37 municipalities which form part of this study, at the time 
that the relevant inquiry was made at each respective municipality:  
 
 Only 8 had adopted tariffs by-laws; 
 Only 13 had adopted credit control and debt collection by-laws; 
 Only 7 had adopted rates by-laws; 
 Only 10 had adopted by-laws for rules and orders (See Appendix E Columns (iii) 
to (vi)). 
 





11.3.4 Legislative Activity in Practice: By-laws Relating to Powers and Functions 
 
Turning now to those by-laws which a municipality may adopt as provided for in section 
156(2) of the Constitution, we find that a state of neglect prevails in the legislative 
function of municipalities. As was mentioned above, only six municipalities in our 
sample had maintained municipal codes and could state with any certainty which by-laws 
had been adopted by them. Amongst these six, the extent to which powers and functions 
were supported by the by-laws varied considerably. It must be remembered, of course, 
that the number of powers and functions purportedly performed varies from municipality, 
so it is necessary to refer to the by-laws adopted by each municipality in the context of 
the number of powers and functions performed by each of them. The following was 
found regarding those six municipalities: 
 
                                                 
251















 One municipality performed 33 powers and functions, of which 24 were 
supported by corresponding by-laws; 
 One municipality performed 18 powers and functions, of which only 5 were 
supported by corresponding by-laws; 
 One municipality performed 20 powers and functions, of which only 6 were 
supported by corresponding by-laws; 
 One municipality performed 26 powers and functions, of which 17 were 
supported by corresponding by-laws; 
 One municipality performed 27 powers and functions, of which only 7 were 
supported by corresponding by-laws; 
 One municipality performed 28 powers and functions, of which 18 were 




It was obviously more difficult to ascertain the position amongst municipalities which 
had not maintained municipal codes. The picture which emerges from these 
municipalities is somewhat alarming. Of the 31 municipalities which did not have 
municipal codes: 
 
 Only 14 were able to identify any by-laws which had been passed since 1999 (the 
year in which the Structures Act come into effect). In the absence of municipal 
codes, however, no indication could be given as to whether the by-laws which 
were identified represented all of the by-laws of the municipality, or which of 
them were in force; and no indication could be given at any of these 
municipalities as to what pre-supersession by-laws, if any, were still in force; 
  Officials at 9 municipalities indicated that they believed that the municipality had 
passed by-laws since 1999, but were unable to locate or specifically identify  them 
or any pre-supersession by-laws; 
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 It should be noted that for purposes of computing the number of by-laws that a municipality had adopted, 
only those by-laws which had undergone the required legislative process of having been passed by the 
















 It was stated unequivocally at 8 municipalities that no by-laws at all had come 
into force since 1999 (although in a number of cases, a process of developing by-
laws had apparently been commenced but for one reason or another had not been 
completed to the point of their being adopted and published).  
 
11.3.5 Capacity to Make and Administer By-laws 
 
It is difficult to comprehend why there should be such indifference amongst 
municipalities to by-laws. It is true that the relevant provision in the constitution provides 
simply that a municipality may make by-laws; nonetheless, municipalities do constitute a 
sphere of government and it is difficult to conceive of such a sphere– much less a 
decentralised sphere – which operates in a legislative vacuum. Some municipalities in 
our sample had gone some way in the process of developing suites of by-laws intended to 
match their powers and functions, but then the process had simply come to a halt, with 
little apart from a collection of partly developed by-laws to show for it. Lack of funds 
was given as a reason for this in one case; difficulties with the public participation 
process were given as a reason in another. In other cases, it was stated that by-laws were 
not a priority of the municipalities concerned, and in yet other cases, it was stated that the 
municipalities intended to embark on programmes of reviewing and developing by-laws, 
but had never actually commenced the process.  But in most cases, officials were unable 
to suggest a cogent reason for not adopting a coherent legislative programme. The 
impression which was gained was that in most cases, municipalities were beset by inertia 
and were quite indifferent to the consequences which the failure to develop, adopt and 
implement by-laws held for service delivery. It was also clear that there was little 
appreciation amongst many officials for the importance and need for by-laws. 
 
Three observations on the issue of by-laws need to be made. First, in cases where 
municipalities had in fact adopted new by-laws, with one exception, those by-laws were 
all developed not internally but by outside consultants. This reveals a lack of internal 
capacity in municipalities, and raises questions about public participation, interest and 
















The second observation is connected to some extent with the first. Perhaps due in part to 
the fact that there was little internal involvement in the process of developing by-laws, it 
was noticeable that there was a lack of familiarity on the part of officials with the 
contents of by-laws. Even in cases where the administration of by-laws was entrusted to 
persons who had been appointed as legal managers, it was clear that, with two exceptions, 
officials were largely unfamiliar with the content, scope and application of the by-laws 
under their charge.  
 
The third observation is that in many municipalities in the sample, given the lack of 
institutional capacity, there is little prospect of effective implementation and enforcement 
of by-laws, even in cases where relatively comprehensive suites of by-laws have been 
enacted. This is due to the fact that most of the municipalities simply did not have 
sufficient qualified staff - let alone dedicated law enforcement units - to ensure the 
observance of by-laws.  
 
11.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
What are the consequences of the state of affairs described above? Municipalities have 
been endowed with specific powers and functions, but in many cases, these powers and 
functions are not exercised. But even where powers and functions are exercised, in many 
cases the effectiveness with which they are exercised is open to question due to the lack 
of a local legislative framework. As we have seen, section 165(2) of the Constitution 
contemplates that by-laws may be made by a municipality “for the effective 
administration of the matters it has the right to administer.” It is reasonable to conclude 
that the drafters of the Constitution envisaged that such by-laws were necessary for the 
effective administration of those matters. In addition, the legality of certain acts 
performed in pursuance of administering those matters could be called into question in 
the absence of by-laws authorising the performance of those acts. Yet it appears that the 
legislative function of municipalities has in a number of cases been all but abandoned. A 















effectively in a legal vacuum arising from the absence of a framework of by-laws; and in 
such circumstances, it becomes almost impossible for a municipality to achieve the 

















Evaluation: Fiscal Dimensions 
 
12.1 Purpose of Chapter 
 
Fiscal decentralisation is the process whereby revenues of the central government, and 
also the power to raise revenues from local sources, are transferred from national to sub-
national governments. This chapter focuses on the last two of our dimensions of 
decentralisation, namely, the authority to raise revenues (dimension (xi)), and revenue 
sharing (dimension (xii)), which are reflected in the notion of fiscal decentralisation. The 
objective of this chapter as regards the authority to raise revenue is to ascertain the extent 
to which provision is made for this function in the local government framework, and also 
to ascertain the extent to which the relevant systems required to give effect to that 
framework are actually implemented in practice by municipalities. As far as the revenue 
sharing dimension is concerned, the objective is again to ascertain the extent to which 
provision is made for this in the framework, and then to ascertain the extent to which 
municipalities rely on revenue sharing - or fiscal transfers - to fund their activities. 
 
12.2 Self-financing or Grant-dependent Municipalities? 
 
South African local government is said to be largely self-financing in the sense that the 
bulk of their resources are raised from own revenue sources such as taxes and service 
charges (van Ryneveld, 2006; National Treasury 2008; Fiscal and Financial Commission 
2010).
253
 As we have noted in previous discussions, the principle that a sub-national unit 
should be significantly self-financing is an important one for any local government 
system, for a number of reasons. It promotes accountability to local residents for the 
functions which municipalities perform, and it empowers residents to play a role in 
expressing their preferences for services and ensuring that municipalities remain 
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responsive to their needs (Rodden 2002; Watt 2004; National Treasury 2008). In reality, 
of course, imbalances between available revenue sources and expenditure needs require 
that municipalities’ own sources of revenue be supplemented by intergovernmental 
transfers. This is an almost inevitable consequence of fiscal decentralisation and occurs at 
least to some extent in most decentralised systems. It is not only the availability of 
resources in relation to spending needs that creates imbalances; the authority, ability and 
willingness to collect those resources also play important roles.  The delegation of taxing 
authority to collect new taxes to sub-national units that lack the administrative capacity to 
collect those taxes can set serious constraints on local budgets and increase the 
dependence of local governments on transfers from central government (Falleti 2005).  
 
In South Africa, notwithstanding the assertion referred to above  that municipalities are 
largely self-financing,
254
 the capacity of individual municipalities to raise revenues varies 
enormously, with significant numbers of them being largely dependent on inter-
governmental transfers, as will be shown later in this chapter. 
 
12.3 Revenue Raising Authority 
 
12.3.1 Sources of Revenue: Rates, Taxes and User Charges 
 
Local sources of revenue for local governments typically include rates or other taxes, and 
user charges or tariffs. In South Africa, section 229 of the Constitution permits 
municipalities to raise revenue from these sources,255 and national legislation in turn has 
been enacted to give effect to these constitutional provisions, as follows: 
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 According to the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, the current funding 
model was based on the assumption that municipalities could garner 95% of their revenue requirements - 
something which the Minister recognised as being unrealistic (reported in the Cape Times, 26 March, p19). 
 
255
 It was estimated that by the 2009/2010 financial year, property rates would constitute 18.9% of 
municipal operating revenue, country-wide. Other sources of revenue were estimated as follows: service 
charges – 42.9%; investment revenue – 3.2%; government grants – 22.3%; other own revenue – 12.7% 
(National Treasury, 2008: 23). Actual budget information for that period suggests that actual proportions 
will be closer to the following: Rates: 17.1%; service charges: 39.8%; grants: 19.9%; other: 17.4% (Source: 
















 Rates:  In order to give effect to the rates provision of the Constitution, the Rates 
Act was enacted in 2004 and came into effect on 2 July 2005. The act provides for 
the power of municipalities to levy rates, and provides a detailed framework for 
the development of rates policies and their review, the enactment of rates by-laws, 
community participation, exemptions, liability for rates, property valuations, 
objections, appeals and a host of other matters.
256
 
 User Charges:  We have already seen that a municipal council has the right to 
finance the affairs of the municipality by charging fees for services, by virtue of 
Section 4 of the Systems Act. Section 75A amplifies this right, and sections 74 
and 75 require each municipality to adopt a tariffs policy and a by-law to give 
effect to the tariffs policy.  
 Other Taxes: Section 229 (2) of the Constitution contemplates the possibility of 
municipalities raising other taxes, levies and duties; the Municipal Fiscal Powers 
and Functions Act, no. 12 of 2007, fleshes this provision out, but to date the 
levying of no additional tax by a municipality has been authorised. 
 
12.3.2 Revenue Raising in Practice 
 
In order for municipalities to perform their functions, it is essential for them to optimise 
their revenue collection processes. Most municipalities are, however, perceived to be 
hard-pressed for revenue. As far as local sources of revenue are concerned, this is due to 
a large extent to the inability or unwillingness on the part of municipalities to collect 
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 A crucial provision of the Rates Act as originally enacted is to be found in Section 89, which provided 
that until a municipality prepares a valuation roll in terms of the Act, it was permitted to continue to use a 
valuation roll or supplementary valuation roll that was in force in its area prior to the commencement of the 
Act, and levy rates against such a roll or supplementary roll. That concession was to lapse four years from 
the date of commencement of the Act – in other words, all municipalities were supposed to have new 
valuation rolls in place by 1 July 2009. Failure to implement by that date would have meant that a 
municipality would not be able to impose rates. By that date, 13 municipalities still had not prepared their 
new valuation rolls. It therefore proved necessary to amend the Rates act so as to extend the concessionary 
period by a further two years. This episode is related as an example of the consequences of imposing 


















 As at December 2007, municipalities were owed a total of R 44.2 billion. 
Metropolitan municipalities were owed the largest portion of this debt, amounting to 
some R 25.4 billion. That said, the amount owed to local municipalities increased from 
December 2006 to December 2007 by some R 3 billion, to nearly R 18 billion. This 
represented some 39% of local municipalities’ total budgets at the time (National 
Treasury 2008). As at June 2009, the total amount owing to municipalities had reportedly 
grown to R 50,4 billion (SA Local Government Briefing August 2009, p22).
258
 According 
to the National Treasury, most municipalities have failed to overcome the challenge 
posed by outstanding consumer debts; it suggests that this fact highlights possible 
governance problems in that many municipalities lack the ability to implement credit 
control policies and pay only lip-service to those policies (National Treasury 2008). This 
is despite legislation specifically authorising and requiring municipalities to collect such 
revenues.  
 
The Systems Act and the Rates Act require each municipality to adopt and implement a 
tariff policy on the levying of fees for municipal services (Section 74 of Systems Act), to 
adopt, maintain and implement a credit control and debt collection policy ( Section 96 of 
the Systems Act) and to adopt a policy on the levying of rates.  
 
It was found that of the 37 municipalities in our sample:  
 
 24 municipalities had adopted tariffs policies; 4 had not adopted such policies; 
and at the remaining  9, no such policy documents could be located and it could 
therefore not be ascertained  whether such a policy had been adopted or not (See 
Appendix F (Table 4) Column (i));  
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 Momoniat (2002) states that “the initial lessons from South Africa indicate that subnational governments 
require both capacity and the political will to collect revenue due. It is also important when the tax base is 
small, because of inequity of income, to ensure subnational governments resist the temptation to be 
selective in the collection of revenue (e.g. by concentration only on those paying their fees or taxes, and 
ignoring or forgiving those not paying). Subnational governments have not demonstrated significant 
improvements in collecting all revenue due, or in increasing their potential from current sources.”(p20). 
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 It is hardly surprising that municipalities in turn often struggle to pay their own debts. It has been 
estimated that in 2010 municipalities owed approximately R1,5 Billion for bulk water supplied to them. 















 26 municipalities had adopted credit control and debt collection policies; 2 had 
not adopted such policies;  and at the remaining  9, no such policy documents 
could be located and it could therefore not be ascertained  whether such a policy 
had been adopted or not ( See Appendix F, Column (ii)); 
 21 municipalities had adopted rates policies; 6 had not adopted such policies; and 
at the remaining 10, no such policy documents could be located and it could 
therefore not be ascertained whether such a policy had been adopted or not (See 




In the light of previous observations regarding compliance with statutory requirements, 
the level of compliance with the requirements relating to the adoption of these policies is 
relatively high.
260
 That is not the end of the matter, however. It will be recalled that in the 
discussion on legislative authority,
261
 we noted that municipalities were expressly 
required by various statutory enactments to adopt certain by-laws, namely: 
 
 Section 75 of the Systems Act provides that a municipal council must adopt by-
laws to give effect to the implementation and enforcement of its tariff  policy; 
 Section 98 of the Systems Act provides that a municipal council must adopt by-
laws to give effect to its credit control and debt collection policy, its 
implementation and enforcement; 
 Section 6 of the Rates Act provides that a municipality must adopt by-laws to give 
effect to the implementation of its rates policy. 
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 3 of the municipalities in the sample were District Municipalities. Section 2(2)(a) of the Rates Act 
provides that a district municipality may not levy a rate on a property except on property in a district 
management area (or “DMA”) within the municipality. A DMA may be declared within a District 
Municipality in terms of Section 6 of the Structures Act if the establishment of a local municipality in the 
area is not viable. In such a case, the DMA is administered directly by the District Municipality. Of the 
three District Municipalities in our sample, all included DMA’s and were therefore entitled to levy rates 
and by implication were required to have rates policies.  
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 One might, however, be surprised at the large number of instances in which policy documents could not 
be located, as a result of which no definitive answer could be given. The simple fact is that many 
municipalities do not have any central record of what policies have or have not been adopted.  
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It is not clear why the legislature considered it necessary to doubly test the drafting skills 
of municipalities by requiring both policies and by-laws to be adopted. In any event, 
provision having been made for them by statute, both policies and by-laws must be 
adopted in order for a municipality to be able to  levy tariffs, practise credit control and 
debt collection, and levy rates. Whilst, as was noted above, there seems to be a relatively 
high rate of compliance with the requirements relating to the adoption of policies, 
compliance with the requirements relating to the adoption of by-laws is extremely poor; 
of the 37 municipalities in our sample: 
 
 only 8 had adopted tariffs by-laws (See Appendix F, Column (iv))  ; 
 only 13 had adopted credit control and debt collection by-laws (See Appendix F, 
Column (v)) ; and 
 only 7 had adopted rates by-laws (See Appendix F, Column (vi). 
This suggests indifference on the part of municipalities to the requirements of the 
statutory framework within which they are supposed to operate. The consequence of the 
failure to adopt these by-laws is that a municipality cannot lawfully impose rates and 
tariffs or perform credit control. Once again, it is difficult to ascertain why precisely this 
state of affairs exists; the information gleaned from the municipalities does not give cause 
for optimism:  
 
 regarding tariffs by-laws, of the 29 municipalities which had not adopted them, 
officials in 19 cases professed not to be aware of the requirement that a 
municipality adopt such a by-law;  
 regarding  credit control and debt collection by-laws, of the 24 municipalities 
which had not adopted them, officials in 17 cases professed not to be aware  of the 
requirement that a municipality adopt such a by-law; 
 regarding rates by-laws, of the 30 municipalities which had not adopted them, 
officials in 16 cases professed not to be aware  of the requirement that a 















Apart from apparent ignorance of the statutory requirements relating to the adoption of 
by-laws, no other cogent reason was proffered for failure to adopt them. 
12.3.3 Sources of Revenue:  Borrowing 
 
We saw in Chapter 6 that borrowing by local governments is considered to be one of the 
most difficult issues pertaining to local government. In South Africa, the issue is now 
closely regulated by sections 45 to 51 of the Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act (“MFMA”).
262
 In addition, by virtue of the Budget and Reporting 
Regulations made under the MFMA,
263
 municipalities are required to adopt borrowing 
policies which internally regulate their borrowing processes (previously, under the 
Regulatory Framework for Municipal Borrowing, it was merely recommended that every 
municipality adopt a written policy when planning to issue debt). It is important to note 
that by virtue of the MFMA, a municipality may incur short-term debt (defined as debt 
repayable over a period not exceeding one year) only to bridge (i) shortfalls within a 
financial year in expectation of specific and realistic anticipated income to be received in 
that year, or (ii) capital needs within a financial year, to be repaid from specific funds to 
be received from enforceable allocations or long-term debt commitments.
264
 Long-term 
debt, on the other hand, may be incurred only for the purpose of capital expenditure on 
property, plant or equipment or for refinancing existing long-term debt.
265
 It is worth 
noting that the Constitution was amended in order to allow the passing of the relevant 
provisions of the MFMA which limit the capacity of a municipality to borrow. Section 
230A of the Constitution was inserted in 2001, and contains provisions for the enactment 
of national legislation relating to the circumstances in which municipalities may borrow 
funds. It appears that in the absence of such an amendment, national legislation which 
purported to limit the capacity of a municipality to borrow would have fallen foul of the 
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 Which should be read with the Municipal Regulations on Debt Disclosure, published under GN R 492 in 
Government Gazette 29966 of 15 June 2007. 
 
263
 Published under GN R 393 in Government Gazette 32141 of 17 April 2009. 
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 MFMA, Section 45(1). 
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Constitution, as it would have impinged upon the municipality’s right to govern the local 
government affairs of the community.
266
  
12.3.4 Borrowing in Practice 
 
According to projections for the 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12 municipal budget periods, 
loans constituted respectively 21.4%, 16.4% and 17.4% of combined municipal capital 
budgets countrywide.
267
 This reflects, in general terms, both the capacity to borrow and 
the commitment to spend on capital projects. As far as individual municipalities in our 
sample are concerned: 
 
 for their 2009/10 budgets, only 14 of municipalities in the sample made any 
provision at all for loan funding for capital expenditure; in one case 48.5% of the 
capital budget was accounted for by loans; loans represented 36.3% of the budget 
in another; in 4 cases, the proportion of the capital budget represented by loans 
was in the 20% - 30% range; in 4 cases, it was more than 10% but less than 20%; 
in 4 cases it was less than 10%; and in the remaining 23 cases, no provision had 
been made for loans at all; 
  for their projected budgets for 2010/11, only 8 of the municipalities in the sample 
made any provision for loan funding of their capital budgets; in two cases, more 
than 50% of  the capital budget was to be funded by loans; in 2 cases, the loan 
proportion was in the 40% to 50% range; in one case it was in the 30% to 40% 
range; in two cases it was in the 20% to 30% range; and in one case it was in the 
10% to 20% range; in the remaining 29 cases, no provision was made for loans at 
all; 
 for their projected budgets for 2011/12, only five municipalities made any 
provision for loans; the proportions of loans in relation to the capital budgets for 
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 See Chapter 6 for a discussion on global practice relating to the control of sub-national borrowing. 
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those five municipalities were respectively 50.5%, 42%, 33.6%; 21.8% and 




It would be tempting to conclude that the low proportion of loan funding is due to these 
municipalities being largely able to fund heir own capital expenditure; as we will see in 
the discussion of revenue sharing, such a conclusion would be unduly optimistic. 
 




As we have seen, fiscal transfers from national to sub-national governments are a part of 
fiscally decentralised life. A consequence of fiscal decentralisation is that sub-national 
governments have lower fiscal autonomy than national government. As a result, the 
constitutional and statutory framework in South Africa provides for an elaborate set of 
revenue transfers from national to sub-national governments, which have the primary 
objective of assisting sub-national governments to provide the services and perform the 
functions assigned to them under the constitution (Yemek 2005). The broad principle 
relating to intergovernmental transfers to local government is contained in Section 227 of 
the Constitution, which provides that local government is entitled to an equitable share of 
revenue raised nationally to enable it to provide basic services and to perform the 
functions allocated to it, and may receive other allocations from national government, 
either conditionally or unconditionally.  
 
Section 214 of the Constitution provides that an Act of Parliament must provide for the 
equitable division of revenue raised nationally amongst the various spheres of 
government. The position is accordingly regulated primarily by the Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations Act. Section 9 of the Act requires the Financial and Fiscal  
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 to submit, in respect of each financial year,  to both Houses of Parliament 
and the provincial legislatures recommendations for that financial year regarding an 
equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national, provincial and local 
spheres of government. It is also required to submit recommendations regarding the 
determination of each province’s equitable share in the provincial share of that revenue, 
and regarding any other allocations to provinces, local government or municipalities from 
the national government’s share of that revenue, and any conditions on which those 
allocations should be made. 
 
The Act goes on to provide
270
 that each year when the Annual Budget is introduced, the 
Minister of Finance must introduce a Division of Revenue Bill  which specifies the share 
of each sphere of government of the revenue raised nationally for the relevant financial 
year, each province’s share of the provincial share of that revenue, and any other 
allocations to the provinces, local government or municipalities from the national 
government’s share of that revenue, and any conditions on  which those allocations are or 
must be made. This bill may be submitted only after consultation with the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission and the various spheres of government. It is in accordance with this 
bill, once enacted
271
 that fiscal transfers are ultimately implemented to municipalities.  
 
The end result is that nationally raised revenues, less debt repayment liabilities, are 
divided between the three spheres of government based on their expenditure 
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 It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that the Financial and Fiscal Commission acts as a consultative body 
for, and makes recommendations and gives advice to, organs of state in the national, provincial and local 
spheres of government on financial and fiscal matters. 
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 In Section 10. 
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12.4.2 Vertical and Horizontal Divisions 
 
A distinction must be made between vertical and horizontal divisions of revenue. The 
vertical division – that is, the division between the various spheres of government – is in 
practice an outcome of government’s deliberations on policy and associated expenditure 
priorities. It reflects government’s view on policy priorities over the medium-term, 
having regard to the responsibilities, expenditure demands, capacity and performance of 
each sphere of government. This will inevitably involve trade-offs between functions and 
spheres of government. The vertical division is not based on a formula; it is largely an 
allocation based on political judgment (Momoniat 2002).Typically, national and 
provincial governments have received the greater shares, reflecting their reliance on the 
vertical division of revenue to secure resources, whereas the local government, in theory, 
can draw on more sources of own revenue
272
 – although, as we will be shown later in this 
chapter, that is often illusory.  The local government share has, however, risen at the 
fastest rate, averaging 21.3 per cent annually since 1995/96, compared to the other 
spheres of government (National Treasury 2008). 
 
Following the vertical division process, the resources allocated to the local government 
sphere in general must be divided into transfer programmes and allocated between 
individual municipalities in a process known as the horizontal division of revenue. The 
basic distinction between instruments for transferring revenue to individual municipalities 
is that between conditional and unconditional funding instruments. A conditional transfer 
is earmarked for specific types of expenditures by municipalities and must be spent in 
accordance with prescribed processes. An unconditional transfer has no such conditions 
attached, although it must be spent in accordance with standards and requirements 
applicable to all public expenditure.  
 
The only type of unconditional transfer in South Africa is the local government equitable 
share which is a constitutional entitlement, being provided for in section 227(1) (a) of the 
Constitution.  It is the largest single transfer programme, accounting for an average of 
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56.7 per cent of all projected transfers between 2003/04 and 2009/10 (National Treasury 
2008), and is intended as the principal “redistribution” tool for fostering government 
expenditure. The equitable share is intended to fund a range of municipal activities 
(including the general expenditures of municipalities) and municipalities are largely free 
to allocate the equitable share as they see fit, after taking account of national priorities 
that underpin the vertical division of revenue. The formula by which allocations are made 









 and correction and stabilisation components. Although the 
Constitution does not prescribe the method for the division of revenue amongst the 283 
municipalities, each component does attempt to capture certain basic provisions of the 
Constitution which must be taken into account for purposes of determining the horizontal 
division of revenue. The basic services component reflects Section 214(2)(d) of the 
Constitution, which refers to the need to provide basic services and perform the functions 
allocated to them; the development component reflects Section 214(2) (f) of the 
Constitution, which refers to the developmental and other needs of  provinces, local 
government and municipalities; the institutional and revenue raising components reflect 
section 214(2)(e) of the Constitution, which refers to the fiscal capacity and efficiency of 
provinces and municipalities; and the correction component reflects Section 214(2)(i), 
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 Subsidies are provided to support five services (water, sanitation, electricity, refuse and environmental 
health) in the basic services formula. 
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 The development component is currently inactive due to a lack of consensus on the funding role of this 
component (Financial and Fiscal Commission 2010). 
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 The revenue raising component attempts to correct equitable share allocations by considering the 
revenue potential and fiscal capacity of municipalities. 
 
277
 The Financial and Fiscal Commission is, however, critical of the formula used for determining the 
equitable share. It suggests that the current cost or subsidy estimates used in the formula have no theoretical 
or empirical basis that efficiently reflects the expenditure pressures that municipalities face. The 
Commission also refers to several features of the current formula that make it difficult to estimate and fund 
fiscal gaps accurately. These include the lack of an accurate costing framework that defines the different 
expenditure needs of municipalities; inefficient calculation, application and the diminishing of influence of 
















Conditional transfers make up the remainder of the resources transferred by national 
government to municipalities. These transfers are provided to support municipal 
infrastructure investment and to strengthen municipal capacity. In both cases, transfers 
are made directly, in the form of cash, and indirectly, in the form of assets or support 
services provided to a municipality. The largest infrastructure transfer programme is the 
municipal infrastructure grant. It accounts for a projected average of 54.1% of all 
infrastructure transfers between 2003/04 and 2009/10. Other direct transfers account for 
an average of 24.8 % of all infrastructure transfers between 2003/04 and 2009/10.  
Indirect transfers and capacity building transfers account for the balance (National 
Treasury 2008). 
 
12.4.3 Transfers in Practice 
 
It has often been stated that local government is substantially financed by its own 
revenues.
278
 This may be true of local government in general, but this contention obscures 
that fact that vast differences exist in the capacities of individual municipalities to finance 
their expenditure from their respective revenue sources. For the 2009/10 financial year, 
72.8% of all municipal revenue (both capital and operating) countrywide was budgeted to 
be derived from municipalities’ own sources, 
279
 with the remaining 27.2% of funding 
being derived from grants in one form or another. If, however, metropolitan 
municipalities are disaggregated from other municipalities, then we find that for 2009/10, 
only 16.3% of metropolitan revenue is derived from grant funding, whilst  a substantial 
40.2% of funding for other municipalities - that is, local and district municipalities- is 
derived from grant funding.
280
 If the so-called “secondary cities” (those being the local 
                                                                                                                                                 
associated with using outdated census data; and difficulties associated with identifying an appropriate and 
socially reflective indicator for poverty (Financial and Fiscal Commission 2010). 
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 See, for example, van Ryneveld, 2006; and Fiscal and Financial Commission 2010. 
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 The levels of grant funding for local and district municipalities for 2010/11 and 2011/12 are projected at 















municipalities with the largest budgets)
281
 are further disaggregated from the greater body 
of local and district municipalities, then grant funding accounts for 50.3% of the 
combined budgeted revenue of the remaining local and district municipalities.
282
As far as 
the relative shares of grant funding are concerned, metropolitan municipalities, which 
accounted for 54.3% of total budgeted countrywide municipal revenue, absorbed only 
32.6% of grant funding in 2009/10, whilst other municipalities accounted for only 45.7% 




Turning to the 37 individual municipalities which make up our sample, an examination of 
their budgets for the 2009/10 financial year reveals that grants represented: 
 
 Less than 20% of budgeted revenue in 5 cases; 
 20% or more  of revenue  but less than 30% in 4 cases; 
 30% or more of revenue  but less than 40% in 8 cases; 
 40% or more of revenue  but less than 50% in 4 cases; 
 50% or more of revenue  but less than 60% in 4 cases; 
 60% or more of revenue  but less than 70% in 4 cases; 
 70% or more of revenue  but less than 80% in 3 cases; and 
 80% or more of revenue in 5 cases, with the highest being 86.9%.284 
 
In other words, 16 (or 43%) of the municipalities in our sample relied on grants for 50% 
or more of their reve ue; 20 (or 54%) (including those 16) of them relied on grants for 
40% or more of their revenue (See Appendix G (Graph 3)). 
 
Projections for the 2010/11 financial year indicate that grants represent: 
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 Source: Capital and Operating budgets for all municipalities, 2009/10 (National Treasury 2009). 
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 Less than 20% of budgeted expenditure  in 4 cases; 
 20% or more  of revenue  but less than 30% in 6 cases; 
 30% or more of revenue  but less than 40% in 6 cases; 
 40% or more of revenue  but less than 50% in 5 cases; 
 50% or more of revenue  but less than 60% in 5 cases; 
 60% or more of revenue  but less than 70% in 4 cases; 
 70% or more of revenue  but less than 80% in 3 cases; and 
 80% or more of revenue  in 4 cases, with one municipality relying on grants to the 




Again, 16 (or 43%) of municipalities in the sample rely on grants for 50% or more of 
their revenue in 2010/11; 21 (or 57%) (including those 16) of them rely on grants for 
40% or more of their revenue. For the first time we notice that a municipality is entirely 
dependent on grant funding (See Appendix H (Graph 4)). 
 
Finally, projections for the 2011/12 financial year indicate that grants represent: 
 
 Less than 20% of budgeted expenditure in 3 cases; 
 20% or more  of revenue  but less than 30% in 5 cases; 
 30% or more of re enue  but less than 40% in 7 cases; 
 40% or more of revenue  but less than 50% in 7 cases; 
 50% or more of revenue  but less than 60% in 2 cases; 
 60% or more of revenue  but less than 70% in 5 cases; 
 70% or more of revenue  but less than 80% in 2 cases; and 
 80% or more of revenue in 6 cases, with one municipality again relying on grants 
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 Source: Capital and Operating budgets for all municipalities, 2010/11 (National Treasury 2009). 
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Thus in 2011/12, 15 (or 41%) of the municipalities in our sample relied on grants for 50% 
or more of their revenue; 22 or 59% (including those 14) of them relied on grants for 40% 




12.5 Management of Revenues and Expenditure 
 
In the preceding sections, sources of municipal revenue and the issues associated 
therewith were discussed. In the present section, the ability of municipalities to manage 
those revenues will be considered. Financial management is an issue which is as 
appropriately discussed under the dimension of institutional capacity as it is here, because, 
it is submitted, effective management is dependent upon the existence of the necessary 
skills within the institutions concerned. For the sake of thematic consistency, however, it 
is dealt with in this chapter. 
 
Of all the challenges facing local government in South Africa, the widespread inability to 
manage finances is perhaps one of the most notorious. One of the most commonly cited - 
and obvious - reasons for this inability is the lack of capacity. The General Report of the 
Auditor-General on Audit Outcomes of South African Local Government for the 
Financial year 2007-08 (“Auditor-General 2009”) identified a general lack of capacity 
and skills (attributable to ineffectiveness of recruitment, training and supervision of 
financial personnel) to enable compliance with the prescribed accounting framework as a 
principal contributing factor to the high incidence of audit qualifications in most 
provinces.
288
 Other challenges identified by the Auditor-General include ineffective 
performance management systems, inadequate governance structures,
289
 lack of 
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 To the best of the author’s knowledge, no norm for or ideal level of grant funding has been established 
by the National Treasury or any other authority, and there is therefore no means of assessing the desirability 
of  the level of grant funding applicable to any particular municipality.  
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 See Auditor-General 2009:26-30. The inability to attract staff and high staff turnover were identified as 
specific underlying causes of lack of capacity. 
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 For example, it was found that in the Free State Province during the 2007/08 financial year, close to 

















leadership involvement, the failure to prioritise and address issues, and non-adherence to 
established controls (Auditor-General 2009:26-30).
290
 Whilst these reasons are varied, 
they are, it is submitted, ultimately traceable to inadequate institutional capacity.  
 
Further causes identified in the Consolidated Report of the Auditor-General on the Local 
Government Audit Outcomes 2008-09 (“Auditor-General 2010”) included a lack of 
participation by municipal leadership in the accounting and auditing process and a lack of 
accountability for a prior year’s negative results by incoming leaders. Governance issues 
are also a cause for concern. A common issue, according to the Auditor-General, is that 
audit committees fail to fulfil their responsibility to identify and mitigate risks, and fail to 
assume adequate responsibility to review financial statements submitted for audit; they 
also fail to play a proper role in the reviewing of performance. Internal audit units are 
also subject to criticism by the Auditor-General: for example, they are reported to fail to 
take responsibility for governance and risk identification, are not always empowered to 
influence management through recommendation, and they do not assist municipal 
leadership by providing independent assurance on implementation plans intended to deal 
with audit issues (Auditor-General 2010:24-25). 
 
These weaknesses are exacerbated by poor financial practices, some of them alarmingly 
basic. These  include  a lack of financial discipline in basic internal controls over 
financial management, such as authorisations, reconciliations and review of accounts; a 
lack of supporting documents; failure to produce proper monthly financial statements; 
lack of processes to identify and prevent unauthorised, fruitless and wasteful and irregular 
expenditure; lack of ongoing monitoring of activities through the year (such as 
performance of basic internal controls); and, alarmingly, the lack of understanding of 
accepted accounting practices by Chief Financial Officers and financial staff (Auditor-
General 2010).  
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 It is particularly interesting, for purposes of the present study, that the Auditor-General found that for the  
2007/08 financial year, instances of material non-compliance with relevant legislation not affecting the 
financial statements were  found in 77% of municipalities. Non-compliance related mostly to the MFMA 
(for example, failure to comply with the budget process, failure to pay creditors in time, and a lack of fraud 
prevention plans).  Instances of non-compliance with other legislation, such as the Systems Act, were also 
found - for example, failure on the part of councillors and managers to declare interests, and failure to 
















The weaknesses in the financial management of municipalities are manifested in the audit 
opinions expressed by the Auditor-General on municipalities countrywide, as indicated 
below: 
 
 for the 2006/07 financial year, the Auditor-General’s audit opinions on the 239  
municipalities which were reported on were as follows: 99 received 
disclaimers;
291
 19 received adverse opinions;
292
 69  received qualified opinions;
293
 
51 received financially unqualified (with other matters)
 294
 opinions; and only 1 
received a   financially unqualified (with no other matters) opinion (Source: 
Auditor General 2009:25); 
 for the 2007/08 financial year, the Auditor-General’s audit opinions on the 278  
municipalities which were reported on were as follows: 110 received disclaimers; 
11 received adverse opinions; 63 received qualified opinions; 91 received 
financially unqualified (with other matters) opinions; and only 4 received 
financially unqualified (with no other matters) opinions (Source: Auditor General 
2010:13); 
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 A disclaimer of opinion is expressed when the possible effect of a limitation on scope is so material and 
pervasive that the auditor has not been able to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to form an 
opinion and accordingly is unable to express an opinion on the financial statements. 
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 An adverse opinion is expressed when the effect of a disagreement with management regarding 
departures from the financial reporting framework/basis of accounting is so material and pervasive to the 
financial statements that the auditor concludes that a qualification of the report is not adequate to disclose 
the misleading or incomplete nature of the financial statements. 
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 A qualified opinion is expressed when the auditor concludes that an unqualified opinion cannot be 
expressed due to the effect of any disagreement with management regarding departures from the applicable 
financial reporting framework/basis of accounting which result in material misstatement of the financial 
statements or due to the limitation on scope being not so material and pervasive as to require an adverse 
opinion or a disclaimer of opinion. 
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 An auditor’s report may be modified by adding an emphasis of matter paragraph(s) to highlight a matter 
affecting the financial statements which is included in a note to the financial statements that more 
extensively discusses the matter. The addition of such an emphasis of matter paragraph(s) does not affect 
the auditor’s opinion on whether the financial statements are fairly presented. The auditor may also modify 
the auditor’s report by using an emphasis of matter paragraph(s) to report matters other than those affecting 

















 for the 2008/09 financial year, the Auditor-General’s audit opinions on the 247  
municipalities which were reported on were as follows: 81 received disclaimers; 8 
received adverse opinions; 47 received qualified opinions; 107 received 
financially unqualified (with other matters) opinions; and only 4  financially 





Our sample of 37 municipalities is fairly representative of the problem. The Auditor -
General found that for the 2006/7 financial year, of our 37 municipalities: 
 
 21  received disclaimers 
 2 received adverse opinions; 
 11 received qualified opinions; 
 1 was   financially unqualified ( with other matters); 
 none was financially unqualified (with no other matters). 
 
Due to late submission of the financial statements, the remaining two municipalities were 
not audited in time for their findings to be contained in the report (See Appendix J ( Table 
5)).  
 
For the 2007/8 financial year the situation had improved somewhat: of our 37 
municipalities: 
 
 12  received disclaimers; 
 1 received an adverse opinions; 
 11 received qualified opinions; 
 5 were financially unqualified (with other matters); 
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 The discrepancies between the numbers of municipalities reported on in each year is due to the fact that 
varying numbers of municipalities failed to submitted their financial statements in time for them to be 

















 none was financially unqualified (with no other matters). 
 
The remaining eight were not audited in time for their findings to be contained in the 




Another interesting measure of financial management capacity is to be found in the 
evaluation of “good management” practices. As part of the audit process, the Auditor-
General measured five basic good management practice indicators which reveal as much 
about the administrative capacity of municipalities as they do about their finances. In 
summary, for the 2007/8 financial year, of the 37 municipalities in our sample: 
 
 only 6 complied with the practice of providing a “clear trail of supporting 
documentation that is easily available and provided in time;” 
 only 7 complied with the practice of ensuring “quality of financial statements and 
management information;” 
 only 17 complied with the practice of timely submission of financial statements 
and management information; 
 only 10 complied with the practice of ensuring availability of key officials during 
audits; 
 only 3 complied with the practice of developing  of and complying with risk 
management and good internal control governance practices; 
 only 9 complied with the practice of providing leadership, supervision and 
monitoring  (See Appendix K (Table 6)).
297 
The audit process also examines matters that do not have a direct impact on the audit 
opinion, but which clearly reflect the consequences of weak financial management. Here 
we are concerned with issues such as material losses, unauthorised expenditure, fruitless 
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 General reports on audit outcomes of local government for the various provinces - in which audit 
opinions of individual municipalities would be indicated - were not available for all provinces for the 
2008/09 financial year at the time of writing, hence it is not possible to provide a comparison of audit 
opinions of the municipalities in our sample for that financial year.  
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and wasteful expenditure, irregular expenditure and under-spending. Information on our 
individual sample municipalities was not available at the time of writing, but the 
following data relating to the position country-wide is illuminating: 
 
 For the 2008-09 financial year, it was found that  municipalities and municipal 
entities across the country 
298
 incurred more than R5 billion in material losses (i.e. 
above average losses resulting mainly from the distribution of water and 
electricity, which in turn translate into a loss of revenue for municipalities) 
(Auditor-General 2010:41); 
 For the 2008-09 financial year, across the country,299 unauthorised expenditure by 
municipalities and municipal entities amounted to more than R 2,4 billion 
(Auditor-General 2010:41) Unauthorised expenditure includes over-expenditure 
on municipal budgets,
300
 overspending on a particular vote, expenditure on a 
department from an unrelated vote, expenditure for a purpose other than specified, 
spending of an allocation other than in accordance with the conditions attaching to 
the allocation, and the making of a grant by a municipality other than in 
accordance with the MFMA; 
 It was found that across the country, more than R117million had been incurred by 
municipalities and municipal entities on fruitless and wasteful expenditure (i.e. 
expenditure that has been incurred in vain and would have been avoided had 
reasonable care been exercised). This was due mainly to interest accrued as a 
result of late payment to creditors, rentals for unoccupied buildings and 
cancellation of irregular contracts (Auditor-General 2010:42).  
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 The preparation of credible, coherent budgets has in itself been a challenge for many a municipality. In 
an attempt to introduce uniformity in budget preparation and presentation, the Minister of Finance 
promulgated the Municipal Budget and Reporting Regulations under GN 393 of 2009, published in 
Government Gazette no. 32141 of 17 April 2009. The regulations are themselves complex, and it is to be 
wondered to what extent many municipalities have the capacity to apply them. Information on the extent of 
















 Country-wide, irregular expenditure (i.e. expenditure incurred in contravention of 
certain statutes, namely the MFMA, the Systems Act or the Public Office Bearer’s 
Act, 1998, or in contravention of a requirement of a municipality’s supply chain 
management policy) by municipalities and municipal entities amounted to more 
than R 2,3 billion for 2008-09. This was due mostly to non-compliance with 
supply chain management requirements (Auditor-General 2010: 42). 
 It was found that in five provinces301  underspending on budgets amounted to 
R1,5 billion. A further R1,6 billion was under-spent on government grants 
(Auditor-General 2010:42). 
 
In addition to the lack of capacity and its inevitable consequences for sound financial 
administration, there is the ongoing threat of corruption. According to Atkinson, “local 
government corruption sometimes appears to be so corrupt as to be endemic. The politics 
of patronage and nepotism continues to blight municipal politics” (2007:67). Atkinson 
suggests that corruption appears to take place on the basis of individual acquisition, or 
with the cooperation of small and informal friendship groups, and that local party 
branches are prone to capture by small informal networks, which in turn capture key 
positions in municipalities. Corruption at municipal level may take many forms, such as 
the misuse of mayoral funds, irregular performance bonuses, abuse of council property 
for private or party ends (Koelble and Li Puma 2008), and irregular staff appointments.  
 
Perhaps the most obvious vehicle for corrupt activities is, however, the procurement 
process. As we have seen, irregular expenditure accounted for R 2, 3 billion in 2008-09; 
according to the Auditor-General, the bulk of that is attributable to non-compliance with 
supply chain management procedures. It is a matter of speculation as to  what proportion 
may in turn be attributed to corrupt practices, but the potential for such practices in the 
context of procurement is clearly enormous. This is despite the provisions of the MFMA, 
which are intended to insulate the supply chain management process from political 
interference and provide checks against corrupt practices. Regulations made under the 
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MFMA provide the basis for a standardised supply chain management policy applicable 
to all municipalities.  Despite the good intentions of the regulations, they have created an 
enormously complex process which requires considerable institutional capacity in order 
to apply properly. Many municipalities simply lack that capacity, with the result that the 
process may be quite easily manipulated and subjected to venal influences. Methods 
employed to circumvent the process which have been described to the author include 
“cover quoting,” whereby connected entities submit tenders whilst purporting to be in 
competition, “tender splitting,” whereby tenders are split into component parts which 
individually fall below cost levels which at which competitive bid processes must be 
applied, thereby enabling favoured bidders to avoid being subjected to those bid 
processes, and inviting tenders for services that are not required. Even more blatant 
activities include paying contractors against false invoices or false certificates of 
completion, or for work not done at all,  influencing bid committees to award contracts to 
favoured contractors, awarding contracts to “ghost” companies or awarding contracts 
without their being subjected in any way to the supply chain management process. 
 
 12.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Fiscal transfers to local government have continued to grow strongly in real terms since 
2003/4 (National Treasury 2008). It has been asserted that this phenomenon has “allowed 
the major transfer programmes to contribute significantly to the fight against poverty” 
and that “a new generation of programmes is beginning to help municipalities meet the 
challenges of economic growth at the local level, through encouraging infrastructure 
investment” (National Treasury 2008:52). It is submitted that this assertion avoids a 
number of serious concerns which arise from the state of affairs described in this Chapter.  
 
Four concerns in particular come to mind. The first relates to the question of compliance. 
A comprehensive statutory framework has been put in place to permit and regulate the 
collection of revenue from local sources, yet many municipalities have failed to comply 
with that framework. This not only limits the ability of municipalities to raise their own 















compliance in general. The second concern relates to the issue of sustainability. When 
municipalities rely on grants for such substantial proportions of their incomes as do many 
of the municipalities in our sample (as much as 100% in one case), then the sustainability 
of these municipalities must be questioned, even if they do comply with statutory 
requirements relating to the raising of local revenue. The third area of concern is the 
effect of grant dependency on accountability of municipalities towards citizens. Grant 
dependency poses a significant threat to accountability, for reasons previously 
discussed.
302
 As far as the author is aware, there is no benchmark against which to 
determine at which level grant funding poses a threat to accountability, but intuition 
suggests that the situation which prevails amongst the municipalities in our sample - in 
which a large number of those municipalities depend on grants for a significant 
proportion of their revenues - cannot promote accountability and has the potential for 
undermining the entire basis for a decentralised system of governance. The final area of 
concern is the ability of municipalities to manage finances. Even assuming that 
municipalities have sound revenue bases, the lack of institutional capacity - combined 
with corruption and a lack of accountability - constitutes a constant threat to proper 
financial governance, as is so clearly reflected in the findings of the Auditor-General. 
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Government’s Response to the Crisis in Local Government 
 
13.1 Purpose of Chapter 
 
In Chapter 1, reference was made to a number of failures of local government. These 
failures and their causes had in many instances been apparent for a considerable length of 
time. Whilst the national government was evidently not unaware of the difficulties with 
which local government was presented,
303
 it appears that it was not fully seized of the 
extent of the crisis facing local government until approximately 2009.
304
 This awakening 
may have been prompted to some extent by the wave of “service delivery protests” 
referred to in Chapter 1 which first become manifest in 2004, escalated rapidly in 2007 
and 2008 and were continuing almost unabated at the time of writing. 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to review government’s current response to the crisis, and 
to consider the role of decentralisation in that response. 
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 For several years, government’s principal response to the growing difficulties facing local government 
was the introduction of a number of capacity building projects (driven not only by national and provincial 
governments, but also parastatal organisations, private organisations and international donor organisations) 
aimed at improving the capacity of local government to deliver services. Some fifteen of these projects 
have been established since 1996, and several of them were still in operation at the time of writing. The 
effectiveness of these projects is difficult to measure, and to the best of the present author’s knowledge, no 
assessment of their impact has been undertaken. See Financial and Fiscal Commission 2009 for a more 
detailed discussion of these programmes. 
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 The Deputy Minister for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs acknowledged in a speech 
delivered on 20 August 2009 that local government “just ain’t working” and that the government had 
overestimated the political depth, governance experience and technical capacity available at municipal level 

















13.2 Government’s Response  
 
13.2.1 Preliminary Work: An Assessment of Local Government  
 
Government’s response in 2009 took the form of a national “Local Government 
Turnaround Strategy” which was to be based on the findings of individual assessments of 
the state of governance and service delivery of all municipalities. The assessments were 
conducted by provincial task teams, which were instructed to “engage with all the key 
stakeholders at municipal level, e.g. caucus/councils, senior management, Traditional 
Leaders, opposition parties and Communities if possible.”
305
 The objective was to 
“investigate the underlying causes of the challenges and weaknesses of governance and 
service delivery, in terms of the institutional capacity and capability, financial challenges 
and the political environment” and “develop a support plan that identifies immediate 
medium and long-term actions, and the required support measures from national and 




13.2.2 “Reasons for Distress” 
 
The assessment reports formed the basis for an Overview Report on the state of local 
government in South Africa.
307
  The Report concluded that the underlying “reasons for 
distress in municipal governance” were due to a number of factors. Tensions between the 
political and administrative interface were identified as being one such factor. Another 
was the poor ability of many councillors to deal with the demands of local government. 
Furthermore, it was maintained that there was insufficient separation of powers between 
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 This instruction was conveyed from national to provincial governments in a letter from the Minister for 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs to Provincial Members of the Executive Committee 
responsible for local government, dated 7 July 2009. 
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 As contained in the abovementioned letter. 
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 “State of Local Government in South Africa - Overview Report on the National State of Local 
















political parties and municipal councils.
308
 The lack of clear separation between the 
legislative and the executive functions was identified as a further cause.
309
 Yet another 
cause was inadequate accountability measures and support systems and resources for 
local democracy. Finally, poor compliance with the legislative and regulatory 





The report suggested that party political factionalism and polarisation of interests and the 
creation of political alliances and elites had contributed to the progressive deterioration of 
municipal functionality, and that factionalism has emerged on a scale that in some areas, 
“is akin to a battle over access to state resources rather than any ideological or policy 
differences,” and the situation has arisen where “there is now a lack of citizen trust and 
confidence in the system”(Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional 
Affairs 2009(a):10-11). 
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 It is not clear whether this statement was intended to suggest that political parties had, in an 
unconstitutional fashion, usurped the powers of municipal councils. 
 
309
 No indication is, however, given as to how such “lack of separation” leads to municipal distress. 
 
310
 It is curious that “poor compliance with the legislative and regulatory frameworks for municipalities” is 
stated as one of the “causal reasons for distress in municipalities.” The Local Government Turnaround 
Strategy which emerged from the assessments by contrast suggests that compliance requirements are in fact 
a cause of municipal dysfunctionality: “…municipalities have been overregulated or inappropriately 
regulated ...Due to the onerous compliance regime…many municipalities have tended to focus much of 
their energies on fulfilling compliance requirements rather than focusing on the critical issues of service 

















13.3 An Examination of the Turnaround Strategy 
 
13.3.1 “Root Cause of Failure” 
 
The “Local Government Turnaround Strategy” (or “LGTAS,” as it is commonly referred 





According to the LGTAS, the “root cause of much of municipal failure” was due to 
inappropriate national and provincial government policies, practices and “onerous 
requirements;”
312
 socio-economic conditions prevailing in many municipalities that had 
not been adequately addressed; political parties undermining the integrity and functioning 
of municipal councils through intra- and inter-party conflicts and inappropriate 
interference in councils and administration; a  breakdown of values at a societal level that 
breeds unethical behaviour, corruption, a culture of non-payment and lack of 
accountability; communities engaging in destructive forms of protest including 
withholding of payment for local taxes and services; municipalities not being geared for 
delivering basic services and are not responsive and accountable enough to residents; and 
finally, an absence of communications resources and no accountability for how and when 
municipalities communicate to communities (Department of Cooperative Governance 




13.3.2 Strategic Objectives and Interventions 
 
Having identified what it considered to be the root causes of municipal failure, the 
turnaround strategy then identifies “five strategic objectives …that will guide the LGTAS 
interventions and support framework…These are aimed at restoring the confidence of the 
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The strategy is contained in a document entitled “Local Government Turnaround Strategy,” published by 
the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs in November 2009. 
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majority of our people in our municipalities, as the primary expression of the 
developmental state at local level. These are: 
 
1) ensure that municipalities meet the basic service needs of communities 
2) build clean, effective, efficient, responsive and accountable local government 
3) improve performance and professionalism in municipalities 
4) improve national and provincial policy, oversight and support 
5) strengthen partnerships between local government, communities and civil society” 
(Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2009(b):19). 
 
These objectives are described in the turnaround strategy as being the “key drivers in 
order to rebuild and improve the basic requirements for a functional, responsive, effective, 
efficient, and accountable developmental local government.” (Department of Cooperative 




The LGTAS provided for a prioritisation of activities. These are divided between 
“immediate pre-2011” priorities and “post 2011” priorities.  Pre-2011 Priorities include 
addressing immediate financial and administrative problems in municipalities; 
introducing regulations to stem indiscriminate hiring and firing; implementing a 
transparent municipal supply chain system; strengthening ward committee capacity and 
implementing a  new ward committee governance model; and implementing “the revenue 
enhancement - Public Mobilisation” campaign. Post-2011 priorities include a single 
election for national, provincial and local government; all citizens having access to 
affordable basic services; the eradication of all informal settlements; the significant 
reduction of infrastructure backlogs; each municipality having the necessary ICT 
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 The LGTAS identifies 13 “pre-2011” priorities and an equal number of “post-2011” priorities. Only a 
















13.3.4 Key Intervention Areas 
 
Complicating matters somewhat, yet another layer of priorities is provided in the LGTAS, 
this in the form of a list of “specific priorities required to ensure implementation of the 
LGTAS. This identifies seven “focus areas,” namely: (i)service delivery, (ii)governance, 
(iii)“establish a single window of coordination for local government”, (iv) “deepen 
people-centred government through a refined model of ward committees,” (v)local 
economic development, (vi) labour relations, and (vii) the intergovernmental fiscal 
system. Various “interventions” are prescribed under the focus areas; such interventions 
include “better planning and oversight over local delivery”; “address constitutional and 
legislative weaknesses in municipal governance and “professionalism and administrative 




13.3.5 A Critique of the Turnaround Strategy 
 
The Overview Report and LGTAS are remarkable in that they are frank about the fact 
that local government faces a crisis; for that reason, they are to be commended.  
 
That said, the Overview Report and the LGTAS suffer from many critical weaknesses. 
The LGTAS is reminiscent of the White Paper on Local Government, in that it fails to 
identify and state accurately the challenges that face local government. Despite its stated 
intention to investigate the “underlying causes” of the weaknesses of governance and 
service delivery, there is very little evidence in either the Overview Report or the LGTAS 
to support their conclusions. Although the LGTAS identifies the purported “core areas of 
concern” and “the root cause of much municipal failure,” little evidence is presented to 
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 Responsibilities of national government under this focus area  include ensuring ( presumably by means 
of legislation or regulation) that senior managers belong to professional organisation and  that senior 
managers are not suspended without the concurrence of the MEC for local government in the province 
concerned as well as of the national minister; strengthening the internal capacity of municipalities to reduce 
















show how these were identified, or to indicate the extent of the problems. In addition, 
little attempt is made in the strategy to establish a causal link between the stated causes 
and the actual failure of municipalities - for example, one of the root causes is stated as 
being “inappropriate national and provincial government policies, practices and onerous 
requirements,” but at no point is any hint given as to what the offending polices, practices 
and onerous requirements are, let alone how they contribute to municipal failure. 
 
Similarly, there is an almost complete disconnect between the alleged root causes of 
failure, the strategic objectives, the proposed interventions, the pre-and post 2011 
priorities, and the so-called specific priorities. The impression is created that these 
various components of LGTAS were conceived and elaborated independently of each 
other and then stitched together with no regard for their respective contents. It is also a 
matter of concern that a number of assertions and assumptions are stated as matters of 
fact with little or no evidence to support them (or at least, no evidence which is contained 
in LGTAS). In addition, the selection of priorities seems to be arbitrary. Furthermore, the 
LGTAS is vague in the extreme as to how these priorities and other interventions are to 
be implemented, providing little clue as to what in practice will be done to implement 
them.  The result is that the LGTAS appears to consist largely of a series of unconnected 
“wish lists” with little indication as to how those wishes are to be achieved. Paradoxically, 
it contains very little that would pass for strategy. 
 
This is perhaps due in part to the approach employed in the initial assessment process. 
Task teams were given a period of a little more than six weeks in which to conduct 
assessments and submit reports. It is questionable whether a reasoned, rigorous and 
properly analytical assessment covering every municipality in the country could have 
been performed in that time. The terms of reference also provided little guidance as to the 
scope of the assessments, the method of conducting them, and the analysis of information 
gathered in the course of those assessments. 
 
One of the most curious features of LGTAS is the fact that it relies to a large extent on 















tailor-made individual strategies were to follow guidelines provided by central 
government, it was largely left to the municipalities themselves to develop them. Whilst 
the notion of allowing municipalities to develop their own strategies might seem to be in 
keeping with a decentralised approach, it appears to overlook the fact that many of the 
municipalities simply lack the capacity to develop meaningful turnaround strategies of 
their own. The LGTAS itself provides very little guidance as to how individual 
municipalities are to develop their own strategies. 
 
It seems that government’s hopes for the success of the LGTAS are based on the fact that, 
according to the Deputy Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, it is 
“different” in that “it’s society’s strategy.... the prospects of this strategy are better 
because it is based on a unique, comprehensive report on the state of local government in 
the country,”
315
 because “there is going to be a phased, temperate approach to 
implementing it” and “because of the serious attention national government is giving 
local government.”
316
  It is premature to judge the success (or lack thereof) of the LGTAS; 
at this point, however, little has emerged to suggest that its objectives are being achieved.  
 
 13.4 The Role of Decentralisation and a Differentiated Approach 
 
Despite the shortcomings of the LGTAS (and of the process leading up to it), it does 
appear to recognise the existence of at least some realities which prevail in the South 
African local government environment. For example, the LGTAS recognises the problem 
of non-compliance with the statutory framework, a theme which frequently emerges in 
the present study. It also recognises the grave challenges posed by the lack of institutional 
capacity, an issue which also emerges from the present study; in addition, as does the 
present study, the LGTAS recognises the dangers attaching to the ineffective application 
of public participation mechanisms. 
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 The report referred to is of course the overview report discussed earlier in this Chapter. 
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 Speech given by the Deputy Minister for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, on 4 

















Nonetheless, there is an apparent lack of appreciation in the LGTAS for the notion of 
decentralisation, and this, it is submitted, is a source of great weakness in the LGTAS. It 
appears not to have acknowledged in any way the decentralised basis of the South 
African model of local governance. It is submitted that a strategy aimed at turning around 
local government should have as its starting point a full analysis of the governance model 
on which it is based. Nowhere in the LGTAS is there any indication at all that there is any 
appreciation for the basic tenets or demands of that model, and nowhere is any attempt 
made to link those tenets and demands with the state of local government in the country.  
 
It follows that an appropriate course of action for government to undertake is to re-
evaluate the purpose and application of the principles of decentralisation in South African 
local government, and, based on that re-evaluation, to determine whether or not the 
decentralised model of local governance is the appropriate one for South Africa.  
 
The Overview Report and the LGTAS refer disapprovingly to the “one size fits all” 
framework which purportedly applies to the South African local governance model. 
According to the LGTAS, “due to the assumption that municipalities are the same, 
government introduced uniform requirements, norms and standards, financial regime (sic) 
and service delivery targets. The reality however shows that some of these have placed 
onerous burden (sic) on low capacity municipalities” (Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs 2009(b):26). It is said that this framework “is not 
based on differing municipal realities. The unintended consequences for municipalities 
have in some instances led to what may be defined as levels of municipal non-viability, 
both financially and in respect to functional performance, socio-economic vulnerability 
and ability to manage infrastructure development and investment” (Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2009(a):29). 
 
The notion of “one size does not fit all” has consequently become something of a new 
mantra in the context of the LGTAS, which calls for a “differentiated approach” to local 















understanding of what is encompassed in this differentiated approach, or as to its 
intentions in regard to the application of this approach, save for the rather ominous 
statement that “the state may have to play a more central directive role in the 
administration of some municipalities in future” (Department of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs 2009(b):26). Cryptic though this statement may be, it does 
provide some hint that government may be willing to consider dispensing at least 
partially with the decentralised model, so as to enable more direct control of certain 
municipalities. If this is the case, then it does contradict one of the “key assumptions” 
which purportedly underlies the LGTAS, namely that “the structure of (the) local 
government system remains. Notwithstanding certain changes that may have to be 
effected, the overall architecture of local government is still sound.” (Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2009(b):5). Given that decentralisation 
underpins the current structure of local government, it is difficult to imagine how the state 
can play a “more central directive role” whilst the structure of local government remains 
essentially unchanged. This might suggest a contradictory or at least ambivalent approach 
on the part of national government: on the one had, there are signs that national 
government has recentralising designs; on the other, it apparently intends to retain the 
existing structure of local government.  
 
Despite the fact that the notion of the “one-size-does-not-fit-all” approach is lacking in 
detail, it must be given serious attention on account of the potential consequences which 
it holds for the decentralised local governance model which prevails at present. The 
application of a differentiated approach must inevitably place constraints on 
decentralisation. The LGTAS is at least correct in concluding that an undifferentiated, 
“one-size-fits-all” approach demands a measure of uniformity for requirements, norms 
and standards for municipalities. Provided that those requirements properly balance the 
demands of efficient administration and a decentralised system, they are a natural and 
desirable consequence of having a comprehensively decentralised system, and the 
framework thereby constituted is an essential component of such a system. It is this 
framework which gives substance to the dimensions of decentralisation which have been 
















The supplanting of the current model by a differentiated “one-size-does-not-fit-all” 
approach which permits a “more central directive” involvement in some municipalities 
raises a host of issues, both theoretical and practical. Presumably, provision would have 
to be made in a differentiated system for a means of classifying municipalities according 
to their ability to govern and to perform their powers and functions, so as to enable the 
identification of those which would be subject to “more central directive” control. It 
would also be necessary to determine how the various types of decentralisation as applied 
in various municipalities would be affected. The effect of a differentiated approach on the 
decentralised status of municipalities might in some cases be quite limited; for example, 
it might affect only certain aspects a municipality’s administrative autonomy, with the 
responsibility for the performing of only certain services being transferred to another 
sphere of government, whilst the municipality retains all other aspects of its autonomy. In 
other cases, the fiscally decentralised character of municipalities may be affected. For 
example, where the sustainability of local financial resources is questionable, reliance 
might be placed entirely on central government for funding, but the municipality would 
retain the right to exercise its powers and functions (and hence spend that funding) and 
would retain notional political autonomy (of course, one might question whether it is 
possible to retain political autonomy in such circumstances). Or, in a more extreme 
arrangement, an agency model of the kind discussed by Dollery and Johnson (2005) and 
Dollery and Crase (2006) might be applied. In such an arrangement, a municipality might 
simply retain its politically decentralised character, that is to say, it would have political 
autonomy as an elected body with jurisdiction over a given geographical area of 
jurisdiction, but would surrender operational control of its services to central or 
provincial government agencies which use central or provincial government funds. In 
effect, under such an arrangement, elected councils would serve as advisory bodies to the 
state agencies. Another (and the most extreme) possibility is that particular municipalities 
might be completely recentralised, with political, fiscal and administrative 
decentralisation being completely abandoned in favour of central control, with or without 
















The scenarios described above are purely speculative, as the present intention of 
government regarding differentiation and its “central directive role” is by no means clear 
and little indication has been given of what precisely those concepts might entail. There 
can, however, be little doubt that the implementation of a differentiated approach will be 
a complex process and one which is fraught with difficulties; it could well be disruptive 
and would almost certainly be costly. It would probably also be viewed with some 
disenchantment by local political elites, given that it will almost certainly always result in 
a diminution of local influence. Not least, there are constitutional considerations which 
need to be taken into account, as measures aimed at transferring or reducing local 
government prerogatives will have constitutional repercussions.  
 
13.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The full significance of the LGTAS for local government and for the notion of 
decentralisation is as yet unclear. A reading of the LGTAS alone gives an incomplete  
indication of government’s intentions regarding the process and practicalities for turning 
local government around. The LGTAS was greeted with much fanfare at the time of its 
unveiling, and it appears that it generated enormous expectations. It is, however, difficult 
to assess, on available information, the levels of success which it has to date achieved or 
even to ascertain whether it has achieved any of its objectives; it is even more difficult to 
assess its prospects for future success. Similarly, it is difficult to speculate as to what 
consequences the LGTAS holds for the concept of decentralisation, and in particular, 
whether it foretells a process of at least partial recentralisation or whether the status quo 
will essentially remain, albeit with some modifications. The LGTAS is simply too 
ambivalent to allow for any confident predictions to be made in this regard. 
 
Let it be assumed for the meantime, however, that “the structure of (the) local 
government system remains,” as indicated in the LGTAS, and that decentralisation, albeit 
perhaps in a modified form, will remain a key feature of the local governance model. Any 
turnaround strategy which is predicated on this model must, it is submitted, recognise the 















and must promote them. This in itself does not guarantee that the problems which at 
present beset local government in South Africa will be overcome; it is, however, an 


















Chapter 14  
Conclusion 
 
14.1  A Recapitulation  
 
An idealised interpretation of the system of local government which prevails in South 
Africa is that the country has developed a framework for decentralised governance which 
aims to transfer key functions and a significant measure of autonomy to local authorities.  
In this interpretation, South Africa has applied best practices which have been advocated 
by international agencies and donor governments in the West (Tapscott 2008), and has 
followed the example of many countries which have in recent decades implemented 
reforms designed to transfer greater power to sub-national levels of government and 
provide a more substantial policymaking and oversight role to citizens at the local level.  
 
There are several presumed benefits of such decentralisation policies, the most commonly 
cited being the promotion of democracy (including participatory democracy through 
public participation mechanisms) and improved service delivery. It is argued that the 
more responsive system of governance which results from decentralisation prevents 
disillusionment with the democratic process and enhances legitimacy. This implies that 
local institutions, if they play a meaningful role in the lives of citizens, can positively 
influence attitudes towards the wider political establishment. 
 
 It must, however, be acknowledged that the decentralisation process can be a double-
edged sword. If the goals of citizen involvement and greater accountability are not met, 
the result may be to undermine citizen support for the system (Hiskey and Seligson 2003). 
Similarly, the absence of the basic conditions required for decentralised systems, such as 
adequate institutional capacity, could lead to institutional failure and possibly to attempts 















Notwithstanding these reservations, an optimistic view of decentralisation enjoys 
widespread currency and it may be said that decentralisation is generally seen as a 
process which is beneficial and which promotes good governance. 
 
Despite the apparent virtues of decentralisation, and despite South Africa having adopted  
a sophisticated constitutional, policy and statutory framework which was on the face of it 
intended to give effect to a decentralised system, the South African sphere of local 
government is faced with a crisis of credibility and in many respects it has proved to be 
incapable of fulfilling its constitutional mandate.  
 
As was noted in Chapter 1, this study seeks to describe the extent to which the precepts of 
decentralisation have been incorporated in the South African local government 
framework and the extent to which they are applied in practice within that framework, the 
ultimate object being to contribute towards an understanding of the difficulties which 
confront South African local government. This study therefore set out to address two 
questions, namely: 
 
 To what extent are the principles of decentralisation incorporated and supported in 
the regulatory framework of Local Government in South Africa? and 
 To what extent are the principles of decentralisation applied in practice within this 
framework? 
These questions are considered in the next two sections. 
 
14.2 A Decentralised Local Governance Framework in South Africa? 
 
The Constitution affirms that a municipality has the right to govern on its own initiative 
the local government affairs of its community and that national and provincial 
governments may not compromise or impede a municipality’s right to exercise its powers 
or perform its functions. As we have seen in Chapters 7 to 12, the various “dimensions of 















to a greater or lesser extent, in the local governance framework which applies in South 
Africa. Thus, in addition to constitutional security for local government being entrenched 
(dimension (i)), constitutional provision and statutory provision is made in the framework 
for size of decentralised units (dimension (ii)), the democratic process (dimension (iii)) 
and intergovernmental relations (dimension (iv)). Provision is made for a local 
government executive structure (dimension (v)), as it is for local government 
administrative authority (dimension (vi)). The enhancing of institutional capacity 
(dimension (vii)), as well as for a public participation process (dimension (viii)) are also 
clearly provided for. The powers and functions of municipalities, reflected in the 
dimension of jurisdictional scope (dimension (ix)) are constitutionally guaranteed; and 
similarly, legislative authority of local government (dimension (x)) is provided for in the 
constitution.  Revenue raising authority (dimension (xi)) and revenue sharing (dimension 
(xii)) are also provided for in the Constitution and subsequent legislation. 
 
Whilst these dimensions of decentralisation are largely reflected in the South African 
local government framework, two cautionary notes must be sounded. The first is that 
there are serious challenges relating to the implementation by all spheres of government 
of many of the dimensions of decentralisation. The second is that signs are emerging that 
national government is attempting to assert its control in relation to certain powers that 
would have been expected, in a decentralised system, to belong in the domain of sub-
national governments. The potential for national government to do so has in fact to some 
extent long been embedded in legislation; it will be recalled from Chapter 8 that the 
Systems Act provides for wide powers of ministerial regulation-making which, if 
exercised, could have the effect of “recentralising” power. Whilst the regulation-making 
powers under the Systems Act have hitherto been far from exercised to their fullest extent, 
national government has in other ways signalled its willingness to make inroads into the 
autonomy of local government - for example, in the form of the proposed Seventeenth 
Amendment to the Constitution;
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 and the proposed amendment to the Systems Act 
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regarding the appointment of senior staff.
318
 In addition, as was also seen in Chapter 8, 
the MFMA reflects strong tendencies towards centralisation. The frequently raised 
possibility of  establishing a single civil service which includes municipal staff is another 
example; furthermore,  as we have seen in the previous chapter, the LGTAS also hints at 
the application of greater “central directive control” and of a differentiated approach to 
municipalities which could have the effect of reducing local autonomy.  
 
It is perhaps not surprising that centralising tendencies have emerged. National 
governments tend to be jealous of their powers; they give them up reluctantly, and then 
may go to great lengths in trying to wrest them back (Wunsch 2001; Campos and 
Hellman 2005). As we have seen, although general consensus was ultimately achieved 
during South Africa’s constitutional negotiating process regarding the desirability of a 
decentralised system, it appears that the ANC was during much of the process less than 
enthusiastic about decentralisation. It is not inconceivable that a government which 
reluctantly devolves powers would look for an opportunity to regain them, and when 
breakdowns in local government occur, central government is presented with a 
justification for embarking on a recentralisation process. It has been argued that because 
the preconditions for the effective decentralisation were not in place in South Africa, the 
policy of transferring functions to local authorities would set many of them up for failure 
and that this would create political pressures to recentralise control (Tapscott 2008). 
Whilst the essentially decentralised character of the South African local government 
framework remains intact at present, it is submitted that such pressures are evident. 
 
In summary, in answer to the first question, it is submitted that the local government 
framework is one which largely reflects a system of decentralised local governance, but 
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14.3  The Application of the Principles of Decentralisation in Practice 
 
The second question is concerned with the extent to which the principles of 
decentralisation are applied in practice within the framework of local government. 
As we have seen, there are several dimensions, largely of a fiscal or administrative 
character, in respect of which the regulatory framework imposes specific obligations on 
municipalities or grants to them particular powers.  As has emerged from this study, it is 
clear that many of these institutions are unwilling or unable to comply with those 
obligations, in that they have failed to give effect to the relevant statutory provisions, or 
to exercise those powers. In this regard, the following are the most pressing issues which 
emerged from the present study: 
 
 Failure to implement mechanisms for the effective performance of executive 
authority (this relates to dimension (v)); 
  Failure to implement systems and mechanisms to promote institutional capacity 
(this relates to dimension (vii)); 
  Failure to implement systems and mechanisms to promote public participation 
and provide information (this relates to dimension (viii)); 
 Inability or unwillingness to perform powers and functions, this despite 
municipalities having been given the constitutional mandate to do so (this relates 
to dimension(ix)); 
 Failure to support the performance of powers and functions with the enactment of 
by-laws, as provided by the constitution (this relates to dimension (x)); and 
 Failure to implement mechanisms and systems to give effect to revenue-raising 
authority (this relates to dimension (xi)). 
 
Each of the issues referred to above reflects a failure of a critical dimension of 
decentralisation; and taken together, they indicate that in practice, the improper 
application of the principles of decentralisation is widespread. The significance thereof 
lies in the fact that it is essential, in order for a decentralised system of government to 















established to give effect to the concept of decentralisation. According to the World Bank, 
one of the most important lessons to be learnt from experiences of decentralisation is 
“that a system based on rules produces better results than one that is not. Explicit rules 
setting out the division of functional responsibilities among levels of government reduce 
ambiguity and increase political accountability” (World Bank 2000:124). It might be 
added that explicit rules relating to the implementation of systems and mechanisms 
required to give effect to the local governance framework are also essential. As has been 
suggested before, the mere existence of rules does not guarantee the success of any 
system of governance, but in the absence of such rules, or in the event of failure to apply 
such rules,  there is little prospect of success at all. This is not to suggest, of course, that 
the need for rules should become an excuse for central government to regain previously 
decentralised powers, a danger alluded to in the previous section. What is required is that 
an appropriate balance be struck in which national government puts in place a governance 
framework without undermining the principle of devolution of powers. It also requires 
that the fostering of a culture of compliance at local level with the relevant rules - 
something which the findings of this study suggest is lacking in South Africa. 
 
14.4  The Challenge: Overcoming Inertia 
 
In Chapter 3, a number of potential challenges to decentralisation were noted. These 
include uninterested and overwhelmed governments, elite capture, clientelism, capacity 
constraints, funding constraints and intergovernmental tensions. 
 
In the South African context, a fundamental challenge which needs to be addressed is that 
of the “uninterested, inertia-bound and overwhelmed” government. In order for a 
decentralised system to flourish, the central government must have the political will, 
capacity and commitment to drive the decentralisation process and entrench it. In South 
Africa, the tolerance displayed by national government (as well as provincial 
governments) towards the inability or unwillingness of local governments to comply with 
and implement the local governance framework suggests a lack of just that will, capacity 















provincial governments to ensure the implementation of critical elements of the 
framework. The inevitable lack of institutional incapacity which prevails at local 
government level, is reflected in the inability of local government to implement the 
requirements of the local government framework which applies in South Africa. It should 
come as no surprise, therefore, that local institutions are unable to perform their 
constitutionally mandated powers and functions, to develop and implement systems for 
community participation, or to develop and implement systems for effectively applying 
executive authority, amongst other things. Combined with weaknesses in oversight 
measures and an apparent indifference to the need for accountability, each of these 
failures exacerbates an already fragile state of affairs. 
 
14.5  Concluding Remarks 
 
South Africa’s process of decentralisation has been described as a transition from a non-
democratic type of decentralisation to a democratic type of decentralisation following a 
comprehensive “big-bang, political-cum-economic devolution” (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006:36). There was no discernible sequencing of the various types of 
decentralisation - that is, political, fiscal and administrative - of the kind described by 
Falleti (2005), all three types having been provided for simultaneously in the Constitution.  
 
It may be argued that, given the obvious shortcomings displayed by many municipalities 
in South Africa, this process of rapid decentralisation proved to be too much, too soon, 
for institutions with limited capacity to absorb and cope with, or for a central government 
not fully persuaded of the merits of decentralisation to implement and oversee.
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 On the 
other hand, it is widely recognised in the decentralisation literature
320
 that time and 
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 The LGTAS apparently does not subscribe to the notion that the adoption of the current local 
government system was a rapid process. One of the “key assumptions” on which the LGTAS is premised is 
that “The local government system is still new and is evolving. The new system of local government was 
always intended to be phased in over time and the current problems must be seen as part of an effort to 
learn and correct as we continue with implementation” (Department of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs 2009(b):5).  
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patience are needed in order for decentralisation to work. That is doubtless correct; but 
given that South Africa has had ample opportunity to make decentralisation work, and 
that attempts to revitalise local government - such as are reflected in the LGTAS - are not 
especially encouraging, one may be forgiven for concluding that the prospects for the 
successful implementation of a decentralised system are limited. This is a somewhat 
sobering realisation, given the importance of a favourable outcome for the 
decentralisation process. It has long been recognised that “successful decentralization 
improves the efficiency and responsiveness of the public sector while accommodating 
potentially explosive political forces. Unsuccessful decentralization threatens economic 
and political stability and disrupts the delivery of services” (World Bank 1999:107). 
Decentralisation as a process for promoting good local governance can and does work if 
implemented properly; haphazard implementation, on the other hand, will almost 
inevitably result in disappointment.  
 
That being the case, and given that a crisis of expectations already exists in South Africa 
(Tapscott 2008), a question which must inevitably arise is whether decentralisation is the 
appropriate model to apply in South Africa in order to achieve the constitutionally 
imposed objects of local government.
321
 The answer, regrettably, has to be conditional in 
nature. Decentralisation is a means to an end, but in order for that end to be achieved, the 
process must be appropriately supported and sound practice must be enforced 
bureaucratically and politically. This demands a commitment from all spheres of 
government to the decentralistion process. This in turn implies a respect for, and 
understanding of, the principles which underlie decentralisation as a concept. It also 
demands proper application of the rules, systems and mechanisms which are put in place 
in order to give effect to decentralisation reforms. As much as anything else, it demands 
that government at every level be properly capacitated in order to enable those reforms to 
be implemented.  If these elements can be brought to bear in the South African context, 
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 Namely, to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; to ensure the 
provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; to promote social and economic 
development; to promote a safe and healthy environment; and to encourage the involvement of 

















then decentralisation as a model for local governance can be made to work. In their 
absence, however, the attempt at decentralisation is likely to prove futile and wasteful, 
and result in the continued failure of service delivery and the consequent risk of political 
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Table 1: Classification of Municipalities 
 
This table shows how the various municipalities examined for purposes of this study 
are categorised according to various classification criteria. See Chapter 5 of the text, 
especially pages 83 to 86, for a full description of the various spectrums in which they 
are categorised. 
 









Local or District  
Municipality 
EC 1 High 3 B1 Local  
EC 2 Low 2 B4 Local  
EC 3 Low 1 B3 Local  
FS  1 Medium 3 B3 Local  
FS 2 Low 2 B3 Local  
FS 3 Low 2 B3 Local  
FS 4 Medium 3 B3 Local  
Gng 1 Medium 3 B2 Local  
KZN 1 Low 2 B3 Local  
KZN 2 Low 1 B4 Local  
KZN 3 Low 1 B3 Local  
KZN 4 Low 1 B3 Local  
Lim 1 Medium 3 B3 Local  
Lim 2 Medium 2 B3 Local  
Lim 3 Low 1 B4 Local  
Lim 4 High 3 B1 Local  
Lim 5 Low 3 B3 Local  
Lim 6 High 2 B4 Local  
Mpum 1 Low 2 B4 Local  

















Table 1 (ctd) 
 










Local or District  
Municipality 
Mpum 3 High 3 B3 Local  
Mpum 4 Medium 2 B4 Local  
NC 1 Medium 4 B3 Local  
NC 2 High 4 B1 Local  
NC 3 Medium 3 B3 Local  
NC 4 Low 2 B3 Local  
NW 1 Low 3 B3 Local  
NW 2 Low  2 B2 Local  
NW 3 Low 2 B4 Local  
NW 4 Low 2 B3 Local  
WC 1 Medium 4 B3 Local  
WC 2 Medium 4 B2 Local  
WC 3 Low 4 B3 Local  
WC 4 Low 4 B3 Local  
WC 5 Medium n/a C1 District 
WC 6 Medium n/a C1 District 




























Table 2 (part 1): Compliance with Systems Requirements: Columns i to vi 
 
This table shows the extent to which the municipalities in the sample used for this study 
comply with certain legislative systems requirements. The various columns of part 1 deal 
with issues referred to in the text of the study as follows: Column (i):  Chapter 8, page 
125; Column(ii): Chapter 9, page 136; Column (iii): Chapter 9,  page137; Column (iv): 
Chapter9, page 137; Column (v) Chapter 9, page 137; Column (vi): Chapter 9,  page 137 
 


























EC 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EC 2 No No Yes No Yes No 
EC 3 No No Yes No Yes No 
FS  1 Unknown No Yes Yes Yes No 
FS 2 No No Yes No Yes No 
FS 3 No No Yes No Yes No 
FS 4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Gng 1 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
KZN 1 No No Yes No Yes No 
KZN 2 No No Yes Yes Yes No 
KZN 3 No No Yes No Yes No 
KZN 4 No No Yes No Yes No 
Lim 1 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Lim 2 No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Lim 3 Unknown No Yes No Yes No 
Lim 4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 

















Table 2 ( part 1) (ctd). 
 


























Lim 6 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Mpum 1 No No Yes No Yes No 
Mpum 2 No No Yes No Yes No 
Mpum 3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Mpum 4 No No Yes No Yes No 
NC 1 No No Yes No Yes No 
NC 2 In Process No Yes Yes Yes No 
NC 3 No No Yes No Yes No 
NC 4 Unknown No Yes Yes Yes No 
NW 1 No No Yes No Yes No 
NW 2 No No Yes No Yes No 
NW 3 No No Yes No Yes No 
NW 4 No No Yes No Yes No 
WC 1 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
WC 2 No No Yes No Yes No 
WC 3 No No Yes Yes Yes No 
WC 4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
WC 5 No No Yes No Yes No 
WC 6 No No Yes Yes Yes No 





















Appendix B (ctd) 
 
Table 2 (part 2): Compliance with Systems Requirements: Columns vii to xii 
 
The various columns of part 2 of Table 2 deal with issues referred to in the text of the 
study as follows: Column (vii):  Chapter 9, page 138; Column (viii): Chapter 9, page 138; 
Column (ix): Chapter 9, page 141; Column (x): Chapter 9, page 141; Column (xi): 
Chapter 9, page 141; Column (xii): Chapter 9, page 141 
 






























EC 1 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EC 2 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
EC 3 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
FS  1 No No Yes No Yes No 
FS 2 Yes Yes No No No No 
FS 3 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
FS 4 No No Yes No Yes No 
Gng 1 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
KZN 1 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
KZN 2 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
KZN 3 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
KZN 4 Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Lim 1 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Lim 2 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Lim 3 Yes No No No Yes No 
Lim 4 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Lim 5 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
















Table 2 (part 2) (ctd). 
 
 






























Mpum 1 Yes No Yes No No No 
Mpum 2 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Mpum 3 No No Yes No Yes No 
Mpum 4 Yes No No No Yes No 
NC 1 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
NC 2 No No Yes No Yes No 
NC 3 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
NC 4 Yes No No No Yes No 
NW 1 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
NW 2 No No No No No No 
NW 3 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
NW 4 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
WC 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
WC 2 No No Yes No Yes No 
WC 3 No No Yes No Yes No 
WC 4 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
WC 5 No No Yes No Yes No 
WC 6 No No Yes No Yes No 























Table 2 (part 3): Compliance with Systems Requirements (ctd): Columns xiii to xviii 
 
The various columns of part 3 of Table 2 deal with issues referred to in the text of the 
study as follows: Column (xiii):  Chapter 9, page 142; Column (xiv): Chapter 9, page 142; 
Column (xv): Chapter 9, page 142; Column (xvi): Chapter 9, page 142; Column (xvii): 
Chapter 9, page 142; Column (xviii): Chapter 9, page 149 
 






















EC 1 No Yes Yes No No Yes 
EC 2 No Yes Yes No No No 
EC 3 No Yes Yes No No No 
FS  1 No Yes Yes No No No 
FS 2 No Yes Yes No No No 
FS 3 No Yes Yes No No No 
FS 4 No Yes Yes No No No 
Gng 1 No Yes Yes No No No 
KZN 1 No Yes Yes No No No 
KZN 2 No Yes Yes No No No 
KZN 3 No Yes Yes No No No 
KZN 4 No Yes Yes No No No 
Lim 1 No Yes Yes No No No 
Lim 2 No Yes Yes No No No 
Lim 3 No Yes Yes No No No 
Lim 4 No Yes Yes No No Yes 


















Table 2 (part 3) (ctd). 
 






















Lim 6 No Yes Yes No No No 
Mpum 1 No Yes Yes No No No 
Mpum 2 No Yes Yes No No No 
Mpum 3 No Yes Yes No No No 
Mpum 4 No Yes Yes No No No 
NC 1 No Yes Yes No No No 
NC 2 No Yes Yes No No No 
NC 3 No Yes Yes No No No 
NC 4 No Yes Yes No No No 
NW 1 No Yes Yes No No No 
NW 2 No Yes Yes No No No 
NW 3 No Yes Yes No No No 
NW 4 No Yes Yes No No No 
WC 1 No Yes Yes No Yes No 
WC 2 No Yes Yes No No No 
WC 3 Yes Yes Yes No No No 
WC 4 No Yes Yes No No No 
WC 5 No Yes Yes No No No 
WC 6 Yes Yes Yes No No No 


























Table 2 (part 4): Compliance with Systems Requirements (ctd): Columns xix to xxiii  
 
The various columns of part 4 of Table 2 deal with issues referred to in the text of the 
study as follows: Column (xix):  Chapter 10, page 150; Column (xx): Chapter 10, page 
155; Column (xxi): Chapter 10, page 157; Column (xxii): Chapter 10, page 158; Column 
(xxiii): Chapter 10, page 142; Column (xviii): Chapter 10, page 158. 
 
 xix xx xxi xxii xxiii 











EC 1 Yes Yes Yes No Info No Info 
EC 2 No No No Yes No 
EC 3 No Yes No Yes No 
FS  1 No No No content Yes Yes 
FS 2 No No No No Info No Info 
FS 3 No No Dysfunctional Yes No 
FS 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gng 1 No No Dysfunctional Yes No 
KZN 1 No No Outdated Yes  
KZN 2 No No No Yes No 
KZN 3 No No No Yes No 
KZN 4 No Yes No Yes No 
Lim 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lim 2 No No Dysfunctional No Info No Info 
Lim 3 No No Outdated No Info No Info 
Lim 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lim 5 Yes Yes Outdated Yes Yes 


















Table 2 (part 4) (ctd). 
 
 xix xx xxi xxii xxiii 











Mpum 1 No No Outdated Yes Yes 
Mpum 2 No No Outdated Yes No 
Mpum 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mpum 4 No No Outdated No Info No Info  
NC 1 No No No No Info No Info 
NC 2 Yes Yes Outdated Yes Yes 
NC 3 Yes No Outdated No Info No Info 
NC 4 No No Outdated Yes No 
NW 1 No No Dysfunctional Yes No 
NW 2 No No Dysfunctional No Info No Info 
NW 3 No No Outdated No Info No Info 
NW 4 No No No Yes Yes 
WC 1 No Yes Outdated Yes Yes 
WC 2 No No Outdated Yes Yes 
WC 3 No Yes Dysfunctional Yes Yes 
WC 4 Yes No Outdated No Info No Info 
WC 5 No No Dysfunctional N/a N/a 
WC 6 Yes No Outdated N/a N/a 





















































EC 1 EC 2 EC 3 FS 1 FS 2 FS 3 FS 4 Gng 1 KZN 1 KZN 2 KZN 3 KZN 4 Lim 1
Lim 2 Lim 3 Lim 4 Lim 5 Lim 6 Mpum 1 Mpum 2 Mpum 3 Mpum 4 NC 1 NC 2 NC 3 NC 4
NW 1 NW 2 NW 3 NW 4 WC 1 WC 2 WC 3 WC 4 WC 5 WC 6 WC 7
 
 
Note: No data available for WC 1 
 
This graph shows the extent to which positions in the staff establishment of each 



































      























EC 1 EC 2 EC 3 FS 1 FS 2 FS 3 FS 4 Gng 1 KZN 1 KZN 2 KZN 3 KZN 4
Lim 1 Lim 2 Lim 3 Lim 4 Lim 5 Lim 6 Mpum 1 Mpum 2 Mpum 3 Mpum 4 NC 1 NC 2




This graph shows the number of powers and functions performed by each 
municipality in the sample. A total of 38 such powers and functions is provided for in 
Part 2 of Schedule 4 and Part 2 of Schedule 5 to the Constitution. See section 11.2.3 
































Table 3: Compliance with Requirements Relating to By-laws 
 
Table 3 shows the extent to which municipalities in the sample comply with specific 
requirements regarding the adoption of by-laws. The various columns deal with issues 
referred to in the text of the study as follows: Column (i):  Chapter 11, page 178; Column 
(ii): Chapter 11, page 178; Column (iii): Chapter 11, page 178; Columns (iii)-(iv): 
Chapter 11, page 180.  
 
 















EC 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EC 2 No No No No No No 
EC 3 No No No No Yes No 
FS  1 No No No No No No 
FS 2 No No No No No No 
FS 3 No No Yes No No No 
FS 4 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Gng 1 No No Yes No No No 
KZN 1 No No No No No No 
KZN 2 No No No No No No 
KZN 3 No No No No No No 
KZN 4 No No No No No No 
Lim 1 No Yes No No No No 
Lim 2 No No No Yes Yes No 
Lim 3 No No No No No No 
Lim 4 No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Lim 5 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 


















Table 3 (ctd). 
 
 















Mpum 1 No No No No No No 
Mpum 2 No No No No No No 
Mpum 3 No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Mpum 4 No No No No No No 
NC 1 No No No No No No 
NC 2 No Yes Yes No Yes No 
NC 3 No No No No No No 
NC 4 Yes No No No Yes No 
NW 1 No No No No No No 
NW 2 No No No No No No 
NW 3 No No No No No No 
NW 4 No No No No No No 
WC 1 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WC 2 No No No No Yes No 
WC 3 No No No No Yes No 
WC 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WC 5 N/a No Yes No No No 
WC 6 N/a No No No No No 


























Table 4: Compliance with Requirements Relating to Fiscal Policies and By-laws  
 
Table 4 shows the extent to which municipalities in the sample comply with specific 
requirements regarding the adoption of by-laws. The various columns deal with issues 
referred to in the text of the study as follows: Column (i): Chapter 12, page 188; Column 
(ii): Chapter 12, page 189; Column (iii): Chapter 12, page 189. The data contained in 
Columns (iii)-(iv) Table 4 are the same as contained in Columns (iii)-(iv) of Table 3, but 
are repeated in Table 4 for ease of reference and for the sake of comparison. 
 
 
 i ii iii iv v vi 
Municipality Tariff Policy Credit 
Control 
Policy 







EC 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EC 2 Yes Yes No No No No 
EC 3 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
FS  1 Unknown Unknown Unknown No No No 
FS 2 Unknown Unknown Unknown No No No 
FS 3 Yes Yes No No No No 
FS 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gng 1 Yes Yes Yes No No No 
KZN 1 Yes Yes Yes No No No 
KZN 2 Yes Yes Unknown No No No 
KZN 3 No Yes No No No No 
KZN 4 Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Lim 1 Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Lim 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Lim 3 Unknown Unknown Unknown No No No 
Lim 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lim 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





















 i ii iii iv v vi 
Municipality Tariff Policy Credit 
Control 
Policy 







Mpum 1 Unknown Unknown Unknown No No No 
Mpum 2 No Yes No No No No 
Mpum 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mpum 4 Unknown Unknown Unknown No No No 
NC 1 Unknown Unknown Yes No No No 
NC 2 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
NC 3 Yes Yes Yes No No No 
NC 4 No No No No Yes No 
NW 1 Unknown Unknown Yes No No No 
NW 2 No No No No No No 
NW 3 Unknown Unknown Unknown No No No 
NW 4 Unknown Unknown Yes No No No 
WC 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WC 2 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
WC 3 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
WC 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WC 5 Yes Yes Unknown No No No 
WC 6 Yes Yes Unknown No No No 











































EC 1 EC 2 EC 3 FS 1 FS 2 FS 3 FS 4 Gng 1 KZN 1 KZN 2 KZN 3 KZN 4 Lim 1
Lim 2 Lim 3 Lim 4 Lim 5 Lim 6 Mpum 1 Mpum 2 Mpum 3 Mpum 4 NC 1 NC 2 NC 3 NC 4





This graph shows the percentage which the projected revenues for each of the 
municipalities in the sample are made up by grants transferred from national 
government for the 2009/10 financial year. See section 12.4.3 of Chapter 12, 











































EC 1 EC 2 EC 3 FS 1 FS 2 FS 3 FS 4 Gng 1 KZN 1 KZN 2 KZN 3 KZN 4 Lim 1
Lim 2 Lim 3 Lim 4 Lim 5 Lim 6 Mpum 1 Mpum 2 Mpum 3 Mpum 4 NC 1 NC 2 NC 3 NC 4





This graph shows the percentage which the projected revenues for each of the 
municipalities in the sample are made up by grants transferred from national 
government for the 20010/11 financial year. See section 12.4.3 of Chapter 12, 















































EC 1 EC 2 EC 3 FS 1 FS 2 FS 3 FS 4 Gng 1 KZN 1 KZN 2 KZN 3 KZN 4 Lim 1
Lim 2 Lim 3 Lim 4 Lim 5 Lim 6 Mpum 1 Mpum 2 Mpum 3 Mpum 4 NC 1 NC 2 NC 3 NC 4





This graph shows the percentage which the projected revenues for each of the 
municipalities in the sample are made up by grants transferred from national 
government for the 2011/12 financial year. See section 12.4.3 of Chapter 12, 































Table 5: Audit Outcomes: 2006/7 and 2007/8 Financial Years 
 
This table shows the audit opinions expressed by the Auditor-General for each of the 
municipalities in the sample for the 2006/7 ad 2007/8 financial years. See page 202, 
footnotes 291, 292, 293 ad 294 for explanations of the terms “disclaimer of opinion”, 
“adverse opinion”, “qualified opinion” and “emphasis of matter” respectively. See 
section 12.5 of Chapter 12 for discussion. 
 
Municipality 06/07 07/08 
EC 1 Qualified Qualified 
EC 2 Disclaimer Audit Outstanding 
EC 3 Disclaimer Adverse 
FS  1 Qualified Disclaimer 
FS 2 Audit Outstanding Audit Outstanding 
FS 3 Audit Outstanding Audit Outstanding 
FS 4 Qualified Qualified 
Gng 1 Disclaimer Audit Outstanding 
KZN 1 Disclaimer Disclaimer 
KZN 2 Qualified Qualified 
KZN 3 Qualified Qualified 
KZN 4 Disclaimer Qualified 
Lim 1 Adverse Audit Outstanding 
Lim 2 Adverse Disclaimer 
Lim 3 Disclaimer Disclaimer 
Lim 4 Disclaimer Audit Outstanding 
Lim 5 Disclaimer Disclaimer 
Lim 6 Disclaimer Qualified 
Mpum 1 Disclaimer Qualified 
Mpum 2 Disclaimer Disclaimer 
Mpum 3 Disclaimer Qualified 



















Municipality 06/07 07/08 
NC 1 Disclaimer Qualified 
NC 2 Disclaimer Disclaimer 
NC 3 Disclaimer Qualified 
NC 4 Disclaimer Disclaimer 
NW 1 Disclaimer Audit Outstanding 
NW 2 Disclaimer Disclaimer 
NW 3 Disclaimer Disclaimer 
NW 4 Disclaimer Disclaimer 
WC 1 Qualified Qualified 
WC 2 Disclaimer Audit outstanding 
WC 3 Qualified Financially unqualified  (with other 
matters) 
WC 4 Qualified Financially unqualified  (with other 
matters) 
WC 5 Financially unqualified  (with 
other matters) 
Financially unqualified  (with other 
matters) 
WC 6 Qualified Financially unqualified  (with other 
matters) 































Table 6: Compliance with Good Management Practices 
 
Table 6 shows the extent of compliance by the municipalities in the sample with “good 
management practices”, as identified by the Auditor-General. See page 204 of the study 
for discussion. “n/av” (not available) indicates that the financial statements were not 
submitted for audit on time and the Auditor-General was unable to comment on 
compliance with management practices. 
 
 
Municipality Clear trail of 
supporting 
documentation 

































EC 1 No No No No No No 
EC 2 No No No No No No 
EC 3 No No No Yes No No 
FS  1 No No Yes Yes No No 
FS 2 n/av n/av n/av n/av n/av n/av 
FS 3 n/av n/av n/av n/av n/av n/av 
FS 4 No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Gng 1 No No No No No No 
KZN 1 No No No No No No 
KZN 2 No No No No No No 
KZN 3 No No No No No Yes 
KZN 4 Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Lim 1 No No No No No No 
Lim 2 No No No No No No 
Lim 3 No No Yes No No No 
Lim 4 No No No No No No 
Lim 5 No No No No No No 

















Table 6 (ctd). 
 
Municipality Clear trail of 
supporting 
documentation 

































Mpum 1 No No Yes No No No 
Mpum 2 No No No No No No 
Mpum 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Mpum 4 No No Yes No No No 
NC 1 No Yes Yes No No No 
NC 2 No -No Yes No No No 
NC 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
NC 4 No No Yes No No Yes 
NW 1 No No No No No No 
NW 2 No No No No No No 
NW 3 No No No No No No 
NW 4 No No No No No No 
WC 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
WC 2 No No No No No No 
WC 3 No No No No No No 
WC 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
WC 5 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WC 6 - No No Yes Yes No Yes 
WC 7 Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
 
 
 
 
